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ABSTRACT
Hackers; a case-studv of the social shaping of computing
The study is an examination of hacking, placing the act in the
context of theories of technological change. The account of hacking is
used to substantiate those theories that emphasise the societal
shaping of technology over the notion of technological determinism.
The evolution of hacking is traced, showing how it reflects changing
trends in the nature of information: the most vivid of these is the
conceptualisation of information known as 'cyberspace'. Instead of
simply cataloguing the impact of technical changes within computing,
and the effects they have had upon information, the study shows
how technical change takes place in a process of negotiation and
conflict between groups.
The two main groups analysed are those of the Computer
Underground (CU) and the Computer Security Industry (CSI). The
experiences and views of both groups are recounted in what
constitute internalist and externalist accounts of hacking and its
significance. The internalist account is the evidence provided by
hackers themselves. It addresses such issues as what motivates the
act of hacking; whether there is an identifiable hacking culture; and
why it is almost an exclusively male activity. The externalist account
contains the perceptions of hacking held by those outside the
activity.
The state of computing's security measures and its
vulnerability to hacking is described, and evidence is provided of the
extent to which hacking gives rise to technical knowledge that could
be of potential use in the fixing of security weaknesses. The division
within the CSI between those broadly cooperative with hackers and
those largely hostile to them is examined, and the reasons why
hacking knowledge is not generally utilised are explored. Hackers
are prevented from gaining legitimacy within computing in a process
referred to as 'closure'. Examples include hackers being stigmatised
through the use of analogies that compare their computing activities
to conventional crimes such as burglary and tresspass.
Stigmatisation is carried out by the CSI who use it in a process of
professional boundary formation to distinguish themselves from
hackers. It is also used by other authority figures such as Members
of Parliament whose involvement in the process of closure takes the
form of the anti-hacking legislation they have passed, an analysis of
which concludes this study.
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1.1 INTRODUCTION
This thesis is an analysis of the recent phenomenon of
computer hacking; that is, the unauthorised access to and subsequent
use of other people's computer systems. Hackers have evolved from
a position of being instrumental in the development of the first
computer programs, to their present status as a marginalised
underground group. The analysis is used as a rebuttal of
technological determinism by showing how computing affects society,
as a result of the negotiations and conflicts of its interested groups,
rather than due to any inherent logic of the technology itself.
Technological determinism encompasses the widespread
perceptions which see technological development as being on an
inevitable and autonomous trajectory. Such perceptions view
technology as a 'black box'; the effects of technology are felt, but the
means by which such effects are achieved are too complex to fathom
or control. It is a notion that particularly applies to computers.
Their literally box-like structure contains a machine that exhibits
great computational power by virtue of its 'mysterious' manipulation
of binary 1/0 inputs in the form of alternating electrical impulses.
The study is part of a tradition of technology studies known as
the 'Social Shaping of Technology'. It explores the way in which
technological development has a large socially-determined element,
rather than being exclusively the result of autonomous technical
processes. Bijker and Pinch describe this commonly-shared aim of
social theories of technological change as, "The development of an
empirically sensitive theoretical understanding of the processes by
which sociotechnologies are shaped and stabilized". (Bijker and Pinch
1992: 13) It will be argued that hacking represents an illustration of
the way in which technology is both "socially shaped" and
"stabilised", phrases used by social theorists to denote the manner in
which various groups within society contribute, by their negotiations
and conflicts, to the eventual shape a technology takes, and which
may then prove resistant to further socially-induced changes. These
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theories are at pains to emphasise that technology is not a 'black-box'
of effects produced by unknown causes; rather, the impact of a
technology is but a reflection of a whole series of political and
economic choices made by groups closely related to the development
of the technology. Hackers constitute one such group in the historical
development of computing: they illustrate a group of actors whose
values oppose those of the dominant social order and who seek to
shape computing to their own purposes.
1.1.1 The definition of hacking
In order to give a fuller idea of the various shades of meaning
that lie behind the phrase hacking, various definitions of hacking
activities are expanded upon in Appendix 2. There is no definitive
description of what hackers and hacking are; the fact that it has
disputed meanings and connotations for different groups is
addressed as part of the study's analysis of group boundary
formation within computing. Throughout this study the term will be
used largely to refer to the unauthorised access to a computer
system, or the information it contains. The term has gone through
several changes from its original dictionary definition: of "cut or chop
roughly; mangle: cut (one's way) through thick foliage etc.: manage,
cope with": to its present definition of: "gain unauthorised access (to
data in a computer)" [The Concise Oxford Dictionary 8th edition]. It
has also evolved from the MIT days of the 1950's onwards when it
was first used in the context of computing. The phrase was originally
used to denote the highly skilled but largely playful activity of
academic computer programmers searching for the most elegant and
concise programming solution to any given problem (Levy 1984). It
has since been increasingly associated with its present-day
connotation of illicit computer intrusion.
The study traces the reason for this evolution in the meaning of
the term and shows it to be part of a process by which hackers have
been marginalised within computing; a process which is described as
'closure'. The reason why the phrase hacking came to be used in the
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first place is possibly a reflection of the development of
programming. The various connotations of the phrase have
resonance with the problems encountered with programming the
early computers, described by Levy (1984) as 'great hulking brutes'.
These valve-based machines were notoriously unreliable, a factor
which, combined with the relative immaturity of programming
methods, led to solutions to any particular computing problem being
rather haphazardly constructed, thus meeting the phrase's first
connotation of something being fashioned roughly: being 'hacked
together'. The baroque complexity and unmanageability of the early
systems can also be associated with the connotations of 'managing or
coping with' and 'cutting through thick foliage'.
In addition to 'hacker' there is also the more specific term
'cracker' which is more consistently and pejoratively used to describe
someone who breaks into systems, often causing deliberate damage.
This study will use the general word 'hacker' as an umbrella term for
the various shades of meaning associated with the phrase. One of the
purposes of the study itself is to highlight the amorphous nature of
the term, and by extension, the activity.
1.1.2 Key Concepts
i) Constituencies
This concept is defined as:
ensembles of institutions interacting with each other through
and within the development of specific technologies ...
Sociotechnical constituencies actually materialize technological
processes in such a way that the fruits of these processes ... are
moments of crystallizations of the workings of the constituency.
Seen in this manner, the creation, production and diffusion of a
given technology becomes a single process of interpenetration
of technical, socioeconomic, political and cultural factors
(Molina 1989a: 4).
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Despite the fact that there may be several sociotechnical
constituencies in the overall constituency of a particular technology,
certain groups obtain a dominant status. In his study Molina defines
the dominant social constituency as "the social forces which have in
practice exercised the dominant control of the basic human, financial,
material, time and space resources necessary for all technological
processes, and which, for the same reason, have most directly
influenced and shaped the development of microtechnology" (Molina
1989 a: 4).
In order to conceptualise the impact of social groups upon this
study on the specific technology of computing, a framework is used
that describes the overall constituency of computing as containing
smaller 'sociotechnical constituencies'. This thesis investigates the
main sociotechnical constituencies relevant to hacking - the
Computer Underground (CU), the Computer Security Industry (CSI),
and the academia-based computer users who are often found to
straddle the two other groups. The study highlights the role of the
non-dominant group of hackers within computing and illustrates
from its investigation of their activity how local groups shape one
particular aspect of a technology: in this case, computer security.
ii) ClQShre
Within the context of the heterogeneous influences upon a
technology's development, dominant interests tend to emerge.
Groups within a technological constituency adopt strategies aimed at
limiting the influence of competing groups. Bijker and Law state
that: "these are designed in all cases to box in the opposition - to stop
it acting otherwise, going elsewhere, or successfully stabilizing its
own alternative version of technological and social relations." (1992:
9) This stabilization of a particular technology puts an end to the
various interpretations that can be placed upon it and the practices
that surround it. The potential for such interpretation seems
greatest in the earliest days of the technology's development. The
fact that opportunities exist for alternative views of technological use
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is referred to as 'interpretative flexibility'; the gradual whittling
away of such opportunities is termed closure. Bijker and Law
describe how:
Technologies and technological practices are built in a process
of social construction and negotiation, a process often seen as
driven by the social interests of the participants. Closure is
then defined as, "the process by which conflicting groups reach
(or impose) a specific outcome and so conclude the dispute"
(1992: 13).
The question arises as to when, if at all, the ability of social
groups to shape a technology is largely eliminated because the
technology has assumed innate characteristics: that is, it is said to
have a 'trajectory'. To some extent the history of hacking- will be
shown to verify such a scenario. The earliest hackers followed the
'hands-on imperative' and were actively involved in the
programming and hardware modifications of the very first
computers. The most recent generation! of hackers, have been
stigmatised to the extent that they are now the subject of criminal
legislation, and thus have a very limited role in the formal
development of computing. Thus computing has arguably been
subjected to some degree of 'stabilisation' or 'closure', the alternative
conceptions hackers might have of computing having been largely
marginalised. The study portrays the processes by which this
marginalisation and stabilisation occur. This said, the recent court
case involving the young hacker Paul Bedworth^ has produced doubt
as to whether computing has experienced unequivocal closure. The
seeming inconsistency of some juries in such cases of computer
misuse seem to suggest that computing is involved in an on-going
and unresolved process of change and negotiation. The thesis as a
1 A full account of the different generations of hackers is contained in Appendix 2.
2 On March 17th 1993 he was charged under the 1990 Computer Misuse Act and acquitted, yet in
the same case, two other hackers were convicted on 21st May 1993, for what the judge described
as 'intellectual joyriding'.
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whole, therefore, seeks to question whether any alleged process of
closure can successfully be exerted against hackers.
1.2 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HACKING
A study of hackers has particular theoretical significance for
social shaping theories because they are an example of a non-
dominant group influencing a very powerful area of technology: a
phenomenon largely ignored by such theories. Molina, for example,
makes the assumption that "the influence of non-dominant social
forces is taken as subsumed in the practical decisions and actions of
the dominant social interests" (Molina 1989: 3). In contrast, this
study describes how the actions of the the dominant social groups
within computing, rather than subsuming the CU, are often in fact
formed as responses to it. A dramatic example of this is the way in
which the very nature and identity of the CSI results from the
differentiations it actively seeks to make between itself and the CU: a
deliberately engineered scenario of 'them and us'.
More generally, hacking is an inherently interesting area to
research. Computers are arguably modernity's most important
technological artefact as society is increasingly being structured
around various networks of interrelated technological systems that
are ultimately linked and coordinated by means of computers. The
growing interdependence of systems has increased the profile of
hackers by raising their potential to cause harm or inconvenience.
The original clumsy valve-based machines have been replaced
with hugely more efficient silicon chip-based models, and this has
produced an equally substantive evolution in the nature of
information. It is now much easier to produce and communicate
information and its increasing importance is continually emphasised
by such commonly used terms as "Information Technology" (IT) and
"The Information Revolution". The rapid proliferation of computer-
generated information has also heightened the public profile of
hackers. The study was begun in 1989 just when hacking was
starting to be a news topic of interest to the general public. Despite
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the fact that the origins of hacking have been traced to the MIT
computer labs of the late 1950's, general public ignorance of hacking
has prevailed, until recently. In 1990 the Computer Misuse Act was
passed in Parliament making computer hacking a criminal offence,
and hacking was topical enough to be included in the plot of the
Australian Soap-Opera Neighbours and such feature films as War
Games. Sneakers, and most recently in Jurassic Park the antics of an
'evil hacker' (who fulfills the stereotypical hacker image down to his
dependence upon junk-food and his immature personality)
contribute to the breakdown of the dinosaur-park's security
measures.
A third element of hacking that has made it increasingly
interesting to the public is the combination of its particular
technological content with the human element of its ingenuity and
daring^. The close relationship of cunning and technological guile is
a perennial area of interest for human beings:
In ancient Greece, children learned the value of cunning from
the exploits of Odysseus, the man 'of many devices'. American
Indian children learned cleverness from the mythic figure of
Coyote the Trickster. All folklore features these masters of
guile, who teach that a good trick may outdo the strongest
sinews in the risky adventures of life. In the modern West, the
survival power of the mind has come to be concentrated in the
'many devices' of our technology, and now most importantly in
a smart machine which is the culmination of that technology
(Roszak 1986: 66).
It is common for the public to view computers with the often
closely related emotions of fear and awe. Computers are feared
because they contain large elements of the unknown 'big black box'
that characterises the technology prevalent in a society where few
3In an article from the New York Times (20th April '91) Erdwin Pfuhl, a professor of criminal
law at Arizona State University, describes as the 'Rust-effect' the tendency of the public to be
interested in hacking. Rust is the name of the West German 'sports flyer' who broke through
Soviet Air defences and performed a 'fly-by' of the Kremlin.
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people have technical knowledge. This ignorance of computing may
also quickly translate into awe at the results computers can produce.
Hackers are thus of immediate interest because they are
simultaneously adept at utilising computing facilities and at
subverting the security and purposes of the technology they use.
They exhibit both knowledge and daring with respect to the
computers that people often fear to the point of irrationality^. The
fact that large computer systems also tend to be owned by large
organisations lends to hackers an added quality of providing
vicarious revenge to the 'average people in the street' over the
faceless bureaucracies that are normally perceived as oppressing
them.
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
(i) Hackers and technological determinism.
The phenomenon of hacking raises questions as to the nature of
the process by which certain social groups gain control over
technology. Social shaping theories debunk the more simplistic
aspects of technologically deterministic theories by giving evidence
of groups that shape technology to their own requirements. A
weakness of such theories, however, is that they tend to concentrate
only upon those groups influencing technology that are part of a
dominant social interest group. Hackers threaten such notions by
influencing computing as a non-establishment sub-culture, hence
their soubriquet 'the computer underground'.
(ii) Hackers' counter-culture status
The thesis describes the nature of the beliefs and motivations
that set hackers apart from other groups within computing. From
4 Beqaui (1987) gives such examples as the Californian Highway Patrolwayman who feeling
threatened and frustrated by his computer, shot it. There are also anecdotes of people
believing that they could catch a computer virus fom the keyboard of their computers.
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this description arises the question of whether hackers can be
identified as a particularly cohesive group. The research addresses
how the CU contains disparate factions and the extent to which it is
unified as a community in its opposition to various ideological
positions of the dominant groups within computing. Added
complexity arises from the fact that there are 'internal' and 'external'
perceptions of what it is to be a hacker. The CSI have different
perceptions of what constitutes a hacker than the hackers
themselves. For example, the latter distance themselves from the
propagators of viruses, whilst the CSI tend to group the two together.
The research aims to answer the question of how these different
perceptions are reflected in the values and ethics people hold within
computing and, in turn, how these ethics influence their computing
activities.
(iii) Boundary formation
In the early MIT days of computing hackers existed within the
main body of computer users. Computing's development, however,
has led to the emergence of separate groupings within computing
and, in particular, in the polarisation between the CU and the CSI.
The research questions the solidity of these boundaries between
groups. Both the literature and fieldwork illustrate how the
'Balkanisation' of computing into these groups has proceeded
problematically.
Hackers and their 'adversaries' in computer security are both
part of a new environment in which knowledge about security
weaknesses is at a premium. Despite the need for improved system
security, the state of computing is such that there is no official
Academy of Hacking or Computer Security Protection Agency from
which standardised and recognisable qualifications can be obtained.
Evidence is examined of the way in which the technical knowledge
hackers possess is being ignored for non-technical reasons. Questions
are asked as to why this is so, and what the significance is of the
decreasing tendency for hackers to move into jobs relating to the
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provision of security. The study shows that although the
constituency of computing is amorphous and therefore often missing
an easily identifiable structure, group identity is crystallizing as the
mobility between groups slows down.
(iv) gtigmatisatiQn
Leading on from questions concerning the stability of the
boundaries between groups is an associated issue of whether there is
still an active role for hackers to play within computing, or whether
they have been largely excluded from any active part in its future
development. Hackers have been marginalised and stigmatised as
part of the boundary formation process. They have been portrayed
on the one hand, as 'technological wizards' and as 'surfers on a
technological wave'5 whilst, on the other hand, media portrayals of
hackers emphasise their purported malice and 'dark' motives. The
study traces this process of stigmatisation by describing the 'them
and us' moral positions increasingly articulated by the nascent CSI;
the way in which physical analogies are used to emphasise these
positions; and the process's most obvious manifestation - the
legislation that has made hacking a criminal offence.
(v) Policy issues
The thesis concludes by asking what the implications of such
legislation will be for both the future of hacking, and computing as a
whole. With respect to the 1990 Computer Misuse Act, the study
asks which policies are the most liable to reduce hacking and
whether criminalising it is likely to solve the problem or risk pushing
it further towards the conventional criminal underground.
1.4 SCOPE OF THE STUDY
5Jacques Vallee (1984)
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The study aims at filling gaps that exists in academic coverage
of the issue of hacking. Most of the coverage is media-based with
journalists being the main authors of the existing literature. This
study adopts a more theoretical and less biographical approach to
hackers and their activity. The most recent entrants identified in the
study have born the brunt of the anti-hacking legislation passed
during the course of the research which made it difficult to gain
access to currently active hackers. This problem was offset by
concentrating upon older, more established, sometimes retired
hackers, and by broadening the scope of the study to protray
external perceptions of hacking as voiced by the other main groups
within computing. The youngest hackers are therefore not part of
the first-hand focus of the study. Brief discussion of their
significance stems from the evidence of the older hackers and is
largely left for future research.
A deliberate ommission is the study's concentration upon the
more narrowly-defined activity of hacking in contrast to the broader
definition of computer crime which includes virus-writing and fraud.
The rationale for avoiding these activities is that they are more
obviously traditional crimes that happen to be using a computer as a
means to their illegal end, rather than an end in itself. They are
manifestations of the traditional crimes of vandalism and deceit for
personal gain, albeit in a new technological guise. They do not pose
theoretical questions of the same level of interest as non-malicious
hacking.
1.5 OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS
To summarise the account of computing presented in this
study: Chapters 1-4 introduce and explain the nature of hacking, and
place it within a wider context of technological change as a whole.
This first section of the thesis introduces the evolution of information
and how this has resulted in new ethical questions being raised
regarding the ownership of and access to information. The second
section of the thesis, Chapters 5-7 portrays the competing ethical
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outlooks of the Computer Underground (CU) and the Computer
Security Industry (CSI) which give rise to the process of attempted
stabilisation or closure: a main theme of the thesis.
Chapter 2 - Methodolodgv
This chapter describes the research methodology employed in
this study and how it was adapted to include electronic mail
correspondence and interviewing techniques. The various
advantages and disadvantages of electronic mail as a methodological
tool are discussed.
Chapter 3 - Hackers: the evolution of information and technological
change
Chapter 3 examines the extent to which hackers illustrate
various themes from social theories of technological change. It starts
by examining the notion of technological determinism and proceeds
to analyse how hackers simultaneously embody its concerns, and yet
also provide a prime example of a societal group involved in a
process of actively changing the technology of computing, through its
interactions with other groups and its influence upon the artefacts
themselves.
Theories of technical change that emphasise this social shaping
element are examined, focusing upon the locus of power within such
a process. The potential power hackers may have to influence
computing is questioned in terms of its viability as a culture
embodying alternative ideals to the dominant social group's, and the
likelihood of such ideals being translated into a coherent programme
of political change.
The programme of change intimated in the first part of Chapter
3 rests upon hackers' alternative interpretations of the political and
economic qualities of information. This chapter explores these
interpretations showing how hackers oppose increasing market
pressures to commodify information. The role of hackers in
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questioning conventional notions of information is further examined
in a section dealing with the informational concept of 'cyberspace'.
Descriptions are given of the qualitatively new situations that arise
because of information's increasing tendency to assume immaterial
forms. This description of the most recent and dramatic stage in the
evolution of information lays the basis for the study's subsequent
coverage of the ethical debate between the CSI and the CU.
Chapter 4 - Hacking: culture and motivation
The purpose of Chapter 4 is to describe how the literature
portrays what it is to hack, and the nature of the hacking community,
consolidating and extending this portrayal with material from the
fieldwork that compensates for lacunae in the literature's coverage.
The resultant survey of the main features of hacking and its
environment forms the basis of the empirical examination in
subsequent chapters of hackers' social role in the technical
development of computing.
The chapter takes the form of a presentation of what hackers
percieve the Computer Underground (CU) to be. It is based on
descriptions by hackers of their activity, both from the study's
empirical interviews and from literature in the field. The basic
elements of 'the hack' and 'the hacker ethic' are portrayed as an
introduction to more specific aspects of the culture of hacking.
Hacking culture is found to be characterised by its heavy reliance
upon technological artefacts; by interactions based on anonymity and
secrecy; by amorphous and fluid relations with the rest of computing;
and by the fact that it is an overwhelmingly male culture.
The second part of the chapter focuses upon the specific
reasons why hackers feel the need to hack. A full rationale is first
given for largely excluding certain activities such as virus-writing
from the analysis. Thereafter, extant academic analyses of hacking
are introduced but criticised for their lack of breadth. A more
detailed and comprehensive examination of the motivations for
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hacking follows that is based upon hackers own descriptions of why
they hack.
Chapter 5 - State of the Industry and the Computer Security
Industry (CSP
This chapter concludes the portrayal of the main groups within
computing, the wider theoretical significance of which will then be
analysed in the remaining chapters. It describes the two major
branches of the CSI: the 'hawks' and the 'doves', so named for their
differing approaches to the question of potential cooperation with
hackers. The two views are compared and contrasted, introducing
the reasons for and against making use of the technical knowledge
hackers have of systems as a means of improving their security.
The relative ease with which hackers obtain access to other
people's systems is described, which illustrates that there are severe
and widespread security faults. The chapter also looks in detail at
the nature and scope of security weaknesses within computing. The
statistics produced by the National Audit Commission and the
National Computing Centre's reports on computer crime, along with
the data gathered from the study's quantitative questionnaire are
examined. The extent of these faults is explained in terms of poor
levels of knowledge and education about security issues.
That hackers can make use of security faults to gain
unauthorised access implies that they have information that is useful
to those wishing to improve the security of systems. This potential is
explored with an analysis of the specific arguments that contend
hacking has a potentially useful technical purpose. The question
then arises as to why there seems to be little cooperation between
hackers with knowledge of security gaps, and those wishing to
improve the security of systems. This is described in the subsequent
chapters as being due to a process of closure whereby hackers are
deliberately excluded from having an influence in the development
of computing.
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Chapter 6 - Ethics and Stigmatisation: "them and us"
The chapter introduces the whole issue of ethics within
computing vis- a -vis hacking activities. It describes the vestigial
and often blurred nature of such ethics which is due to the emerging
status of the CSI and the relatively new phenomenon of hacking (at
least in a widespread form). Specific examples from discussions
within the CSI of such ethical ambiguity are given along with some of
the technical reasons for the ambiguity.
The maintenance of a gap between the CSI and hackers can be
seen as part of a group formation process whereby the emerging CSI
is creating an identity defined by its opposition to the CU. The
chapter looks at various examples of this boundary defining process
with reference to the activities of computer professionals and
interest groups, both from literature sources and fieldwork
interviews.
Analysis of the ethical questions surrounding hacking is
extended in this chapter by a discussion of the role of analogies in
the debate between the CSI and the CU. Analogies are shown to be
utilised predominantly by the CSI as part of a boundary formation
exercise that distances itself from the CU, whilst at the same time,
serving the purpose of establishing and reinforcing its own identity.
Attention is drawn to the inherent weaknesses associated with the
use of physical analogies, giving the specific illustration of the
comparison made between hackers and the cowboys of the Wild
West.
Chapter 7 - Criminality
Chapter 6 illustrates some of the pressures that have led to a
legislative response to hacking. This chapter furthers that analysis
by specifically addressing the implications and consequences of the
debate that accompanied the parliamentary passage of the Computer
Misuse Act. The chapter refers to the "disembodied" nature of
computer crime; the various specific purposes of the legislation; and
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the likelihood of the legislation achieving its stated objectives. The
possibility that hacking legislation may, in some respects, be merely
a symbolic response is also considered. Illegal computer activity is
described (in so far as the fieldwork could produce evidence of
criminality in the face of obvious disclosure problems). Finally, the
practical consequences of exposing hackers to the prison system are
briefly explored.
Chapter 8 - C<?n<?lqgiQn
The final chapter summarises the contribution of this work to
existing literature about hacking and comments upon its novel
methodological utilisation of e-mail techniques. The process of
stigmatisation described throughout the body of the study is
assessed in relation to its implications for policies aimed at reducing
the incidence of hacking. The chapter also pays particular attention
to the study's comparison of the account of hacking given by hackers
themselves (the internalist account), and the different interpretation
of the activity made by outsiders (the externalist account).
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Chapter 2 - Methodology
2.1 INTRODUCTION
2.2 CHOICE OF RESEARCHMETHODS AND INSTRUMENTS








Various methodological problems arose in this study's analysis
of the phenomenon of hacking. The most obvious of these relates to
the fact that, by its very nature, computer-based communities are
not such an easily identifiable social group as their 'real-world'
counterparts. The disadvantage posed by this lack of physicality is
that the researcher does not have a group of people with
institutionalised degrees of seniority and knowledgeability with
whom they can converse.
At an early stage of the thesis it was realised that conventional
assessments of expertise were not appropriate for the various
subject areas of the resarch. In keeping with the frontier and
hobby-like aspects of computer security, knowledgeable people were
found widely dispersed within the computing community. As a
result, empirical data sources for the research came from a wide
range of electronic-mail (e-mail) interviews with contributors to
various electronic-mail publications^. These were supplemented by
more traditional face-to-face interviews with figures from the main
computing groups and additional interested parties such as
spokespersons for the Department of Trade and Industry and the
police. t
The various methodological tools listed below were used in
order to overcome the above problems, and to fulfill the overall aim
of this study: to describe the experiences and attitudes of the wider
computing community that exists, between and including, the two
poles of professional computer security experts and dedicated
system crackers. We shall see shortly how boundaries between the
various groups within computing appeared to be somewhat
amorphous. For example, some individuals had originally become
involved in computing through hacking, and are now concerned with
6 Electronic mail publications are magazine digests that are published in electronic form and
then either archived and accessed by those wishing to read them, or alternatively, sent out on
an automatic mailing list to those who subscribe (generally at no cost).
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the preventative side of computer security, either in their work as
security consultants, or, alternatively, as computing officers in charge
of the maintenance and development of academic systems. Thus the
rationale behind using the methodological tools described in this
chapter was to achieve a broad cross-section of the opinions and
experiences of the net community from which a more representative
and realistic account of hacking and its implications could be derived
than would be possible with a more compartmentalised approach.
Meyer (1989) in his study of hacking culture, cites three basic
approaches that could be utilised in investigating hackers as a
"deviant group". These are:
1. social psychological: looking at the motivations and personal
characteristics of hackers.
2. socio-structural: - addressing the implications of hackers for
society.
3. social organisation of deviant groups: analysing the way in which
hackers structure their relations amongst themselves.
In contrast to Meyer's preference for the third of these approaches,
this study prefers to combine elements of both 1 and 2, analysing
them more fully than has hitherto been attempted. This is done by
building upon the 'internalist' description of hacking given by
hackers themselves, and supplementing it with the 'externalist'
account from their opponents. The study thus includes the opinions
and experiences of diverse figures in the computing community,
describing the interactions of hackers with other groups within
computing: an external as well as an internal account.
2.2 Choice of Research Methods and Instruments
(i) Interviews
A series of semi-structured interviews were conducted: they
were either traditional face-to-face interviews, or based upon e-mail
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correspondence over a prolonged period of time. During the
research, e-mail-based interviews assumed an increasingly
significant role in the gathering of empirical data. Face-to-face
interviews were largely used as a means of initial research design,
and in order to engage with key figures identified as being poorly
represented by the e-mail method.
Variations on the semi-structured e-mail interviews included
two interviews with figures from the USA: Prof Spafford from
Purdue Technical University sent me an audio tape of his thoughts to
specific questions I had e-mailed to him, in order to supplement our
correspondence. Another, particularly inventive, interview was
conducted with an American hacker, who, because of the conditions
of probation that he was under, was not allowed access to computers
and hence was unable to take part in an e-mail dialogue. The
interview took place by a phreaked phone^ call from the hacker and
was recorded directly from the phone at my end of the call.
(ii) Method Qf contact
The UK based face-to-face interviews were obtained in the
orthodox manner of writing to those perceived to be key figures
within computer security. These perceptions were influenced by a
combination of their professional occupation and reputation, along
with their reputation amongst the computing circles actively using e-
mail, and contributing to electronic magazines. The Dutch-based
face-to-face interviews initially stemmed from two e-mail contacts
from which further contacts 'snowballed'. The empirical data
gathered in the Netherlands proved particularly useful. At the time
of the research starting, British hackers seemed to have largely
disappeared from public (electronic view) as a result of the passing
of the Computer Misuse Act in 1990; in contrast, Dutch hackers at
this time, enjoyed general freedom from hacking-related
prosecutions. In addition, contact with Dutch hackers proved useful
7 A small prototype touch-tone dialler was used which was capable of obtaining unbilled long¬
distance phone connections.
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as means of gaining further access to their hacker associates in
several countries because it provided me with a firsthand
opportunity to prove my non-establishment credentials (in so far as
my interest in their activities was purely academic) and thus gain
their trust and help in meeting more hackers. Sole reliance upon e-
mail interviewing would have made breaking the initial barriers of
suspicion much more difficult.
An imaginative approach had to be used for making contact
with hackers reluctant to risk possible incrimination under the
Computer Misuse Act which was passed halfway through this piece
of research (1990). In addition, it became apparent at an early stage
of the research that a disproportionate amount of time could be
spent on the ultimately impractical aim of seeking subjects fully
representative of an indeterminate and mercurial culture. One
example of the generally ad hoc and unorganised nature of the
computer underground was my request to one of my e-mail
correspondents, John Draper, to pass my e-mail address to hackers
present at an annual underground 'conference'. His response
illustrates the anarchic structure of underground groups and the
subsequent difficulties encountered in attempting to gather
information even in environments full of hackers:
I tried to contact them, but the HoHoCon^ situation was such
that it was almost impossible to find any one individual, as
there was no common place where people can meet. All
meetings were done in hotel rooms, and there was no list of
rooms, and the only way to do that was to stay outside and
grab people going from room to room (Draper: e-mail
interview).
Weariness of press contact and language problems also seemed
to exclude the relatively active German hacking scene which includes
such organisations as The Chaos Computer Club of Hamburg, whom I
made several unsuccessful attempts to contact.
8 This was the name of the conference.
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The contact that was made with e-mail correspondents resulted
from spending relatively large amounts of time reading various
electronic magazines and newsgroups, and forwarding a list of e-mail
questions relating to various hacking issues which was posted widely
around the internet. From a large number of responses (90-100) to
this questionnaire, the main areas of interest common to both myself
and the respondents became clear. It also became clear, from the
length and amount of detail given in the responses, who was most
likely to be informative to the research. These respondents were
then targeted for a more concise list of questions based closely upon
their original response, and in this manner an electronic dialogue was
entered upon with various individuals which, in some cases, lasted
several months.
(iii) Sampling and Representativeness
The respondents were self-selecting to the extent that they all
had access to the internet and regularly read and/or contributed to
the newsgroups. This led to an original bias in the list of responses
to people from academia and US citizens. The latter bias was
inevitable due to the predominance of US users on the internet and
the lack of realistic alternative means of communication, but it was
off-set somewhat, by the european-based nature of the fieldwork.
The academic bias was countered by using an e-mail directory from
the commercial sector, and dispersing the questionnaire amongst as
many commercial sites as possible.
The willingness of hackers to chat with me had the implied
disadvantage that they were unlikely to be actively involved in
clandestine hacking activity. The general consensus of opinion from
those that would talk was that active hackers tended to lie low due
to the fear of prosecution stemming from the CU's recent experience
of various law-enforcement 'stings' or undercover operations. Those
that were contacted consisted of mostly 'retired' hackers, who,
through a lack of current activity, felt more at ease discussing
hacking issues. Also, some of the garruloussness of hackers
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interviewed seemed to be due to the fact they had already been
investigated by the Secret Service or experienced prison^, and
therefore were more aware of what they could safely confide to me,
these interviewees lacked the general feeling of concern and
suspicion that seemed to inhibit others in the net community.
The extent to which my e-mail respondents were
representative of the computing community as a whole is dependent
on the fact that they use e-mail in the first place and, furthermore,
that they tend to be the most regular and voluminous of contributors
to the various electronic magazines that formed the basis of my
sampling area. The first of these potential objections is insubstantial
given the fact that an almost intrinsic prerequisite to membership of
the international computing community is a tendency to use e-mail.
The second limitation was justified on the basis that those willing to
spend large amounts of time making such contributions would also
be more likely to engage in time-consuming correspondence with
me.
2.3 ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF E-MAIL AS A
METHODOLOGICAL TOOL
2.3.1 Advantages
(i) Costs and space
The low-cost and university-funded nature of much e-mail
correspondence resulted in it becoming an extremely useful
information-gathering instrument, in a subject area where the
geographical spread of subjects would have made more traditional
forms of interviewing prohibitively expensive.
(ii) Speed and interactive nature
9 As in the cases of Eric Coggans (Legion of Doom) and John Draper (Captain Crunch),
respectively.
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Once an interesting avenue of research had been identified
from an electronic response, greater expansion or clarification could
be more easily and effectively sought than would have been possible
compared with a normal face-to-face interview, which tends to be of
the 'once and for all' form of information extraction. The possibility
of practically interactive clarifications of key research issues soon
became apparent, largely as the serendipitous result of the study's
progress. This said, the methodological implications of e-mail are
ambivalent to the extent that it allows the respondent more of a
chance to reflect upon issues, and so to refine their responses. This
may increase the accuracy of replies, but it may also reduce some of
their spontaneity.
(iii) Increased response rate.
A pleasant surprise from the fieldwork came from the amount
of 'high profile' actors in the field of computer security who were
prepared to spend considerable amounts of time corresponding by e-
mail. Apart from the obvious geographical problems I would have
encountered attempting to interview the main actors in the area of
computer security, it is debatable whether I would have been
accommodated so generously into the schedules by some of the main
figures in this study. An aspect of e-mail which may facilitate this
apparently greater willingness to communicate than by face-to-face
or phone methods, is the fact that e-mail, although almost
instantaneous when required, can otherwise be answered when the
recipient chooses. This creates the impression that e-mail
correspondence is less burdensome, even though, judging by the
detail of their replies, for some of my respondents, their replies were
obviously very time-consuming. The ease with which e-mail is
transmitted can lead to bothersome back-logs just as with the paper
variety of message. Arguably, however, e-mail backlogs are not as
off-putting as a heaped 'in-tray', and furthermore, the 'reply'
function of e-mail programs reduces the time needed to deal with an
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e-mail enquiry by automatically sending any typed response to the
destination of the original message.
2.3.2 Disadvantages
(i) Absence of regulating feedback
Due to the 'disembodied' nature of e-mail communication, no
visual or aural cues can be used with which to intimate the limits
required for the response to a particular question. On occasion this
reduced the efficacy of correspondence, as the particular nuances
and thrust of a question may be overlooked, and a second corrective
number of questions may need to be sent.
(ii) Validity
Again due to the 'disembodied' nature of e-mail it can be
difficult to verify the veracity of the respondent's identity, and the
content of their responses. The study's Dutch fieldwork, however,
involved face-to-face interviews with previous e-mail
correspondents and they seemed to validate e-mail as a legitimate
method of interviewing.
2.4 Specific E-mailine techniques
In addition to the above methodological aspects, specific ad hoc
techniques were used as some of the idiosyncracies of e-mail
interviewing became more apparent. Examples of this include:
(i) Mailing list targeting.
This technique refers to the use of an electronic mail address
register for approximately 400 British commercial sites from which
just under 40 responses were gathered in a single mail shot. The 10
per cent return rate was achieved with a 'cold' targeting technique
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(the questionnaire was sent out to a previously unknown list of
contacts with an attached explanatory and confirmatory note from
my supervisor). This technique made use of the automatic mail-
sending ability of e-mail, whereby a standardised message could be
simultaneously sent out to all commerical sites on the list.
(ii) Personalised Correspondence
Whilst the previous technique proved useful for the
standardised distribution of a small quantifiable questionnaire, a
deliberate decision was made to avoid using similar techniques with
more qualitative questionnaires although, at least in the first stages
of the distribution process, automated and standardised methods
could have been used. The rationale for this was the belief that the
response rate of more discussion-based questions would diminish
if e-mail messages were received which seemed to be of a standard,
depersonalised format. Thus, although the first batch of broadly
focused qualitative questions were sent out to individual
respondents from a stored file, a personalised, explanatory and
introductory message was sent with each list of questions. Whilst
there is no conclusive way of establishing whether such an approach
did in fact increase the response rate, it did serve to establish an
early rapport with some respondents, evidence of which being the
friendly, light-hearted tone of many messages. This emphasises the
electronic medium's apparent predisposition to produce solicitiously
helpful and readily communicative correspondents. It is also likely
that such a rapport subsequently facilitated my efforts of
'snowballing' existing respondents so that they gave me some access
to their network of colleagues or 'net-friends'. The best example of
this was the extended fieldwork I conducted in the Netherlands from
my initial e-mail contact with one Dutch hacker.
2.5 CONCLUSION
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To summarise: the research design and methodology were
adapted to make the fullest use of the efficiency of e-mail as an
information-gathering tool relevant to all sectors of the computing
security constituency. The novelty and scope of the research were
thus enhanced by e-mail. It allowed access to a hacking culture that
would otherwise have been closed to observation from an outside
source due to both the desire, catered for by e-mail, to remain
anonymous, and also due to the large geographical spread of the
computing community.
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Chapter 3 - Hackers, theories of technological change and
the changing nature of information
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3.7.1 Cyberspace and technological domination
3.7.2 Cyborgs: a rejection of technological determinism
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3.8.1 Opposition to commodification
3.8.2 Hacking as anti-bureaucratic rebellion




The hacker is a figure of ambivalent status in the public's
perception. He*® may symbolise the 'little man' against the big
corporations, or equally, the electronic manifestation of the urban
mugger. Both of these perceptions derive from deterministic
conceptions of technology. People resent the fact that computers are
controlled by faceless bureaucracies: hackers can be seen as the
'man in the street's' vicarious revenge over the 'system'. They also,
however, fear hackers, they feel vulnerable to the threats posed by
the potentially random electronic violence of the sociopathic hacker.
Computing is thus perceived as either inevitably oppressive and
conducive to Orwellian-type control or, in contrast, beyond control to
the extent that it is vulnerable to sabotage and possibly catastrophic
breakdown.
This chapter examines the notion of technological determinism,
applying it to hacking and the 'information revolution'. Social
shaping theories of technological change seek to explain what is
referred to as the 'heterogeneity of factors' that influence and shape
the development of a technology. Social groups seeking to influence
technology in their preferred direction have arrayed against them
the dominant social forces that stand to lose power and/or material
benefit from such interference. These dominant social forces are
variously described as 'the establishment', 'the dominant social
constituency', and Latour's (1986) notion of 'the Prince'. This chapter
analyses within in the context of such theories the role hackers play
in opposing the dominant social constituency's agenda within
computing.
The advent of computing has brought conflicting pressures to
the way in which information is treated in society. Computers add
value to information due to their ability to manipulate it faster than
previously possible, whilst simultaneously weakening the properties
of information that could be subjected to proprietary claims. It is
l^The male predominance of hackers is described fully in Chapter 4.
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upon these claims that the commodity status of information
ultimately rests. Quantitative improvements in the processing of
information have become so fundamental as to threaten changes in
the qualitative nature of information: changes that challenge
information's status as an economic commodity. There is a growing
tendency for the barriers of exclusion upon which information's
commodity status depends to be weakened. The barriers are
becoming less and less material in form as its means of diffusion
become more diverse and productive, and this is reflected in the
behaviour and attitudes of consumers who increasingly fail to
respect informational copyright in areas as diverse as computer
software and pop-music recordings. There is thus an immediate
source of conflict between those seeking to exploit what they
perceive to be the weakening of information's commodity properties
and those seeking, in contrast, to enforce its property rights.
The relationship of hackers to information provides a vivid
example of one side of this conflict: they pay scant respect to
conventional notions of property rights. Evidence of hacking's
oppositional status is presented, in two particular areas: software
copyright and system intrusions. In the former, proprietary claims
are eschewed in preference to those elements of information
conducive to widespread sharing and duplication. In the latter area,
hackers perceive traditional notions of privacy as inapplicable in
many computer-based situations. Their unwillingness to be affected
by considerations of other peoples' privacy is fuelled by the alleged
invasions of privacy either routinely carried out by the
establishment, or allowed to continue as a result of its perceived
negligence in failing to improve the security of the computer systems
under its control. Hackers subsequent interpretation of information
and its place in society is markedly different to that of the dominant
social constituency. It is most evident in the notion of cyberspace
which provides a framework with which to explore their claim to be
an alternative culture. The 'cyberpunk' genre of science fiction
describes hackers mentally travelling through lattice-like structures
of information known as cyberspace or the matrix. The usefulness of
31
this fictional account as a portrayal of hacking culture's anti-
establishment nature will be analysed.
3.2 TECHNOLOGICAL DETERMINISM
The perennial subject of technological determinism is of special
contemporary significance with regards to the widely imputed
phenomenon known as the 'information revolution'. Technological
determinism is in its crudest form, "the idea that technology as the
sole result of an internal dynamic, and then, unmediated by another
influence, moulds society to fit its patterns" (Mackenzie and Wajcman
[eds] 1985: 26). The concept can be split into two major areas,
namely, technological determinism seen as, either, a uniformity of
impact on society, or, as technology having an autonomous realm of
its own. In addition, it can also be viewed as the powerlessness of
humans faced with the speed of technological change; speed such
that social structures are forced to adapt to technology rather than
vice versa. The notion is that there is a 'cultural lag', as society
attempts to catch up with the technological changes it is undergoing.
The fundamental fear associated with the notion of
technological determinism is that technology is out of human control.
It is compounded by doubts as to whether, even when human beings
have nominal control of technology, it is invariably used for
destructive purposes. Lorenz argues that such behaviour can be
traced back to homo sapiens at the earliest stages of its development:
Obviously instinctive behaviour mechanisms failed to cope with
the new circumstances which culture unavoidably produced
even at its very dawn. There is evidence that the first
inventors of pebble tools, the African Australopithecines,
promptly used their new weapons to kill not only game, but
fellow members of their species as well. Peking Man, the
Prometheus who learned to preserve fire, used it to roast his
brothers: beside the first traces of the regular use of fire lie the
mutilated and roasted bones of Sinanthropus Pekinenis [Peking
Man] himself (Koestler 1987:339).
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The relationship between humans and technology is thus seen
as an uneasy one. The stark conclusion is that: "The Promethean
myth has acquired an ugly twist: the giant reaching out to steal
lightning from the Gods is insane" (ibid:331). A frequent theme of
modernity highlighted by theorists is that of human subordination to
technology. A series of thinkers have emphasised a loss of human
control in the face of technology which seems to have created its own
independent path or trajectory of development. Martin Heidegger,
for example, anthropomorphises technology and highlights the
inevitability and finality of a process out of man's control (Winner
1971: 14). Computer technology has dramatically increased these
fears. Hackers are an example of a group, the health of whose
relationship with technology has been questioned and yet who offer
the potential to break away from the sort of technological domination
Heidegger describes.
3.3 HACKERS AND TECHNOLOGICAL DETERMINISM
In the theoretical literature there are ambivalent views as to
what hackers signify in the process of technological change. Hackers
are viewed as either a reassuring element of humaneness in the
otherwise dehumanised realm of technology; alternatively, they are
seen as a startling example of the degeneration of human values
within technology. Using a mythological analogy, Michael Shallis
(1984) argues that the above defence of hackers is untenable. He
points out that these feelings of powerlessness and the concomitant
relationship between human beings and technology can be usefully
described as a modern form of the myth of Narcissus. He argues that
technology produces an insiduously numbing effect, the most
extreme example is that of the hacker: Narcissus being his
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mythological representation. The argument is that groups such as
hackers and their addiction to the technology of computers merely
illustrate the wider phenomenon of man (sic): "becoming a servo-
mechanism of the technology, adapting to the technique and
becoming thereby closed to the world. Such a procedure ... manifests
itself in the notion of the technological imperative: the idea that
technology has a life of its own, what can be done must be done. It is
the argument of a Narcissus treating his own reflection as an end in
itself" (Shallis 1984: 80).
This study looks at how hackers fit into a scenario outlined by
writers such as Marcuse (1964) and Shallis (1984), who see human
beings increasingly finding themselves in a symbiotic relationship
with the artefacts of technology. Shallis argues that people and
technology tend to form a feedback loop or servo-mechanism. He
points to the idea that the demarcation line between human identity
and the artefacts created by it is increasingly blurred. The image of
Narcissus appears again with Latour's conceptualisation of the
appropriate methodology with which to approach the analysis of
technology. In a seminar at Edinburgh University! 1, he finished his
talk by arguing that the general interpretation given to Mary
Shelley's Frankenstein was symptomatic of the general myopia with
which the area of technology is usually approached. Her novel is
most often interpreted as an account of how man tends to lose
control of his creations. Latour argued that it would be more
productive to see the novel in terms of a love story. Frankenstein
failed to love his creation and it is this rather than any inherent
uncontrollability of the invention that was the reason for the story's
tragic denouement. If Latour is correct and the most important
element of technological change is not the characteristics of the
artefacts we produce, but rather the way in which we relate to them,
then the case of hackers is an intriguing area of investigation.
Hackers more than any other group involved with technology
epitomise what it is to love a technology, it remains to be seen
Summer 1990.
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whether this love is the Narcissistic love of the technological
imperative or whether in fact hackers are an example of a group that
are pioneers in the field of producing non-alienating human-
technology relationships.
In deterministic theories of technological change hackers are
seen as an illustration of a trend within society: the denigration of
human reason and its subordination to 'the cult of information.' In
this general context of technological confusion and anomie, hackers
are portrayed as having gained mastery of their chosen technology
yet at the cost of having lost some of their humanity in some sort of
Faustian bargain. In One Dimensional Man Marcuse talks in terms
of modern man only finding his soul in his hi-fi, split-level cooker, or
any other modern consumer durable. Similarly, Weizenbaum
describes hackers as obsessed and addictive, almost manic, their
behaviour leads him to even argue that, "I'm coming close to
believing that the computer is inherently anti-human - an invention
of the devil" (1976: 125).
The study examines whether hackers can shed light upon the
pessimism or realism of such a sentiment at both the level of their
individual relationship with technology and to the extent that their
activities are conducted in a societal context. In contrast to the*
pessimism of technologically deterministic theories, hackers
represent a positive aspect of human interaction with technology.
For example, the increasingly immaterial nature of information has
led to new perceptions of what it is to use or 'relate with' a computer.
Computers have arguably produced qualitatively new human
experiences. Hackers in the sense of compulsive programmers claim
to experience mind-machine 'melds', they conceptualise their
relationship with their computer as involving journeys along the
imagined lattice-like matrices of the computer's memory passages.
In an ironic reversal of Ivan Ilyich's call for humans to make and
search for 'convivial tools' which are embodiments of a 'simple and
wholesome' interaction of people and their natural environment,
hackers have instead found conviviality with one of the most
complex artefacts human beings have produced to date. Jacques
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Vallee (1984) describes such a process with relation to a hacker
called Chip Tango: "He never speaks of 'using a machine' or 'running
a program'. He leaves those expressions to those engineers of the old
school. Instead, he will say that he 'attaches his consciousness' to a
particular process. He butterflies his way across the net, picking up a
link here, an open socket there" (Vallee 1984: 136).
In contrast to the common perception of feeling swamped by
technology, hackers like Chip Tango represent a group whose raison
d'etre is derived from their mastery of technology. Society's reaction
tends to produce a mystery and mythology surrounding hackers.
They are often perceived and portrayed in the media and the
popular mind as computer whiz-kids or even wizards^. This
portrayal perhaps received its highest profile in the film
"WarGames". The film told the story of a young boy who through his
computer prowess and hacking skills stopped the Pentagon's central
computer in charge of nuclear weapons from autonomously initiating
a nuclear exchange with the then Soviet Union. The film's portrayal
of hacking combined fear of autonomous technology with the
mythical powers of the young, technologically competent adolescent.
Age, rather than being viewed as conferring the benefits of
experience, is portrayed as almost being a barrier to the intuitive
grasp of technology that hackers seem to enjoy.
From a societal perspective, the 'cultural-lag' thesis of
technological determinism is perhaps the most pertinent to the
particular case of hacking. Hackers can be seen as a post-modernist
reaction against 'cultural modernity' and its technologically imposed
uniformity, they are: "a conscious resistance to the domination of but
not the fact of technological encroachment into all realms of our
social existence" (Meyer and Thomas June 1989 a:7).
12a full analysis of this is the subject of chapter 6.
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3.4 TECHNOLOGICAL POLITICS
technology is most productive when its ultimate range of
results is neither foreseen nor controlled (Winner 1971: 98).
Winner calls for a development of a theory of 'technological
polities' with which to make sense of the growing complexity of
technology. Molina (1989), in contrast, calls for a new social
constituency in the area of IT. He argues that, "it seems that to
exploit this new wealth for the benefit of mankind and realise the
'era of computational plenty' for all nations, more will be needed
than simply further technical advances. Ultimately, the social
framework nurturing the technological revolution may need
profound changes" (Molina 1989: 146). It is common for theorists in
the field of technological politics to look for the major groups
involved in making changes in the social framework. Molina talks of
the marginal effects of groups attempting to influence technology in
what he sees as a more humane direction, for example, the Lucas
Aerospace technology group. He concludes that, "In the present
context, perhaps the greatest contribution of these efforts lies in the
creation of a valuable technical stock offering potential for a world of
different and humane possibilities. From this angle, they show that
there is nothing inevitable about the shape of microtechnology and,
indeed, the general development of technical systems" (1989:147).
However, for profound changes to occur requires, according to
Molina, the setting up of a dominant social constituency. The
existence of marginal groups is likely to remain just marginal when
in IT the dominant social constituency is as dominant as capital. To
reorientate IT away from the trends currently imposed by capital, an
alternative social constituency is required, one which will displace
the present dominant one and at the same time be able to infuse it
with humane ideals. The question then becomes:
Can those ideals acquire the urgency of over-riding interests -
which has proved so successful for the present social
momentum to the development of technology? And in the
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same vein, which social forces embody these humane ideals in
their raison d'etre in the same manner as capital embodies the
purpose of profit-driven accumulation? (1989:163).
Molina comes to the conclusion that with regard to the
dominant social constituency of capital: "only its costly inability to
succeed has ever exposed the power complex's fundamental lack of
humane purposes ... Somehow people must be shocked out of their
confidence in the power complex and thus recognise the irrationality
of its means and ends" (1989: 165). This 'shock' required to replace
the power complex is only ultimately liable to come about as a result
of a "catastrophe" which will then make necessary technological
developments based upon more humane criteria. He notes that Ellul
and Mumford call for "conversions" away from our "technological
mentality". The latter describes a need, "to replace the mechanical
world picture, and to give to human personality, as the highest
known manifestation of life, the precedence it now gives to its
machines and computers" (cited in Molina 1989: 173).
Placing hackers within the context of theories of technological
change points to them as having the potential to be a group that can
play a useful role in building the "valuable technical stock" necessary
as at least a starting point for "a world of different and humane
possibilities" (even if their actions are insufficient in themselves to
threaten the dominant social constituency). Winner views "the
pioneers of radical software" as having the potential to form an
"alternative emancipatory culture" that can help towards building a
"platform for a more humane tomorrow" (Molina 1989: 179). The
study will show the extent to which they provide a good example of
a group capable of practising Winner's (1971) concept of
epistemological Luddism, whereby socio-technical systems are
dismantled in order to find out the exact nature of the benefits they
bring to mankind. A central tenet of hacking behaviour in various
forms is the belief that technology of all sorts is to be understood and
mastered rather than accepted as the strange machinations of little
black boxes. It is this belief which gives hackers a significant place
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in the debate over technological determinism. They are intrigued by
the nature of systems and gaining control over, and ultimately
'beating' whatever technological system they confront. Vallee neatly
sums up the position of hackers, vis a vis technological determinism,
when he describes his meeting with, 'Chip Tango' a 'midnight
irregular' and archetypal hacker who:
looks at the future with enthusiasm. His trust in humanity is
inexhaustible. He takes for granted that computer technology
is out of control, and he wants to ride it like a surfer rides a
wave. The opportunities for fouling up the world through
computer power are unlimited, but he thinks that people like
him are useful agents in establishing a balance, a sense of
humaneness and humor ... when presented with a scenario of a
world which increasingly uses information in an oppressive
Orwellian manner, [he] replied, "I'm not worried for a minute
about the future. If the world you describe is going to happen,
man, I can fuck it up a lot faster than the world we live in now!
(Vallee 1984: ppl50-151).
Hackers see the battle-lines already forming between those
who are attempting to promote the non-proprietal diffusion of
information and access to computing, and those who wish to impose
upon computing the control and commodification elements of the
capitalist social order in a manner which is oppressive and ripe for
opposition. John Perry Barlow and the Electronic Frontier Foundation
call for an educational struggle whereby computer users can
safeguard some of the informational rights that they claim have been
attacked by an establishment not accustomed to the nature of the
new IT realm. They wish to avoid "a neo-Luddite resentment of
digital technology from which little good can come ... there is a
spreading sense of dislocation, and helplessness in the general
presence of which no society can expect to remain healthy."
(Statement from the EFF: CuD 1.13)
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3.5 LATOUR AND 'THE PRINCE'
The CU projects itself as a group which rejects conventional
notions of information and its property rights. This rejection is
shown in their acts of computer intrusion and in their general
cultural milieu which draws inspiration from works which promote
an anti-establishment view of technology and information, such as
William Gibson's 'Cyberpunk' fiction. Hackers tend to value
information as an end in itself and not as an economic commodity.
Both the CU and the CSI define themselves, to some extent, in
relation to each other. The two related issues of who controls
information, and by extension the technology of computing, and the
means by which they control it gives rise to a process of boundary
formation and mutual shaping. Theories of technological
determinism have one thing in common: they presuppose a linear
relationship between technology and society with technology being
imposed upon society. Social shaping theories are based on a
rejection of such linearity: technologies are shaped by a range of
heterogenous factors (Bijker and Law 1992: 3).
In investigating theories of technological change, therefore, full
weight has to be given to these factors that affect the final shape a
technology takes. Technological development is seen as a process of
negotiation and conflict between groups vying for influence:
"artifacts embody trade-offs and compromises. In particular, they
embody social, political, psychological, economic, and professional
commitments, skills, prejudices, possibilities, and constraints" (Bijker
and Law 1993: 5 and 7).
The relevance of hackers to theories of technological change
relates to the process by which they have obtained their
underground status. They have been allegedly marginalised within
society, thus reducing the impact their expertise might otherwise
have had upon the development of computing. From some hackers'
perspective it is because of this diminution of their influence that
computers are still predominantly perceived as being used in
impersonal or 'inhuman' ways; hackers have the potential to defeat
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notions of technological determinism by being able to master and
direct technology for their own purposes (the 'hands-on imperative').
The lack of a mainstream level of recognition and influence, raises
questions about the way in which society responds to sub-cultures
that contribute towards the development of a technology.
Within the general social shaping approach, Latour's
comparison of technological change with the political intrigues of
Machiavelli's The Prince, provides a useful theoretical framework
from which to examine the particular case of hacking. 'The Prince' is
a name given to "describe at once machines, and machinations,
techniques and society" (Latour 1986: 4). It is the
anthropomorphisation of the various ways in which power is gained
in society. Machiavelli's original Prince lived in a largely non¬
technical age where power was almost exclusively exercised by
means of social ties. Men exerted power over other men in a
hierarchical system of loyalties and obligations from which the social
order sprang. Machiavelli's The Prince investigates the strategies
and duplicity necessary to gain and consolidate this power in the face
of numerous enemies threatening the stability of the social order.
The issue of power is a perennial quality of human life, but in the
modern technological world the means by which it is exercised
includes, not just social ties, but the enlistment of 'non-human' allies
as well, in the form of technological artefacts. The
anthropomorphisation of the exertion of power, both social and
technical, in the form of the Prince, is an attempt to describe the
complex process whereby modern socio-technical systems exhibit
deterministic tendencies: an identifiable trajectory of development.
In the social shaping tradition of 'getting inside the black box of
technology', Latour argues that the apparent irreversibility of
technology should not be accepted unopposed. The portrayal of 'The
Prince' conceptualises a focus of power and control over technology
that can be then be opposed by those seeking to prevent
irreversibility. His injunction is to occupy the 'space' of the Prince.
The artefacts that confront those wishing to do so are not the sine
qua non of power. Their ability to reinforce the power of the Prince
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is underscored by a series of social relationships without which they
are obsolete. The Prince's medieval communal mill's importance as
an instrument of social power rests upon the fact that he can coerce
people into using it rather than their own hand mills: "The hardware
is only the shadow of the technical plot" (Latour 1986: 17). The plot
consists of various attempts by the Prince to create from the process
of technological change, what Latour terms "inertia and automatism".
Hackers are actors who consistently challenge these "two most
common cliches about technology" (inertia and automatism). Hacking
may be seen as an attempt to answer Latour's call to "occupy the
space of the Prince".
(i) Inertia
Once a technology is closed to social shaping forces it readily
assumes the quality of inertia, that is, it appears to be on an
irreversible, autonomous trajectory of self-direction. Latour
emphasises the fact that accretions of irreversibility, eventually
leading to closure, are a result of the deliberate action of the
dominant social groups aimed at preventing alternative interests
redefining technology in line with their particular interests. Latour's
crucial point is that regardless of how inertial technology appears to
be to those human actors affected by it, at every stage of the
technology's development, choices have been made that have shaped
it. These choices are made by human actors whom Latour labels
'Sartrian Engineers'. These engineers he describes as 'Sartrian',
"because they are free to choose even what will limit their freedom"
(Latour 1986: 19). Technological trajectories are seen as a by¬
product of a Scrabble-like game between these engineers: just as a
scrabble player is limited in his options by the words already placed
on the board so engineers are sometimes faced with a technological
fait accompli. "Irreversible technical constraints" can in fact be
produced but these are not seen as evidence of technological
determinism, rather, "It must be realized that part of the game is for
each engineer to limit the freedom of movement of a later one...
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Thus, in the end, a weaker engineer might find him or herself
confronted by something that looks indeed like an irreversible
fatum" (Latour 1986:18).
(ii) Automatism
Automatism is the notion, closely related to 'inertia', that
technology's pervasiveness makes attempts to shape it to one's own
aims futile. Its proliferation increases feelings of powerlessness and
is achieved by a particular strategy of the Prince: the enlisting of
non-human allies in an attempt to increase power and limit
opposition. An example is the way in which the replacement of
Police officers to direct traffic with traffic lights, enables authority to
be exercised more subtly and pervasively than previously possible.
3.5.1 Hackers and the Prince
It is the accretion of individual choices by human actors in
conjunction with the spread of automatism that eventually leads to
people perceiving themselves to be dominated by technology's
autonomous logic. Latour describes how this process can take on the
aspect of a "socio-technical imbroglio" (Latour 1986:19) and how,
"the mega-machine becomes bigger. Time, that is, irreversibility, is
being constructed" (Latour 1986: 23). It is against such a project of
closure that hackers will be shown to be fighting.
They are an example of a group that are unconvinced that
computing should be received unquestioningly as a black box, and
subsequent chapters trace the course of the closure process whereby
attempts have been made to 'transform' computing: to convince
people that the hackers' ability to get inside the black box should be
prevented:
The two most common cliches about technology, its inertia that
would be too strong for anyone to resist, and its inner
complexity that would be too much for anyone to fathom, are
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real enough, not as the cause of the Prince's moves, but as the
effects that the Prince strives to achieve ... The first principle
of technical democracy is thus never to offer this goal to the
Prince on a golden plate (Latour 1986: 24).
Hacking is therefore an opportunity to analyse some of the
Prince's moves in sharper relief than that which circumstances
normally allow. The conflict between the establishment and
computer users seems to be an ideal juncture at which to address
questions of technological determinism and the alleged Machiavellian
manipulations of the Prince. It is a fertile ground for enquiries into
the process Latour describes as translations', the negotiations and
various strategies, including acts of persuasion and violence, by
which the establishment seeks to gain authority and power. Hackers
provide an ideal location from which to embark on an enquiry into
this realm: "science and technology are politics pursued by other
means...the only other way to pursue democracy is to get inside
science and techniques" (Latour 1986:25), an injunction that seems
tailor-made for the hacker-ethos.
The subsequent chapters of this thesis form a detailed
illustration of the translations that have occurred within computing
and which the computer underground have sought to oppose. All the
elements of Latourian technological change can be seen in the conflict
between hackers and the dominant groups within computing. The
way in which both sides of the hacking conflict translate the aims of
their struggle into a language of persuasion using words and
metaphors with emotive connotations, for example, is in keeping
with Latour's emphasis upon the way in which "an actor bends space
around itself, makes other elements dependent upon itself and
translates their will into a language of its own" (Latour 1981: 286)
(emphasis mine).
A crucial question for the Latourian view is the extent to which
it is applicable to a political world where macro institutions and
structures such as the state exert a sizeable constraining influence
over individuals' attempts to shape technology to their own
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purposes. Thus Williams and Russell point out that such an
approach:
leads, paradoxically, to a view of technological development as
much more malleable than is the case. It overstates the power
and autonomy of local actors, which are seen as capable of
imposing their will. There is no explanation of the external
conditions [emphasis mine] under which the attempt will fail
... Perversely this 'over-politicised' view of technology-an
overblown significance accorded to scientists and technologists
as shapers of society-(re)creates a form of technological
determinism (Williams and Russell 1988:9).
The question for such groups as hackers, remains one of how to
correctly place them in this interplay between negative macro-
induced constraints and positive, potentially world-changing micro-
originated actions. In one respect, they seem to be a development
and response to the, "context of already strongly-articulated
economic and social interests" (Williams and Russell 1988:10),
prevalent within computer science. We see in the following sections,
for example, the way in which they oppose the tendencies within
society towards the privatisation of information and their
subsequent claims to represent an alternative cultural view of
computing. Hackers are thus receptive to an analysis which takes
macro constraints into account whilst also illustrating their micro-
level ability to change. Both parts of this approach are needed in
order to avoid the pitfall of some micro-sociologists who indulge in,
"opening up the black box and getting inside it, so to speak, only to
close the lid behind them" (Williams and Russell 1988: 6).
3.6 THE CHANGING ECONOMIC NATURE OF INFORMATION
One of the more obvious effects of recent technological
advances is the apparent threat such changes have made to
traditional concepts such as the economic qualities of information.
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Unlike other commodities, information has the usual economic costs
of creation but practically zero reproduction costs. It also seems to
be a 'commodity' which is particularly susceptible to increasing
returns to scale within its production which lead to a tendency for
large monopolies to exist within information processing.
The reason for both these qualities is the fact that: "the creation
of any new knowledge, regardless of the creativity involved, requires
a once and for all outlay of time and effort which does not need to be
repeated, and is quite independent of the extent to which that
knowledge is subsequently put to use. A greater demand spreads
the fixed costs of creation over a greater information output"
(Metcalfe, 1986:44). This creates increasing returns to application
(substituting for the usual economic phrase, returns to scale), and
thereby generates the natural tendency towards monopoly
conditions within the information-creating activity. Such
monopolistic tendencies go beyond just economic significance and
create extra political significance when one considers the increasing
returns to scale as they apply to government-sponsored
communication networks and data bases. Large national
communication networks tend to have an infrastructure
administered as a nationalised industry or increasingly as a private
firm granted conditional monopoly status. This creates the
possibility of a communications system more conducive to central
control and the surveillance of individuals^.
A second peculiarity of information as a commodity, is the
inherent uncertainty that exists in the links between efforts and
outcomes and outcomes and market demand. Uncertainty in the
demand for any commodity is inevitable due to the very nature of a
market place. In economics, the market is said to imitate an
auctioneer matching available demand with available supply, the
coincidence of the two amounts giving the equilibrium price. The
process whereby equilibrium is achieved, however, is impersonal
13 Individual evidence of which is given later by Robert Schifreen - The Prestel Hacker.
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and not conducive to advance planning, thus creating inevitable
uncertainty as to the exact position of the eventual outcome.
With the case of information, however, the uncertainty
arguably enters a new qualitative dimension. All knowledge is risky
in an even more fundamental sense, namely that the eventual utility
of information can only be fully ascertained de post facto: once the
information has actually been put to use. In economic jargon, there
is no stable production function, that is, the costs of producing
information may be more or less than the value of the product once
it actually reaches the market. In addition, the production of normal
commodities, even if the ultimate price and eventual degree of utility
are not known, at least has the benefit of the fact that the resulting
product has some sort of value stemming from, if nothing else, the
fact it is made of some sort of physical, material product. Immaterial
information, however, has the danger that it will prove to be of
absolutely no value to anyone.
This lack of certainty is a major reason why generally
investments in knowledge creation such as science research are
publicly funded. Risk is also apparent on the side of the buyer too, in
so far as the nature of information clearly is not entirely known
before it is purchased. These two peculiarities of information both
point towards the inherent difficulty of establishing property rights
in information and by extension computing, and linking rewards to
effort, a cornerstone, (at least ideologically), of capitalism. In short,
problems are experienced because, "uncertainty regarding outcomes
and their valuations diminishes the incentive to engage in
information creating activity, while the fact that knowledge is more
costly to create than to communicate or imitate means that those
who do not generate the knowledge may still capture a share of the
rewards from application" (Metcalfe 1986: pp 44-45).
The basic, most important non-market peculiarity of
information lies in its public good nature. Most economic
commodities derive their prices from their scarcity. An element of
this scarcity is the quality most commodities have which is that of
rivalry in use, which simply refers to the fact that scarcity tends to
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result from the fact that more than one person wishes to consume a
single good. Information, however, is such that the term commodity
does not seem to adequately apply. There is a fundamental lack of
rivalry in use. If it is to be looked at as a commodity, then it is has
the unique characteristic of its quantity not being reduced by
consumption. The problem for the capitalist market therefore is
that there is a need to obtain a revenue from the production of
information by differentiating the market for it and excluding certain
sectors of the market, allowing access to the information only if they
are able to pay.
Within IT there have been two attempted solutions to this
problem. One attempt has been to limit physical access to
information where it is in a non-durable form. Examples of this
would be the viewing of professional sports or the performing arts,
and the scrambling of satellite and cable services. The general
purpose in all these areas is to create a barrier to the informational
good you are providing which a potential viewer can only overcome
by paying for access to it. This technique recreates rivalry to access
and generates a revenue base. The other attempted solution is
where information is embodied in durable objects which are
themselves private goods, for example, books, video recordings, and
computer software in the form of floppy discs. The sale of these
durable assets gives some sort of commodity status to information,
provides a revenue base and is therefore a reward for creativity.
However, as we have seen computer-generated information tends
not to have as many opportunities for establishing such rivalry in
use. Those wishing to do so are faced with the problem of imposing
property rights on a commodity which has intrinsic potential to be
used in a non-proprietary way. This leads to a situation whereby
those attempting to impose property rights in information are
confronted by those who recognise its non-proprietary potential.
The increasing tendency to privatise information is in keeping
with wider privatising trends within market societies as a whole.
Satellite and cable television are marketed with the emphasis placed
upon the consumer watching their individually expressed preference
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of entertainment free from any 'contamination' by such concepts as
public broadcastingl4 More vividly still, Umberto Eco^ amongst
others describes what he sees as the increased tendency of American
buildings to minimise, within their original design, the concept of
public space by following a fortress-like architectural style. New
self-contained and fenced-off communities are springing up that
have a similar appearance to medieval walled cities. Hackers, and
their desire to freely access and share information represent an
alternative interpretation of information with respect to the above
market-orientated account.
3.7 CYBERSPACE - THE REAL AND VIRTUALWORLDS
The most radical conceptualisation of the change in the nature
of information is the notion of 'cyberspace'. It has fuelled hackers
alternative interpretations of information's political and economic
qualities. One of the immediate causes of conflict between hackers
and the authorities is that the former view the systems of the latter
as something of a 'playpen area':
Cyberspace is not real ! ... Hacking takes place on a screen.
Words aren't physical, numbers ... aren't physical ... Computers
simulate reality, such as computer games that simulate tank
battles or dogfights or spaceships. Simulations are just make-
believe, and the stuff in computers is not real. Consider this: If
'hacking' is supposed to be so serious and real-life and
dangerous, then how come nine-year-old kids have computers
and modems? You wouldn't give a nine-year-old his own car,
or his own rifle, or his chainsaw- those things are 'real'
(Sterling 1993: 84).
This 'virtual reality' of computer data-bases has been
fictionalised in the work of William Gibson, almost required reading
14 Future mooted developments within cable T.V. promise interactive viewing qualities
whereby the viewer can choose from a selection and combination of camera angles. This will
have the effect of further personalising the viewers experience of an event.
15 Eco Travels in Hvper-realitv (1986)
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for those interested in computer underground issues. In his science-
fiction short story collection, Burning Chrome (1986), he gives the
following description of both cyberspace also referred to as the
matrix, and cyberpunks, the hackers of cyberspace:
Bobby was a cowboy, and ice was the nature of his game, ice
from ICE, Intrusion Countermeasures Electronics. The matrix is
an abstract representation of the relationship between data
systems. Legitimate programmers jack themselves into their
employers' sector of the matrix and find themselves
surrounded by bright geometries representing the corporate
data. Towers and fields of it ranged in the colorless nonspace
of the simulation matrix, the electronic consensus-hallucination
that facilitates the handling and exchange of massive quantities
of data. Legitimate programmers never see the walls of ice
they work behind, the walls of shadow that screen their
operations from others, from industrial-espionage artists and
hustlers like Bobby Quine. Bobby was a cowboy. Bobby was a
cracksman, a burglar, casing mankind's extended electronic
nervous system, rustling data and credit in the crowded matrix,
monochrome nonspace where the only stars are dense
concentrations of information ... (Gibson 1986: 197).
The information cyberspace represents is owned by huge
multinational companies known as 'zaibatsus'l 6. The way in which
hackers' activities are devoid of normal geographical and time
constraints heightens their appreciation of, and affinity with, the
cyberspace notions of information. The image of hackers as pioneers
on a new frontier of immateriality is explicitly developed by John
Perry Barlow:
Cyberspace in its present condition has a lot in common with
the 19th Century West. It is vast, unmapped, culturally and
legally ambiguous, verbally tense (unless you happen to be a
court stenographer), hard to get around in, and up for grabs.
'Zaibatsu' is a new addition to the latest edition of the New Shorter Oxford English
Dictionary, it derives from the Japanese 'zai' meaning wealth and 'batsu' meaning 'clique'.
(David Lister: The Independent pg 1, Tues 24 August, 1993)
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Large institutions already claim to own the place, but most of
the actual natives are solitary and independent, sometimes to
the point of sociopathy. It is of course, a perfect breeding
ground for both outlaws and new ideas about liberty ... In this
silent world, all conversation is typed. To enter it one forsakes
both body and place and becomes a thing of words alone
(Barlow 1990: 45).
These 'new ideas about liberty' refer to the ethical issues that
'cyberspace' raises for informational property rights. The case that
new technologies go hand in hand with unconventional
interpretations of their uses is put by the protagonist of
Neuromancer: "burgeoning technologies require outlaw zones, that
Night City wasn't there for its inhabitants but as a deliberately
unsupervised playground for technology itself" (Gibson 1984: 19).
Cyberpunk fiction portrays this 'unsupervised playground for
technology' in the context of a dystopian future redolent with the
fears of technological determinism: in both the sense of technology's
inexorably autonomous trajectory and in fears of its dehumanising
powers.
3.7.1 Cyberspace and technological domination
(i) Domination of the individual
Levy describes how the earliest hackers "attained a state of
pure concentration ... When you had all that information glued to
your cerebral being, it was almost as if your mind had merged into
the environment of the computer" (Levy 1984: 37). Cyberspace
represents this juncture of the qualitative evolution of information
and the human interaction with the machines that process it.
Hackers of the future are typically portrayed as the ultimate
extension of this idea of man/machine symbiosis: "Certain central
themes spring up repeatedly in cyberpunk. The theme of body
invasion: prosthetic limbs ... genetic alteration. There is the even
more powerful theme of mind invasion: brain-computer interfaces,
artificial intelligence, neurochemistry - techniques radically
redefining the nature of humanity, the nature of the self" (Sterling
1986: xi).
Levy foresaw cyberpunk's depiction of the man/machine
symbiosis with his observation that "Real optimum programming, of
course, could only be accomplished when every obstacle between
you and the pure computer was eliminated - an ideal that probably
won't be fulfilled until hackers are somehow biologically merged
with computers" (Levy 1984: 126). The earlier description of Chip
Tango 'attaching his consciousness' to a process and 'butterflying his
way across the net' also has connotations of such biological merging,
and implies that hackers capable of similar merging are also capable
of controlling computers at will. Later fieldwork evidence from
hackers describes their experiences of accessing information as
similar to 'drugs running through an addicts veins'. One US hacker,
Eric Coggans, former member of the group known as the Legion of
Doom, describes his relationship to the information contained on
computers as that of 'a junkie in need of a fix' (Coggans: e-mail
interview).
Cyberpunk's fictional depiction of cyberspace and what it is to
mentally 'jack into' its matrix of information predicts, in language
similar to the imagery of addiction used by hackers, an ultimate
inability to control something that is inherently non-human:
he closed his eyes ... It came on again, gradually, a flickering,
non-linear flood of fact and sensory data, a kind of narrative
conveyed in surreal jumpcuts and juxtapositions. It was
vaguely like riding a rollercoaster that phased in and out of
existence at random, impossibly rapid intervals, changing
altitude, attack, and direction with each pulse of nothingness,
except that the shifts had nothing to do with any physical
orientation, but rather with lightning alternations in paradigm
and symbol system. The data had never been intended for
human input (Gibson 1986 a:40).
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Thus cyberspace can be viewed as part of the tradition of
writers who express the technological determinst fears that
technology dehumanises people and its progress is uncontrollable.
(ii) Cyberspace and technology's autonomous trajectory
In addition to its portrayal of technology's dehumanising
effects for the individual, Cyberpunk reinforces technologically
deterministic views about the nature of the more general process of
technological change. Sterling in his preface to Gibson's collection of
short stories, Burning Chrome, argues that:
In Gibson's work we find ourselves in the streets and alleys, in
a realm of sweaty, white-knuckled survival, where high tech is
a constant subliminal hum, 'like a deranged experiment in
social Darwinism, designed by a bored researcher who kept one
thumb permanently on the fast-forward button. Big Science in
this world is not a source of quaint Mr Wizard marvels but an
omnipresent, all-permeating, definitive force. It is a sheet of
mutating radiation pouring through a crowd, a jam-packed
Global Bus roaring wildly up an exponential slope. These
stories paint an instantly recognizable portrait of the modern
predicament (Gibson 1986:11).
The protagonists of Gibson's fiction give the sense that even
though they may be technically literate in the workings of the
environments they find themselves in, their experiences result in
them having increasingly less control over their eventual fates.
3.7.2 Cyborgs: a rejection of Technological Determinism
Cyberpunk explores the implications computing technology has
had for conceptualisations of information's changing qualities. It
gives a fictional account of a group dealing with the blurred
boundary between the material and immaterial nature of
information and has empirical significance in so far as it has
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relevance to hacking as a real world phenomenon. Cyberpunk's
treatment of the changing boundaries of information is extended to
the blurring of the boundaries between the organic and inanimate by
Haraway's concept of the 'cyborg': "A cyborg is a cybernetic
organism, a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social
reality as well as a creature of fiction ... but the boundary between
science-fiction and social reality is an optical illusion ...". (Haraway
1985:174). Because of cyborgs:
certainty of what counts as nature - a source of insight and a
promise of innocence - is undermined, probably fatally ... Who
cyborgs will be is a radical question, the answers are a matter
of survival. Both chimpanzees and artifacts have politics, so
why shouldn't we? ... taking responsibility for the social
relations of science and technology means refusing an anti-
science metaphysics, a demonology of technology ... (Haraway
1985:177).
Haraway endorses theoretical attempts to analyse the political
implications of artefacts in the process of technological change.
Whilst Latour refers to the conflict between the Prince and his
adversaries, Haraway describes how, "the relation between organism
and machine has been a border war ... This essay is an argument for
pleasure in the confusion of boundaries and for responsibility in
their construction" (Haraway 1985:174). Hackers are a prime
example of a group enjoying the pleasure Haraway prescribes. The
next section examines how this then characterises them as a group
opposed to the status quo.
3.7.3 Cyberspace and the culture of opposition
The sense of powerlessness that accompanies cyberpunk
narratives raises doubts as to the potential of cyberpunks (and by
implication their real world representatives, hackers) to be a
meaningful focus for cultural opposition to the establishment's
control of technology. Cyberpunk has been dismissed for "its
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resexing of the 'neutered' hacker in the form of the high-tech hipster
rebel" (Ross 1990: 145). Cyberpunk is accused of being rooted in the
fears of the white male middle-classes rather than being based on a
realistic cultural force. It is criticised as feeding off:
the phantasmatic street diet of Hobbesian lawlessness and the
aesthetic of detritus that is assumed to pervade the hollowed-
out core of the great metropolitan centers. This urban fantasy,
however countercultural its claims and potential effects, shared
the dominant, white middle-class conception of inner-city life.
In this respect, the suburban romance of punk, and
subsequently, cyberpunk, fashioned a culture of alienation out
of their parents' worst fears about life on the mean streets
(Ross 1991:146).
Some writers, however, do find within cyberpunk a vestigial
description of hacking culture's potential as an oppositional force.
Cyberpunk can be viewed as a portrayal of the amalgamation of the
technological knowledge of hackers with the anti-establishment
ethos of the punk-rocker. The potential for this amalgamation to
produce a source of opposition to the dominant social constituency is
aided by the fact that technology is now more readily accessible and
manipulable than in previous times when it was more easily
subjected to institutionalised control:
times have changed since the comfortable era ... when Science
was safely enshrined - and confined- in an ivory tower. The
careless technophilia of those days belongs to a vanished,
sluggish era, when authority still had a comfortable margin of
control. For the cyberpunks, by stark contrast, technology is
visceral. It is not the bottled genie of remote Big Science
boffins; it is pervasive, utterly intimate. Not outside us, but
next to us. Under our skin; often inside our minds. Technology
itself has changed. Not for us the giant steam-snorting
wonders of the past ... Eighties tech sticks to the skin, responds
to the touch ... (Sterling 1986: xi).
55
3.8 HACKING AS AN ALTERNATIVE CULTURE
Hackers more than any other group of people epitomize what it
is to interact with a machine. It remains an open question, however,
whether hackers' technical competence is one of humankind's last
forms of defence against an ever more baroque, complex yet
centralised technological world: or whether they have lost control of
themselves as a reaction to the seduction of technology's 'powers'. To
put the issue more bluntly, computer subcultures are perhaps one of
the last of what Marcuse terms 'alternative cultures'. They offer the
promise of opposition to technological determinism and the
machinations of the Prince:
the CU reflects an attempt to recast, re-appropriate, and
reconstruct the power-knowledge relationship that increasingly
dominates the ideology and actions of modern society ... we
interpret the CU culture as a challenge to and parody of
conventional culture, as a playful attempt to reject the
seriousness of technocracy, and as an ironic substitution of
rational technological control of the present for an anarchic and
playful future (Meyer and Thomas 1989 a: 1-2).
In keeping with this portrayal of hackers encapsulating forces
of opposition, increasingly "the elitist class profile of the hacker
prodigy as that of an undersocialized college nerd has become
democratized and customized in recent years; it is no longer
exclusively associated with institutionally acquired college expertise,
and increasingly it dresses streetwise" (Ross, 1990:26). However, the
fact that the CU is an underground movement may inherently limit
the political impact hackers have:
They find it hard to make any remotely convincing case for
their actions in front of the general public ... But if they speak
out too loudly and publicly, they will break the fragile surface
tension of the underground, and they will be harassed and
arrested. Over the longer term, most hackers stumble, get
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busted, get betrayed, or simply give up. As a political force,
the digital underground is hamstrung (Sterling 1993: 230).
Sterling's characterisation of hackers as a group whose
oppositional status makes them intrinsically reluctant to 'break the
surface tension' of the underground is recognised within the CU.
Hackers' necessarily underground status does not inevitably lead to
them being 'politically hamstrung', it can also seen as their political
advantage:
The worst thing the underground could do now is organise on a
mass level. Our strength is to be found in that we are a mass
of atomic entities operating against a concerted attack. The
attacks on the Underground by the witch-hunters may smash a
few individuals here and there, but the overall body lives on.
Just as the United States Army failed to fight effectively
against a dispersed phantom force like the Vietnamese, so too
will the onslaught fail against a patternless weaving of hackers.
What the opposition is trying to do is like trying to shoot gnats
with a shotgun. As long as the Underground remains dispersed
and loosely organized, there is no way they can search out and
destroy the entire bunch of us. If we band together, then of
course, they have much larger target (The Dark Adept 1990).
Molina (1989) describes 'dominant social constituencies' as
being the prime agents that dictate the pace of that change. Hackers
and their 'geeky' image might be perceived as an unusual choice of a
group with pretensions to contest this domination. A further
complicating aspect of hacking is the degree to which hackers oppose
dominant social forces within computing whilst at the same time
containing their very traits. Thus, whilst generally opposing trends
towards the increasing commodification of information and by
extension the ethics of the free market, some hackers at least, almost
personify market values, leading to the claim that they are not an
alternative culture at all:
57
the hacker cyberculture is not a dropout culture; its
disaffiliation from a domestic parent culture is often manifest
in activities that answer, directly or indirectly, to the legitimate
needs of industrial R and D. For example, this hacker culture
celebrates high productivity, maverick forms of creative work
energy, and an obssessive identification with on-line endurance
(and endorphin highs) — all qualities that are valorised by the
entrepreneurial codes of silicon futurism ... The values of the
white male outlaw are often those of the creative maverick
universally prized by entrepreneurial or libertarian
individualism ... teenage hackers resemble an alienated
shopping culture deprived of purchasing opportunities more
than a terrorist network (Ross 1990: 90).
The political status of hackers as an oppositional subculture is
thus debateable. The comments made by Hayes illustrate some of
the concerns writers have about the potential ambivalence of the
hackers' position: their actions are rooted in opposition to the
dominant social constituency in control of computing, yet they
exhibit other tendencies which leave them open for absorption into
that dominant social constituency. This is perhaps an inevitable
result of the fact that hackers utilise the very technological artefacts
that the dominant social constituency relies upon to facilitate its
control over power. What is less ambiguous about hackers is the
way in which they turn on its head, the usually negative counter-
cultural response to technological progress, instead of demonising
artefacts, they prefer to use them to their fullest advantage.
Hackers' more specific claims to be an alternative culture rest with
their instinctive dislike for government information-gathering
bureaucracies, which they perceive to be encouraging the
privatisation of information.
3.8.1 Opposition to commodification
Control of information by government is no longer possible.
Indeed, information is now transnational. Like money, it has
no fatherland (Denning D. 1990).
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It's as if big companies and their suck-up lawyers think that
computing belongs to them, and they can retail it with price
stickers, as if it were boxes of laundry soap! But pricing
'information' is like trying to price air or price dreams
(Sterling 1992: 85).
The complexity and difficulties encountered by the market
economy in attempting to impose intellectual property rights are
reflected in its struggle with hackers. Information and its specific,
and in some respects unusual, economic properties can be seen as
part of a wider social phenomenon whereby conflicting groups
struggle and negotiate over whose view of information will
ultimately prevail. The opposition to market pressures to commodify
information and enforce property rights can be seen in two distinct
realms: software production and computer systems intrusion. The
more obvious form of hackers' oppositional status is their failure to
respect the copy-protection methods used to assert it. The Software
Publishing Association estimates that software producers lost
approximately $1 billion in sales in 1986 as a result of unauthorised
copying (both for profit and for personal use)17.
Companies that have attempted to challenge the corporate
emphasis placed upon information's marketability have ended up
operating within the ground rules of the capitalist approach to
software. The Apple Computer Company, for example, was so named
because it was conceived as a wholesome, politically liberating, user-
orientated, alternative to corporate computing. Despite its original
aim, it too became part of the corporate culture it was established to
oppose. However, there remains a groundswell of opposition to the
corporate commodification of information from such people as
Richard Stallman and his GNU project. GNU stands for Gnu's Not
Unixlo. In essence the GNU system is a completely Unix-compatible
system, the major difference being that as Stallman says about his
17 c.f. Pelaez,1990:6
A general-purpose operating system particularly popular in academic environments
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creation, "I am writing so that I can give it away free to everyone
who can use it" (Stallman, 1985: 1). The GNU manifesto is important
because it contains crucial elements of what Levy identifies as the




"Software sellers want to divide the users and conquer them, making
each user agree not to share with others. I refuse to break solidarity
with other users in this way. I cannot in good conscience sign a
nondisclosure agreement or a software license agreement" (Stallman,
1985: 2)
21 BENEFITS TO USERS.
"Once GNU is written, everyone will be able to obtain good system
software free just like air", [ibid: 3]
The specific advantages of this are that,
a) "Much wasteful duplication of system programming effort will be
avoided. This effort can go instead into advancing the state of the
art." {ibid : 3)
b) Source codes are freely available, which will mean that users will
be free to make program application changes to suit their individual
needs without interference from copy-right litigation worries.
c) Free availability of source code tends to lead to a better
educational environment for further software development.
d) The legal costs of implementing copy-right protection are
eliminated.
31 BELIEFS.
"Copying all or parts of a program is as natural to a programmer as
breathing, and as productive. It ought to be as free." {ibid : 4)
3.8.2 Hacking as anti-bureaucratic rebellion
An aspect of the modern technological order is the individual's
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perception of anonymity in the face of large commercial entities.
Acts which manage to express individuality become valued as human
blows struck against dehumanised and unaccountable bureaucratic
structures. Hacking as a form of rebellion can take both macro and
micro forms. On a macro-level, Steve Hardin argues, "most law-
abiding people fantasize about breaking the law big-time and getting
away with it. We "ordinary folk" are intrigued by the little guy who
beats the big corporations or governments" (Hardin: e-mail
interview). The anti-authoritarian outlook of hackers which is
needed as part of their 'free information' ethos tends to encourage
little empathy with governmental agencies. The president of the
French Chaos Computer Club, Jean-Bernard Condat, who partially
began his career as an act of political rebelliousness, relates how:
When I was 16 1/2 years old, I finished the "lycee" and passed
without any problem my "bacculauret." I go from Beziers to
Lyon (middle of France) for my University ... and discover that
all the information will easily be available on a host in Palo
Alto (California, USA). I try to connect me from my University-
room and work on my poor $53.00-TTY-terminal all the nights.
One night, I have the visit of the great DST service (anti-spy
service) that ask me kindly "Explain us how you do for
connecting you..." I never answer correctly to this question, and
enter the same day in the CU (Condat: e-mail interview).
The dislike many people have for large 'faceless' bureaucratic
organisations adopts a specific manifestation with hackers whose
failure to have ethical qualms about obtaining free communication
services is encouraged by what they perceive to be the unjustified
level of the firms' monopoly profits: (Sterling 1992: 62). Activities
which involve the avoidance of payment for communication services
are further encouraged by a belief that no 'real' cost is being
incurred by the victim company. Ralph and Maelstrom a Dutch and
US hacker respectively, both emphasised that any pecuniary losses
attributable to their activities were carried not by individuals but by
an unscrupulous monopoly power. Maelstrom, for example, in
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describing the activities of the German hacking groups Red Sector
Inc. mentions the use of stolen AT&T card numbers but qualifies
the use of the word 'stolen' by contending that:
You can't 'steal' a number without stealing the whole card; you
can only copy it. The rationale was that the customer whose
card is being abused won't have to pay the bill, AT&T will
absorb it and give him/her a new one. And AT&T deserves to
absorb. After all what does it cost to make a phone call? The
lines are already in place, and the electrons don't care how far
they travel. The voltage is going through your lines whether
you use it or not. So you're not really ripping anyone off. Big
companies like AT&T just like to make it seem that way so
they can get more money (Maelstrom: e-mail interview).
On a more micro-level Rop Gongrijp points out how hacking can
be in response to the bureaucratic inconveniences imposed on
computer users:
I gave you the example of the VMS system where the
operating system itself has all these little windows and forms
built in ... many for the sake of the internal bureaucracy and if
you program around that, you can hack the system, because
one of the many purposes of those windows is to keep you out,
but the other advantage of programming around that, and
that's been done quite a lot by very respectable programmers,
and the techniques are used in most professional pieces of
software, especially for IBM machines. If you hack around that
window, that whole bureaucratic system, your file access
becomes faster, you can do more things with the system, you
can write software that genuinely looks more impressive,
because it's much faster than anything that's written in the
official way, and in DOS that's very, very well known (Gongrijp:
Delft interview).
'Mercury' also emphasised the positive aspects of hacking
which can be used to defeat bureaucratic inertia and the obstructions
c.f. Chapter 7 for full details
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thrown up by the exigencies of day to day commercial life. He
argued that he benefited from hacking because it helped him in his:
learning how operating systems work and how to scrounge for
resources. I work for a multinational corporation. In fact,
there is a gulf between the home office and those of us
'foreigners' in the field. This means that we do not always
receive engineering change orders or detailed schematics or
software manuals. Having learned about computing from trying
things on a wide variety of systems and having acquired a
'sense of the system' I have been able to hack our own
computers. The need here is varied. My job is to train users of
our systems. Ideally, I guess, I would merely parrot the words
of my bosses. In fact, the users feel a need to know more
about what is under the surface. Therefore, I have been able
to help the clients of my employers by knowing how to get
beneath or around security (Mercury: e-mail interview).
The exploits of people such as Captain Crunch^O gjve nSe to the
tacit respect and recognition that the technologically unversed
majority hold for acts involving illegal but technically dexterous
methods. Edward Pfuhl^l refers to this phenomenon as the "Rust
effect", named after the young West German solo pilot who breached
Soviet Air defence systems. Respect tends to be afforded for any
non-violent feat that involves a technological artefact being used to
defeat a technological system, especially if that system, is part of 'the
system'. Human individuality is perceived as threatened by the
anonymity of modern technological systems, those that are seen as
striking back against that anonymity are more difficult to view as
criminals than would those acting against identifiable individuals
using less technological means.
20 John Draper alias "Captain Crunch" achieved notoriety because he serendipitously found
that by whistling into a phone with a toy whistle he could access on a global basis, telephone
systems. The name derived from an American brand of breakfast cereal within which was
enclosed the plastic child's whistle as a free gift. This discovery was due to the fortunate
coincidence that the tonal quality of the whistle exactly matched the electronically coded
whistles of the international telephone system which were used to limit access to its
communication network.
21 New York Times 20-21 April 1991
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Hacking can be seen as "the necessary evil that will always be
there; humans, by nature, will attempt to break the rules placed over
them. And the anonymity of much of the computer underground
activities make it that much more attractive" (Kehoe: e-mail
interview). If hacking is sometimes fuelled by anti-authoritarian or
anti-bureaucratic sentiments then ironically government attempts to
reduce it may themselves be the raison d'etre of further hacking.
Richard Stallman identifies this anti-authoritarian stance, when
asked whether he thought that some hacking was undertaken in a
spirit of political rebelliousness he replied: "I don't see a connection
directly with abuse of power by governments, but abuse of power on
a smaller scale by sysadmins seems directly relevant". His emphasis
was upon the behaviour of grass-roots system managers and
administrators and contended that it is not enough just to prosecute
and/or fix holes that hackers draw attention to, "neither of these
would eliminate the motive for cracking. The way to do that is to
stop the fascist behaviour which inspires blind resistance—to stop
treating disobedience as if it were evil" (Stallman: e-mail interview).
3.8.3 Anti-Government Sentiment - privacy and double standards
A particular aspect of hacking's general anti-bureaucratic
sentiment is its perception that it may represent one of the last
safeguards against government intrusions of privacy made
increasingly easy by the information-gathering capabilities of
computers. Whilst the CSI emphasise that even hacking's element of
'harmless browsing' is unethical because of its accompanying
invasion of peoples' privacy, hackers prefer to emphasise the almost
total lack of privacy that exists in the modern electronic world and of
which most people are ignorant:
The concept of privacy is something that is very important to a
hacker. This is so because hackers know how fragile privacy is
in today's world ... In 1984 hackers were instrumental in
showing the world how TRW kept credit files on millions of
Americans. Most people had not even heard of a credit file
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until this happened ... More recently, hackers found that MCI's
Friends and Family program allowed anybody to call an 800
number and find out the numbers of everyone in a customer's
'calling circle'. As a bonus, you could also find out how these
numbers were related to the customer ... In both the TRW and
MCI cases, hackers were ironically accused of being the ones to
invade privacy. What they really did was help to educate the
American consumer (Goldstein 1993: CuD 5.43).
They contend that the most pressing moral requirement is not
to criticise those who highlight peoples' lack of privacy, but rather to
improve security so that privacy can be re-established. In this
context, disregard for property rights and privacy is viewed as a
justifiable aspect of their drawing attention to the establishment's
tolerance of lax security standards:
I am not sold on the bourgeois liberal idea of 'privacy'. If you
don't want your neighbors to know you can't cum unless your
wife canes your bum, well don't do it in public. If you use a
credit card to pay for a meal, you can hardly complain if your
name shows up on a mailing list. Private is what you can keep
in your head, your heart, your home. Three can keep a secret
if two of them are dead. We live in an electronic fishbowl ...
and yet, I'm still attracted to the words of Frank Lloyd Wright
who designed houses for privacy, calling privacy 'the hallmark
of civilization' noting that savages have no privacy (Mercury: e-
mail interview).
Such a conflicting mixture of attitudes is mirrored in the
concerns of other hackers. For example, Gongrijp and other members
of Hack-Tic voiced their concern that encryption methods are not
used frequently enough to ensure the privacy of e-mail
communications, and that the available encryption keys have been
compromised by the NSA's requirement that they be breakable^.
22c.f for example, the NSA encryption debate covered in John Perry Barlow's: Decrypting the
Puzzle Palace - Communications of the ACM June '92.
65
Such concern over privacy rights were also voiced by Martin Freiss a
hacker from Paderborn in Germany:
information freedom' is the slogan of most hackers over here
(including the notorious CCC, chaos computer club). We already
have a situation where electronic communications are unsafe,
i.e. governments may legally tap data lines and make copies of
electronic mail. Plus, the suspicion of 'hacking' alone (i.e. no
evidence) is sufficient to get search warrants or to impound
equipment. What hackers (not the kind that wilfully destroys
data for the fun of it, but the real hackers) are fighting for, is
something of a battle of principles. They want to keep the new
electronic media as safe or even safer than regular paper mail
from intrusion by government agencies (Freiss: e-mail
interview).
Hackers argue that threats to privacy posed by government
agencies are ignored, whilst at the same time, they are stigmatised
because of the threats they are deemed to pose. This apparent
double-standard fuels their belief that they are being victimised in a
form of an alleged witch-hunt process. Concern over the possible
actions of government agencies is not limited to hackers, however.
The subject was raised during the parliamentary debate over the
passage of the Computer Misuse Act: "The security services represent
much more hacking than a few private individuals, yet they are not
recognised in the slightest in the Bill" (Cohen, Hansard 1170: 9th Feb
1990). Added to the possibility of uncontrolled intrusions by
government agencies is evidence of breaches of privacy made
possible through the neglect of those responsible for ensuring
privacy. Eric Howe the Data Protection Registrar, for example, has
called for the removal of legal loopholes that allow banks and other
organisations to be safe from prosecution when they have been
deceived into giving out personal information by fraudsters
pretending to be personnel authorised to receive the information^.
23 The Independent pg 4 15 July 1993.
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Although the CSI has been vocal in its condemnation of hackers
who interfere with other peoples' privacy privacy rights, there are
several instances of the authorities using the same techniques that
they have criticised in others. For example, System managers argue
against hacking activity on the grounds that it is an invasion of the
privacy of other users, whilst they retain the right to read other
peoples' electronic mail, or tap their phones. That such instances
occur may be partly due to the ease with which ethically dubious
situations arise within computing. Robert Schifreen, the 'Prestel
hacker' describes the extent to which his activities were monitored:
It's pretty certain that my phone was being tapped. Once or
twice I picked up the phone when it was tinkling and there
were people talking on the other end saying things like "shall I
record this John?" ... I heard it tinkling on a Sunday afternoon
and it said "oh, sod it, I've got the wires in the wrong order". I
also had an account on Telecom Gold, one of the commercial
services run by BT, and there is a little known command on
Gold known as stats or fstat, that tells you what files you've got
open and I typed that once and it told me that I had a file open
such that everything I typed was being copied to a mail-box
called "security", and basically the security manager was
logging my entire sessions and I phoned him up and he said
"yes, well as part of my contract with you, BT is entitled to
monitor selective lines, to guarantee quality of service" which
the interception of communication act, specifically allows, and
it then turned out that Steve Gold, my partner in crime was
also having his box monitored so make of that what you will
(Schifreen: London interview).
Morally ambiguous activities are thus on occasion sanctioned in
certain instances, yet hacking is argued to be unequivocally wrong.
Gongrijp points out that: "no boss can open up your private mail, no
university can steam open your mail if it has your name on it, not
without being in serious legal trouble if you find out, and yet every
employer thinks he has the right to look at e-mail" (Amsterdam
interview). Although recourse is made to arguments based on the
premise that computer-stored data, and remotely accessed computer
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systems should be treated as if they are physical property, system
operators are accused of dropping such criteria in their own
computing activity. Thus, Cosell a commercial systems manager who
was one of the most vociferous of the CSI opponents to hackers
encountered during the study, compared hacking to the joy-riding of
cars: "Assuming you come out to the parking lot and your car is JUST
where it was left, except maybe the engine feels a bit warm. How is
this different than discovering that someone had logged into your
computer?" (Cosell: e-mail interview). Despite the force of his moral
view he also admitted that he:
had to do this sort of thing once or twice over the years. I
recall one incident where I was working over the weekend and
the master source hierarchy was left read-protected, and I
REALLY needed to look at it to finish what I was doing, and this
on a system where I was NOT a privileged user [although I was
an authorized ordinary user], so I 'broke into' the system
enough to give myself enough privileges to be able to override
the file protections and get done what I needed [at which point
I put it all back, and told the sysadmin about the security hole]
(Cosell: e-mail interview).
This experience is particularly interesting because of the way
in which Cosell proceeds to imply (by his use of inverted commas) a
break down of the applicability of a physical analogy when it is
applied to his own action. The ease with which ethical quandaries
can arise with the question of information is further illustrated by
Bruce Sterling's account of his time spent 'trashing' whilst having
been temporarily excluded from a particular session of a Federal
Computer Investigations Committee (FCIC) security conference he
was attending. Sterling proceeds his description of his act of trashing
by commenting: "The legality of trashing is somewhat dubious, but it
is not in fact flagrantly illegal". Backed by this 'lack of illegality' he
proceeded to empty one of the trash baskets in one of the office-
rooms opposite the security conference. Apart from finding a
telephone-card bill from which he found out a woman's home
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telephone number and a list of acquaintances' numbers that she had
phoned, he also sellotaped together fragments of various drafts of a
love letter she had written. At this stage in the account Sterling is
aware that he was "Driven by motives that were completely
unethical and prurient", yet this did not stop him from examining in
detail the handwritten notes (Sterling 1993:198).
Despite the professed concerns hackers have with the issue of
privacy, members of the CSI interviewed gave little credence to the
idea that hackers represent legitimate or sincere concerns about
privacy. The distance between the two groups on this issue is shown
with such comments as: "System crackers take the 'public good' stand
to try and justify their actions. I'd wager NOT ONE of them ever said,
'Hey, let's break into xxxx system tonight because I think they're
violating the privacy rights of the local townfolk". Pardon the
expression, but that's a lot of bullsh*t. It's a coverup - and a weak
one" (Bob Johnson: e-mail interview).
3.9 CONCLUSION
This chapter has illustrated two main issues of control
stemming from the concept of technological determinism. Firstly,
there is the common complaint that 'technology is out of control'.
This loss of control is seen as being exogenous to social factors, and it
is experienced as an autonomous quality of the technology itself. The
impact of its autonomous nature is viewed as one of domination, at
both a micro and macro level, of the individuals and society that feel
its impact. Secondly, there is the situation where loss of control over
technology is the result of one set of interests within society exerting
its power over another. This is the deliberate reduction of control
where its loss is endogenously determined by societal factors
deliberately limiting the control certain groups have over a
technology. One group gains power through the control it has over
technology, it thereafter attempts to practice 'closure', that is, it seeks
to shape the technology so that groups undesirable to the original
group are excluded from having any influence.
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Hackers have been shown to have relevance in both of the
above categories. In the first case, they have an intimate knowledge
of, and close affinity with, computers. Technological theorists are
often dispirited with the repeated tendency of technology to
seemingly assume anti-human stances. They frequently call for an
alternative cultural repository of new technological values that
express mastery over, not subjugation to, artefacts. Hackers' ability
to control technology for their own purposes is seen as evidence of
human empowerment over technology's dehumanising tendencies.
At the social level, therefore, hackers represent resistance to passive
acceptance of technology and its impact. At the level of technology
as it effects individuals, the close affinity hackers like Chip Tango
have with computers has ambivalent implications for notions of
technological determinism. This affinity can be interpreted as both
evidence of individual control over technology, or alternatively,
narcissistic dependence upon it. This issue is treated more fully in
the next chapter, with its analysis of the role addictive behaviour
plays in hacking.
Hackers disregard for informational property rights, combined
with their technical expertise, offers hope for those seeking examples
of technology being put to uses that run against the interests of
dominant social constituency. The particular significance of hackers
as a group involved in the process of technological change is that
they offer a manifestation of 'technological politics' in action. The
battleground of closure where hackers' claims to viability as an
alternative culture reside, is the point where the competing
interpretations of information meet. Hackers reject both the
technologically deterministic implications that computing is beyond
peoples' ability to control for their own ends, and also the notion that
the control of it should be the sole preserve of dominant social
groups wishing to assimilate it into the market economic order. They
contend that the nature of information is fundamentally unsuited to
attempts of commodification: it is 'like pricing air'. The chapter has
identified the main problems encountered in attempting to enforce
property rights over information. Hackers contribute to an
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environment where free access to non-proprietary information is
seen as both technically possible and ethically desirable by the CU.
This forms the basis for group differentiation between themselves
and the CSI. Whilst the CU professes its stance of free information
for all, the CSI doubts its sincerity, preferring to judge the stance an
ex post rationalisation of their 'alienated shopping culture', rather
than an a priori motivating factor.
Whilst it would be naive to force the links between the work of
William Gibson and the world of contemporary hackers, his notion of
cyberspace and its cyberpunk denizens arguably does have some
resonance with the computing environment as experienced by
hackers. Within the information revolution, the notion of cyberspace
provides an illustration of the process by which the nature of
information is changing, and the implications of the process for both
groups and the individual. The pertinence of Gibson's work rests
upon the way his imagery can be seen as being metaphorically
representative of both how individuals relate to the mass of data
being produced by computers, and also the role of large
contemporary communication organisations. The lack of respect and
even feelings of antipathy held towards such companies as "Ma Bell"
in the USA are held not just by those directly involved in the
inventive manipulation of technological artefacts such as telephones
and telephone systems. 'Ordinary people' with few technological
skills seem to express resentment at the bureaucratic and
monopolistic nature of IT firms. Zaibatsus may be an extreme
characterisation, if not caricature, of modern communication
companies, but the concept arguably provides an accurate, if not
dramatic, representation of the contemporary public's perception of
large institutional facelessness.
The greatest significance of notions such as cyberspace and
cyborgs, is the way they highlight hacking's potential as a site for
alternative cultural values. Evidence for the notion that hacking
represents a repository of counter-cultural values is ambivalent. It
is potentially accurate to the extent that it portrays the visceral
approach hackers adopt to technology. This approach offers a
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possible method for 'reducing the margin of control authority has
over technology'. It promises to provide the basis of a political
approach with which humans can confront the inertia induced by
determinist perceptions of technological dominance. Cyberpunk,
however, has also been dismissed as a projection of 'techno-
masculinity' aimed at making up for the inadequacies of the
'neutered hacker'. An interpretation that throws doubt upon the
concept that hackers, in either their real or fictional form, represent
a meaningful challenge to establishment control. A fuller
investigation of hacking culture is the subject of the next chapter
which will help to ascertain the validity of hackers' claims that they
embody alternative cultural values.
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Chapter 4 - The hacking community: culture and motivation
4.1 INTRODUCTION
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4.1.2 The hacker ethic
4.2 HACKING CULTURE
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4.4 HACKERS' MOTIVATION THEORIES
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4.4.2 Curiosity- humans and technology
4.4.3 Boredom






After locating hacking within theories of technological change,
this chapter begins the study's specific examination of the activity's
status as an alternative cultural phenomenon. It explores those
aspects of hacking that form the basis of its boundary-forming
conflict with the CSI.
The empirical data in this chapter draws from my fieldwork of
both e-mail and face-to-face interviews with hackers. The resultant
findings make it apparent that hackers' reasons for hacking are more
complex than the literature on the subject indicated. The main
motivational aspects of hacking are described from an academic
standpoint and thereafter largely from an internalist, hackers point
of view. This is in preparation for the subsequent investigation of
how hacking is perceived and construed by those external to it.
The motivations lying behind hacking, as described by the
hackers themselves, are categorised into six areas. The first
category, curiosity, is an essential prerequisite for the activity to
begin in the first place, but it risks becoming the addictive behaviour
described in the second category. The example used is that of Paul
Bedworth, who was acquitted whilst charged under the Computer
Misuse Act, on the defence that he was addicted to computers. The
other categories form part of the complex interrelation of factors that
influence hackers, different factors playing a variable role in the
motivation of any one hacker. It is thus difficult to categorically
gauge how representative of the hacking community such
interviewees were, but those chosen tended to be relatively high-
profile figures (based upon the number and apparently
uncontradicted knowledgeability of their contributions to electronic
magazines, and their reputation within the computing community).
The quotations used are individual examples of opinions commonly
encountered amongst a wide range of different hackers. Suitable
emphasis is placed upon any of those quotations that appeared to be
atypical in any way.
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Groups within computing recognise that 'hacking' has changed
its meaning from it's original usage1. Levy (1984) describes three
generations of hackers who exhibited, to various degrees, qualities
associated with the hacking's original connotation of playful
ingenuity, epitomised by the first generation of pioneering computer
aficionadoes at MIT's laboratories in the 1950's and 1960's. The
phrase is now almost exclusively used to refer to unauthorised
computer intrusions carried out by an addition to Levy's generations
of hackers: the fourth generation. The study concentrates upon this
generation, who are now vilified by the establishment, but who claim
to represent a continuation of hacking's original values. The first
generation of hackers were active in the development of the earliest
software, the fourth generation have been criminalised by the
passage of anti-hacking legislation. This evolution in hacking's role is
explained in the study by its description of the closure process
whereby the reduction of hackers' influence within computing is
seen as the result of a social process of negotiation and conflict. This
chapter's purpose is to present an internalist account of hacking
which can then be compared later in the work with the externalist
account. The ensuing conflict between the two interpretations is
what fuels the process of closure.
Levy, and some of the hackers interviewed in this study, made
the point that the phrase 'hacking' implies a potential quality of any
technology. However, the word has now been used by the media to
such an extent that its de facto definition more narrowly refers to
anyone who attempts unauthorised access to a computer system.
This reduction in meaning has meant that computers are at the fore¬
front of the media's perception of hacking. It has also resulted in a
general lack of awareness that the breaching of computer systems
seems to be but one aspect of a range of activities centred upon
curiosity as to the workings of technological artefacts of varying
degrees of sophistication. Such activities may also range from lock-
1 c.f. Levy in Hackers: Heroes of the Computer Revolution (1984)
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picking to phone-phreaking2. Whilst hacking may indeed contain
such heterogenous roots, this study has been forced to adopt a more
specific focus than would have been possible with such a broad-
based definition. It has concentrated more narrowly on hacking in
computing.
4.1.1 The hack
The basis of hacking culture is 'the hack'. The hack did, and
still does in some quarters, refer to the performing of a neat
programming trick. It is more widely defined as an attempt to make
use of a technology in an original, unorthodox and inventive way,
although it will predominantly refer to illicit break-ins and use of
computer systems. Turkle (1984), categorises the main elements of
the wider definition of illicit hacking, and the general mentality of
those who hack in the sense of seeking to manipulate any technology
for unorthodox means.
She refers to the "hack" as being: "the holy grail. It is a
concept which exists independently of the computer and can best be
presented through an example using another technology complex
enough to support its own version of hacking and hackers" (Turkle
1984: 232). The example she uses is that of phone-phreaking and its
main adherent is John Draper, alias Captain Crunch. The hack, in this
instance, refers to such technological stunts as having two phones on
a table; talking into one and hearing your voice in the other after a
time-delay in which the original call has been routed around the
world first.
Turkle interpreted this type of hack in the following manner,
Appreciating what made the call around the world a great hack
is an exercise in hacker aesthetics. It has the quality of [a]
magician's gesture: a truly surprising result produced with
ridiculously simple means. Equally important: Crunch had not
2 Hackers at the headquarters of the Dutch group, Hack-Tic, also referred to gene-biology
hackers and chemical hackers who they define as people who push their respective disciplines
to the furthest limits.
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simply stumbled on a curiosity. The trick worked because
Crunch had acquired an impressive amount of expertise about
the telephone system. That is what made the trick a great
hack, otherwise it would have been a very minor one. Mastery
is of the essence everywhere within hacker culture. Third, the
expertise was acquired unofficially and at the expense of a big
system. The hacker is a person outside the system who is
never excluded by its rules (Turkle 1984: 232).
The main characteristics of a hack are therefore identified as:
1. Simplicity: the act has to be simple but impressive.
2. Mastery: the act involves sophisticated technical knowledge.
3. Illicitness: the act is "against the rules".
The hack and the heterogenous 'kick'
In addition to the elements identified by Turkle is the
characteristic eclectic pragmatism with which hackers approach any
technology. Apart from Levy's very early recognition in Hackers that
hacking involved such diverse activities as lock-picking and model-
railway maintenance (and the accompanying tinkering with gadgetry
that this involves) hackers themselves express the wide range of
their targets:
In my day to day life, I find myself hacking everything
imaginable. I hack traffic lights, pay phones, answering
machines, micro-wave ovens, VCR's, you name it, without even
thinking twice. To me hacking is just changing the conditions
over and over again until there's a different response. In
today's mechanical world, the opportunities for this kind of
experimentation are endless (Kane 1989: pp 67-69).
Dutch hackers Gongrijp and Dell in relating some of their
activities illustrated how broadly the desire to technologically
explore can reach. Dell claimed to have physically explored the
subterranean tunnels and elevator shafts of Amsterdam including
government nuclear fall-out shelters. Gongrijp described how he had
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entered the out-of-bounds areas of buildings such as banks by
pretending to accompany legitimate tour groups and then taking the
first opportunity to wander off on his own, assessing the security of
the site and then somewhat cheekily informing the security staff of
that assessment (Gongrijp: Amsterdam interview). The "technology"
which is the subject of their curiosity in these cases, simply being the
architecture and security features of buildings which they found
interesting.
The heterogenous range of technological targets considered as
"hackable" is described by Ralph, a Dutch hacker, who argued that
hacking is not just about computer break-ins but should be defined
so that it does not:
only pertain to computers but pertains to any field of
technology. Like, if you haven't got a kettle to boil water with
and you use your coffee machine to boil water with, then that
in my mind is a hack. Because you're using the technology in a
way that it's not supposed to be used. Now that also pertains
to telephones, if you're going to use your telephone to do
various things that aren't supposed to be done with a
telephone, then that's a hack. If you are going to use your
skills as a car mechanic to make your motor do things it's not
supposed to be doing, then that's a hack. So, for me it's not only
computers it's anything varying from locks, computers,
telephones, magnetic cards, you name it (Ralph: Utrecht
interview).
Gongrijp described, as his example of the heterogeneity of
hacking, how, "the Wageningen agricultural university a couple of
years ago had a couple of students doing a project enhancing the
genes of marijuana plants, to me that's gene-hacking, it's more than
science, it's just somebody gets a kick out of it". He argued that
hacking is a frame of mind, a sort of intellectual curiosity that
attaches itself to more than just one type of technology or
technological artefact: " ... for me a hacker is more all-round than to
some people, I think a hacker is not a real hacker unless he has a
basis in two or three skills, not just hacking Unix systems but also a
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little bit of something else, electronics, audio hacking or something
general" (Amsterdam interview). This heterogeneity of hacking's
targets fuels the 'kick' gained from satisfying the primary urge of
technological curiosity:
in the early days of say the uses of electricity and how to
generate it, were first developed, I think Tesla and all the
people who were playing with it then were as much hackers as
most computer hackers are now, they are playing on the
frontier of technology and all those hefty experiments were not
only done for science, they were done because they got a kick
out of it (Gongrijp: Amsterdam interview).
The 'kick', thus gained, crucially depends upon an element of
inventiveness which serves to distinguish 'true hacks' from those
that could be labelled as acts of 'Nintendo Perseverance', that is,
hacks which exhibit large amounts of concentration and dedication
rather than ingenuity. Methods of hacking entry may become widely
publicised by means of the various branches of the hacker grape¬
vine, for example, electronic and paper-based specialist magazines,
or even "word of electronic-mouth". From such sources, hacking
'cook-books' result. Those that predominantly, or exclusively, use
such sources of information for the illicit use of a technology, can be
technically labelled as hackers since they fulfil the definition's basic
property of the illicit use of a technology. However, the Dutch
hackers I spoke with were keen to differentiate themselves from
such people, by imparting their concept of a hack similar to Turkle's
description of the Holy-Grail type hack.
Using the example of phone phreaking phone-calls Ralph
illustrates this distinction between a technical and a 'true hack':
it depends on how you do it, the thing is that you've got your
guys that think up these things, they consider the technological
elements of a phone-booth, and they think, "hey, wait a minute,
if I do this, this could work", so as an experiment, they cut the
wire and it works, now THEY'RE hackers. Okay, so it's been
published, so Joe Bloggs reads this and says, "hey, great, I have
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to phone my folks up in Australia", so he goes out, cuts the
wire, makes phone calls, leaves it regardless. He's a stupid
ignoramous, yeah?
The second situation is another hacker reads this and
thinks, "hey, this is an idea, let's expand on this". So what he
does is go to a phone box, he cuts the wire, puts a magnetic
switch inbetween, puts the magnetic switch up against the case,
closes the door again and whenever he wants to make a free
phone call, he puts a magnet on top, makes the wires
disconnect, and he has a free phone call, goes away, takes the
magnet away and everybody else has to pay. Now he's more of
a hacker straight away, it's not a simple black and white thing
(Ralph: Utrecht interview).
Thus it is evident that there are various forms a hack can take,
and a hacker tends to be defined not just by what he does but by
how he does it. A 'true' hack should involve an element of originality
in keeping with the characteristic typical of the hacking fraternity of
this study, namely the way their mind perceives unorthodox ways of
subverting any given technical situation. For example, Gongrijp
pointed out in an Amsterdam housing estate, startlingly vivid yellow
paint on road over-pass supports. He explained that it was indelible
anti-graffiti paint and observed wryly that people could cause havoc
if they used such paint for graffiti purposes (Gongrijp: Amsterdam
interview).
4.1.2 The hacker ethic
Fuelling the hack and setting the ideal standard of hacking
morality within the culture of hacking is the ethos of the early MIT
hackers. Its main tenet was, according to Levy:
Access to computers - and anything which might teach you
something about the way the world works - should be
unlimited and total. Always yield to the Hands-On imperative!
[Levy, 1984:40].
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More specific elements of this hacker ethic consist of the
following points:
1. "All information should be free".
2. "Mistrust Authority- Promote Decentralisation".
3. "Hackers should be judged by their hacking, not bogus criteria
such as degrees, age, race, or position."
4. "You can create art and beauty on a computer".
5. "Computers can change your life for the better".
(Levy 1984: pp 40-45).
Bill Landreth also describes the intended ethical outlook of a
hacker group he was instrumental in setting up in 1982. They called
themselves the "Inner Circle", an elite group of hackers who could
trade information amongst themselves and thereby avoid passing on
information to less ethical hackers liable to use it for nefarious ends.
The need for such a group had arisen due to the huge increase in the
amount of hackers at this time, itself attributable to the increased
diffusion of microcomputers. Typically for hackers and the informal
nature of their culture, whilst claiming to be an ethical group, no
attempt was made to formally draw up a specific code of behaviour.
If such an attempt had been made, Landreth argues, it would have
been as follows:
No Inner Circle member will ever delete or damage information
that belongs to a legitimate user of the system in any way that
the member cannot easily correct himself. No member will
leave another hacker's name or phone number on any
computer system. He will leave his own on a system only at
his own risk. All members are expected to obtain and
contribute their own account information, rather than use only
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information given to them by other members (Landreth 1985:
ppl8-19).
The most important underlying principle behind this purported
code of behaviour, Landreth contends, was respect for other people's
property and information: "We were explorers, not spies, and to us,
damaging computer files was not only clumsy and inelegant - it was
wrong". Having described how hacking involved its own particular
ethic and 'kick' we now turn to a more detailed exploration of its
culture.
4.2 HACKING CULTURE
It's Sunday night, and I'm in my room, deep into a hack. My
eyes are on the monitor, and my hands are on the keyboard,
but my mind is really on the operating system of a
superminicomputer a thousand miles away ... The only light in
the room comes from the green screen of my computer monitor
and the small red lights on my modem. I turn and check the
clock: 3:00 a.m. "Good," I think. "Three hours before I have to
leave for school. Too bad I didn't have time to do any
homework." Thoughts of school evaporate, and I return to my
computer with the enthusiasm of a Super Bowl football player
(Landreth 1985: 57).
This section examines the social element of hacking that such a
portrayal would seem to leave little room for. It is difficult,
however, to readily identify an obviously structured group acting as
a CU culture in an open way. The 'culture' of the CU is mediated by
the fact that it 'inhabits' a non-traditional environment which has the
inherent quality of anonymity and invisibility: a basic lack of
physicality:
To find 'Hacker Culture' you have to take a very wide view of
the cyberspace terrain and watch the interactions among
physically diversified people who have in common a mania for
machines and software. What you will find will be a gossamer
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framework of culture. Come back in 100 years and you may
see more (Marotta: e-mail interview).
A comprehensive description of the social organisation of
hackers has been attempted by Gordon Meyer (1989). The limited
scope of the work, however, means that scant attention is paid to the
actual culture of that social organisation. It is the 'gossamer
framework of culture* that this section explores, starting with its two
primary underpinning aspects: the hack and the hacker ethic. From
these fundamental elements of hacking has sprung what is difficult
to define unequivocally, but what is generally recognised as a
hacking culture:
Cultures have (1) Technology (2) Institutions (3) Language (4)
Arts. By this measure, what is 'Catholic Culture'? It is heavy
on Institution and weak on Technology. Hacker culture is
obviously very technological. Hacker Language is based on
jargon that separates it from mainstream English. Hacker Arts
would be centred on Star Trek and fractals. But you would be
hard-pressed to find a reason for saying that Classical or
Electronic New Age Music is 'hacker' since some probably enjoy
Rap far more (Mercury: e-mail).
This description illustrates the difficulties faced when trying to
define 'hacking culture'. The following section discusses the elements
that are relatively easy to identify.
4.2.1 Hacking Culture - Specific elements
(i) Technology content
Hacking culture is epitomised by its easy relationship with
technology. For the first time, a new generation of young people are
growing up completely at home with computers and their
capabilities:
What we are confronted with is a generation that has lived
with computers virtually from the cradle, and therefore have
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no trace of fear, not even a trace of reverence. To me, a
computer is still, well, something to be revered. When I
started my career in computing, there wasn't really computing
at that time ... there were about three of them, you had one
shot at a run a day if you were lucky. It was sacrosanct, it no
longer is to those kids, you go in, have a bash at the keyboard,
they're convinced by experience that nothing much can go
wrong (Herschberg: Delft interview).
We will see throughout this study that technology inevitably
forms the material basis of hacking culture. We have already seen
how a crucial element of hacking resides in the innate curiosity with
which hackers approach a diverse range of technological artefacts.
Such a quality has existed throughout history, but the mass diffusion
of computing and telecommunication equipment has meant that
curiosity can more easily utilise technological artefacts for purposes,
or by people, not originally intended in the initial design of the
objects. The significance of hacking's technology-based culture is
that it represents a qualitatively new challenge to governments and
establishment forces who may no longer have a monopoly power
over the ways in which technology is controlled and used. It raises
questions concerning the nature of ownership in an era of
'informational plenty', and the possibility of adequate government or
societal control over the new communication technologies. The key
political aspect of hacking rests with the fact that it represents a
direct challenge to government control of technology of a more
worrying kind than previously arising with the perennial presence of
innovative and curious individuals. The advent of the 'cyberspace'
and advanced telecommunication systems has created the conditions
necessary for cooperation between previously geographically
dispersed and hence isolated, technologically curious people.
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(ii) Secrecy
Another characteristic of hacking is its secrecy. This causes
obvious difficulties for any attempt at describing its culture, for
example its true size is largely unknown:
Some professional informants ... have estimated the hacker
population as high as fifty thousand. This is likely highly
inflated, unless one counts every single teenage software pirate
and petty phone-booth thief. My best guess is about five
thousand people. Of these, I would guess that as few as a
hundred are truly 'elite' - active computer intruders, skilled
enough to penetrate sophisticated systems and truly to worry
computer security and law enforcement (Sterling 1992: 77).
The following description given by Schifreen helps to account
for many of the difficulties in drawing a detailed picture of hacking
culture. He described the immediate impact on his local hacking
group when he related how recent legislation appeared to have
forced hackers underground:
There used to be a hacking community in the UK, the hackers I
used to deal with 8 or 9 years ago, where all based in North
London where I used to live and there were 12 of us around
the table at the local Chinese restaurant of a Friday night,
talking about lots of things and getting through lots of Diet Coke
... within about 20 minutes of me and my colleague Steve Gold
being arrested: end of hacking community. An awful lot of
phone calls went round, a lot of discs got buried in the garden,
and a lot of people became ex-hackers and there's really no-
one who'll talk now, it's difficult (Schifreen: London Interview).
The following is an example of the enforced atmosphere of
secrecy within hacking circles that makes identification of any overt
cultural qualities, difficult. Mofo was a hacker encountered in the e-
mail fieldwork who was using somebody else's account and the
above pseudonym as a precaution against identification. He asked
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me to: "Tell me more about yourself, but wait about a week to
respond as I use this account only with the 'permission' of the real
owner and login only occasionally. I login on this account very
infrequently as I do not want to get the rightful owner any undue
attention" (Mofo: e-mail interview). He proceeded to describe in the
following manner, his views and interpretation of the significance of
the actions of Robert Morris3. The quotation below is illuminating in
the way it vividly portrays how hackers in the CU depend upon
secrecy, and trust each other not to act in any way which might incur
a clampdown from the law-enforcement agencies, fear of whom
increasingly characterises part of the CU milieu:
BTW, I think that you might be interested to know that I and
many others have used the UNIX sendmail bug to access many,
many systems throughout the world (without damaging data in
any way) until that stupendous asshole, Robert Morris, royally
phucked everything up for us. I've known about the print f ()
sendmail bug ever since I got access to source. Only a dummy
would publicize something as good as that by doing something
completely phucking stoopid like what Morris did. His idiocy
cost hackers/phreakers more than anyone can imagine (Mofo:
e-mail interview).
The Robert Morris incident seemed to mark a watershed in the
openness of the Internet. During the late 1980's and early 1990's
there was a series of 'crackdowns' in the form of legislation and
arrests by Secret Services/Police forces4. Sources, such as the
Computer Underground Digest, have repeatedly drawn attention to
the belief, commonly held within the underground community, that
the establishment has been guilty of paranoia and over-reaction in
their pursuit of hackers. The commonly portrayed image is that of
secret service men raiding adolescent, bespectacled hackers' homes
3 The Internet Worm was a worm program written by Robert Morris Jr., ironically the son of the
National Computer Security Centre's chief scientist. It hit the Internet network of computers on
November 2nd 1988, estimates of affected machines range from 6,200 to 2,000.
4c.f. The Hacker Crackdown by Bruce Sterling, in which he documents and comments upon the
spate of U.S. Secret Service investigations into CU activity in the early 1990's.
86
with guns drawn. Such operations are known as 'stings' and have
such colourful names as 'Operation Sun Devil'. The establishment's
reaction also takes less dramatic forms. I was informed by a Dutch
programmer that one of the Dutch hackers interviewed as part of
this study was under surveillance by the security services, and
Schifreen describes how he came to give up hacking after having had
his equipment seized by the police at the start of their investigations
into his hacking activity: "When I got it back, I'd sort of lost the
inclination and I was sort of scared as well, because when you're on
bail, it's not a good idea to carry on doing it. Plus the fact that it's
pretty certain that my phone was being tapped" (Schifreen: London
interview).
(iii) Anonymity
Cyberspace's ultra-modern, 'virtual' depiction of increasing
immateriality questions some of our notions of what constitutes
reality and threatens some conventional notions based upon physical
reality. It can also, however, be conceptualised as a reinforcement of
reality in the sense that:
In many ways, the world of cyberspace is more real than the
real world itself. I say this because it is only within the virtual
world that people are really free to be themselves - to speak
without fear of reprisal, to be anonymous if they so choose, to
participate in a dialogue where one is judged by the merits of
their words, not the colour of their skin or the timbre of their
voice. Contrast this to the 'real' world where we often have
people sized up before they even utter a word (Goldstein: CuD
5.43).
Part of the hacker ethic as described by Levy is the assertion
that "Hackers should be judged by their hacking, not by bogus
criteria such as degrees, age, race, or position". The egalitarianism of
such a principle within the hacker culture is aided by the fact that
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computer communication is intrinsically non-physical5, as a result,
computer communication generally fails to differentiate between
normal social hierarchies.
power and prestige are communicated neither contextually (the
way secretaries and meeting rooms and clothes communicate)
nor dynamically (the way gaze, touch, and facial and
paralinguistic behaviour communicate; Edinger and Patterson,
1983). Thus charismatic and high status people may have less
influence, and group members may participate more equally
in computer communication (Dunlop 1992:334).
Stemming from the disembodied characteristics of computer
mediated communication (CMC), e-mail correspondence generally has
a depersonalised quality, the reception of an e-mail message occurs
without any accompanying indicators. Even with non-interactive and
inanimate means of communication as traditional letters, important
information can be transmitted from aspects such as the letterhead.
E-mail, in contrast, is blind as to the social position or mood of the
sender, which would normally be conveyed by facial expressions and
general demeanour.
One result of this blindness is the tendency of many e-mailers
to drop some of the conventions and propriety that are normally
expected in more traditional forms of communication. 'Flaming', is a
term used to describe the particularly vituperative tirades of insults
which can result when an e-mail discussion or disagreement becomes
heated. The experience of the French introduction of the minitel chat
system6, is one risque and vivid illustration of the way in which the
status-stripping qualities of e-mail can reduce people's expressive
inhibitions. People seem to have a somewhat surprisingly ready
predisposition to swap intimate details of each other's lives, more
5For example, to compensate for the inability of computer communication to convey certain
gestures and emotions, users have developed various computer substitutes. During my research I
came across the following examples: [; -) ] to express a winking face, that is, irony or sarcasm; [:
- 0 ] to express shock;
[: -) ] happiness, and so on.
6 c.f. De Lacy, Justine "The Sexy Computer" (1989)
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specifically, their sex lives and accompanying fantasies,
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phenomenon which seems to be exacerbated by the fact, peculiar to
e-mail correspondence, that those communicating have no visual or
aural clues as to the identity of their correspondent.
The hacking community and its accompanying culture is
directly affected by such qualities of CMC. The anonymity it
produces means that 'exploration' by hackers is not of a direct
physical nature, and this may play a role in hackers being slow in
many cases to accept responsibility for their actions, or that their
actions are in any way morally wrong. CMC qualities, as will be
shown later, also have important effects upon the nature of the
establishment's response to the computer underground and its
activity, tending to exacerbate fears of it and increase its
underground status.
(iv) Fluidity of boundaries and speed of change
The third quality of hacking culture relates to the fluidity of its
boundaries and the speed with which it changes. Clough and Mungo
described how, from the point of view of law enforcement, the
computer underground represents an amorphous, constantly
changing environment:
There is no organized structure in the computer underworld, no
mysterious chairman of the board to run things. The
underground is anarchic, a confederation of phreakers/hackers
and virus writers from all over the world whose common
interests transcend culture or language. Most hackers have
two or three handles and operate on a number of boards. They
change ID's, aliases, sites, their methods, targets and gang
membership as rapidly as the authorities track them.
Stamping out hacking is like trying to pin down mercury
(Clough and Mungo 1992:18).
In addition to the intrinsic intangibility of groups existing by
means of CMC, the medium also encourages a constantly shifting
environment:
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People come and go pretty often, and if you lay off for a few
months and then come back, almost everyone is new. There
are always those who have been around for years, but you can
weed out the amateurs by comparing two lists of names
acquired several months apart from each other ... I would
consider the hacker community a very informal one. It is
pretty much anarchy as far as rule-making goes. The hacker
ethic is not always applied, unfortunately, (and that's why
hacking has such a bad name). The community was structured
only within the framework of different hacking "groups".
Legion of Doom would be one example of this. A group creates
its own rules, and usually doesn't have a leader ... The groups
I've been in have voted on accepting new members, kicking
people out, etc (Eric Coggans: e-mail interview).
4.2.2 Hacking and gender: male predominance
A hallmark of the event [Hack-Tic computer club's 1993
Summer Conference] was the male to female ratio: running at
roughly 100:1, it did not bode well for the demise of the
anorak. Even so there was some emergence of a hacker chic,
with one of the few women sporting jewellery made from
watch parts and hair decoration courtesy of an eviscerated
floppy disk (Goodwins 1993: 11).
Faced with the above difficulties of establishing a coherent
hacker culture, one characteristic of it that does stand out is the male
dominance of the activity. This section looks at the possible reasons
for hacking's gender bias, and thereby introduces the whole general
issue of what factors motivate hacking:
The computer underworld is populated with young men (and
almost no women) who live out their fantasies of power and
glory on a keyboard. Most are single. That some young men
find computing a substitute for sexual activity is probably
incontrovertible. Just as a handle will often hide a shy and
frightened fifteen-year-old, an obsession with computing to the
exclusion of all else may represent security for a sexually
insecure youngster. The computer is his partner, his handle is
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his real self ... and the virus he writes is the child of his real
self and his partner. A German virus writer once said: "You
feel something wonderful has happened when you've produced
one. You've created something which lives. You don't know
where it will go or what it will do, but you know it will live on."
He was talking about his new virus (Clough and Mungo 1992:8).
The above quotation is one sexually-based theory of why, as is
generally accepted, there are almost no female hackers active in the
computer underground. The research failed to uncover any
significant evidence of females active in hacker-related fields, and as
can be seen from the quantitative survey, only 3% of respondents to
a questionnaire, widely dispersed throughout the computing
community, were female. Examples of women, active in or at least
associated with related activities, are: Susan Thunder, an associate of
Kevin Mitnick, described in Cyberpunk: during an American radio
phone-in programme on hacking7, a woman called Anna proclaimed
herself to be a phone-phreak; and in Approaching Zero the authors
describe how "Leslie Lynne Doucette was once described as the
'female Fagin' of the computer underworld. In her mid-thirties, she
was considerably older than the 150 or so adolescent Olivers she
gathered into her ring. As a woman, she has the distinction of being
one of only two or three female hackers who have ever come to the
attention of the authorities." (Clough and Mungo 1992:148). Keller
states that:
In the course of a career in computing which spans 20 years in
industry and academia in the United States and Great Britain I
have met several people I would call hackers ... I have never
met a female hacker. No one I know with whom I have
discussed hacking can recall an instance of meeting or hearing
of a female hacker...[and in a footnote] ... The Hacker's
Handbook. 3rd Edition mentions one, but at one point puts she
in quotes, as though to denote irony or uncertainty about that
particular hacker's true gender (Keller 1988: 57).
7 Ed Schwartz Show on WGN Radio. September, 27-28,1988.
Transcript published in Phrack Vol 2, Iss 21.
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Although computing still tends to be a male-dominated
environment, the almost complete absence of identifiable female
hackers does not seem to be adequately explained by merely
drawing attention to the minority status of women in computing.
There are still sufficient numbers of women in computing to suggest
that statistically one would expect the existence of some female
hackers. Ellen Spertus in her paper, "Why are There are so Few
Female Computer Scientists?" states that "In the most recent years
for which figures are available, women received a third of the
bachelor's degrees in computer science [in the USA], 27% of master's
degrees, and 13% of PhDs." (Spertus 1991: i) These figures would lead
one to expect the existence of at least some female hackers, but such
hackers do not seem to be forthcoming. No women hackers were in
fact encountered in direct fieldwork or in the "snowballing"
technique used in the electronic-mail interviewing as described in
the methodology chapter. The question of why, therefore, there is
such a dearth of female hackers will be looked at directly in the next
section, whilst the peculiarly masculine aspects of hacking will be
further illustrated throughout the study in subsequent sections
analysing the culture of hacking.
4.2.3 Reasons for the paucity of female hackers
Spertus looks at factors that discourage women from computer
science in general, rather than the act of hacking, specifically, the
factors relating to the former, however, are also relevant to the
latter. Her three main reason why women are discouraged from
computer science are:
1. Societal factors - e.g. the sexual stereotyping of young children, the
boys are given technical toys. The girls are given cuddly toys.
2. The masculine environment - computer science is dominated by
men and therefore this creates a general 'locker-room' climate in
which women feel threatened or uncomfortable.
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3. Gender in language - the male gender-bias in the language used in
computer science reinforces points 1 and 2.
(i) Societal factors
Sherry Turkle emphasises the differences of approach to
computing that gender seems to produce are culturally reinforced.
She argues that males tend to exhibit tendencies towards 'hard
mastery' and females tend towards 'soft mastery': "Hard mastery is
the imposition of will over the machine through the implementation
of a plan ... Soft mastery is more interactive ... try this, wait for a
response, try something else, let the overall shape emerge from
interaction with the medium. It is more like a conversation than a
monologue" (Turkle 1984: pp 102-3). Whilst men tend to be
overwhelmingly 'hard masters' females are generally 'soft masters'.
This would be an immediate reason why females tend to be excluded
from the 'hard' world of hacking and a general fascination for
technology and what it can do:
In our culture girls are taught the characteristics of soft
mastery - negotiation, compromise, give-and-take - as
psychological virtues, while models of male behaviour stress
decisiveness and the imposition of will ... Scientific objects are
placed in a "space" psychologically far away from the world of
everyday life, from the world of emotions and relationships.
Men seem able, willing and invested in constructing these
separate "objective" worlds, which they can visit as neutral
observers ... We can see why women might experience a
conflict between this construction of science and what feels like
"their way" of dealing with the world, a way that leaves more
room for continuous relationships between the self and other
(Turkle 1984:107 +115).
Hacking does seem to convey a feeling of power which
arguably appeals to the male gender more than the female:
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The deep attraction of this sensation of elite technical power
should never be underestimated. "Technical power" is not for
everybody; for many people, it has no charm at all. But for
some people, it becomes the core of their lives. For a few it is
overwhelming, obsessive; it becomes something close to an
addiction. People - especially clever teenage boys whose lives
are otherwise mostly powerless and put-upon - love this
sensation of secret power and are willing to do all sorts of
amazing things to achieve it (Sterling 1993:19).
The qualitative field-work responses pointed to a general
uncertainty or lack of conclusive arguments for the general absence
of female computer scientists or hackers. They tended to emphasise
the societal argument factors in preference to the other potential
reasons of a threatening, biased-language environment. Several e-
mail correspondents identified general social trends discouraging
women from scientific pursuits such as computing. Social factors
seem to be mixed in equal part with tentative views that women are
psychologically less amenable to the 'hard mastery' implicit within
computing. Krista Bradford, a female American journalist who has
had an interest in computing for 10 years, argued:
I think you have to go back to the day women are born and the
kind of social conditioning we get ... I believe the culture
discourages women from pursuing math/science. The
computing process/logic seems much more 'male' to me
personally - more linear than circular thought (somehow my
Macintosh seems friendlier and therefore more 'female') ...
more Spock than Captain Kirk (Bradford: e-mail interview).
Whilst Mercury contended:
When Adam delved and Eve span ... who was then the
gentleman? Well, we see that Adam delves into the workings
of computers and networks and meanwhile Eve spins, what?
Programs? again, my wife programs and she has the skills of a
hacker. She has had to crack security in order to do her job.
But she does it AS HER JOB, not for the abstract thrill of
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discovering the unknown. Eve spins. Females who compute
would rather spend their time BUILDING a GOOD system, than
breaking into someone else's system (Mercury: e-mail
interview).
Jean-Bernard Condat, President of the French Computer Chaos
Club, gives a perspective which fuels some of the suspicions that
hackers may have a sexist streak:
In France, the boys play computers and bicycles and/or skate¬
board, and the girls are at home. Technology is for a long time
in my country an uni-sexual one. The notion of male/female
criteria is not an important one. It's the cognitive aspects of
the hacker ... and a tradition factor. The long concentration of
the hacker's spirit on a particular problem is, perhaps, possible
only for French boys! (Condat: e-mail interview).
A different emphasis was placed upon the potential
psychological differences between men and women by a security
manager, Bob Johnson:
Most men see a problem or puzzle as a direct challenge. They
keep attacking it until it's solved, and then brag about it.
Women will fuss with a problem for a little while, decide it's
too hard, and will drop it. I've heard about experiments where
students were given puzzles with varying degrees of difficulty,
including some that were unsolveable. Men tended to keep
fighting with the unsolveable puzzles and get quite frustrated
and angry. Most women simply gave up. In discussing this
question, I got some other thought-provoking questions. How
come you don't see women working for hours on puzzles like
the Rubik's cube? How come you don't see women sitting in
front of a Nintendo game for days on end? How come there
are many more men in prisons than women? Psychological
make-up? Ethics? Sociological pressures? Peer pressure?
Different maturity levels? Western cultural roles? Who
knows?!? (Johnson: e-mail interview).
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The research found no evidence which conclusively refutes the
notion that there may be some innate gender differences in the
responses of men and women to computing and so they remain a
possible explanation. There is evidence both from the literature and
fieldwork, however, of identifiable social trends that discourage the
women from computing.
Factors (ii) and (iiii the masculine environment and gender in
language: cvbersexism?
It would seem that males involved in computing are more
predisposed to enjoy the anonymity and lack of personal contact
afforded by electronic-mail, than are their female counterparts. The
'maleness' of the cyberspace environment is reinforced by its
frontier-like status vividly described by John Perry Barlow (1990).
Such a frontier-like status also has the effect of encouraging and
emphasising the penchant adolescent males seem to have for
exploration, be it physical space or increasingly computer
cyberspace: "But then teen-age boys have been proceeding uninvited
since the dawn of human puberty. It seems hard-wired. The only
innovation is in the new form of the forbidden zone and the means of
getting in it" (Barlow 1990: 48).
Barlow, compares cyberspace to the "Wild West", and draws
attention to the machismo nature of hackers: "the actual natives are
solitary and independent, sometimes to the point of sociopathy. It is
of course a perfect breeding ground for outlaws and new ideas about
liberty" (ibid: 45). He communicated with various hackers during an
on-line conference, his initial sympathy for crackers diminished
"under a steady barrage of typed testosterone" (ibid: 46), a
machismo that is exaggerated by the nature of the medium within
which they 'electronically travel'.
Within the male-dominated world of computing there are
accusations of blatant anti-female sentiments . In an article printed
in the Computer Underground Digest and entitled "Sexism and the
CU" Liz E. Borden writes:
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skewed participation transports the male culture of values,
language, concerns, and actions, into a new world and creates
models that women must conform to or be excluded from full
membership ... BBSs, especially those catering to adolescents
and college students, are frightening in their misogyny ...
sexism is rampant on the nets. The alt.sex (bondage, gifs, what-
have-you) appeal to male fantasies of a type that degrades
women (Cud 3:00, article 4).
In the ensuing debate that this posting gave rise to, a man
replied that the misogyny in the CU is:
a sad reflection of how our society has created values by way
of mass media ... First, when measured against the standards
of today's society, "six foot, 180 lbs of tanned muscle, a full
head of perfect hair, and gorgeous eyes," few computer freaks
measure up. preferring the "safeness" of their computers ...
Computers don't turn you down for a date. As a result, a
growing misogyny appears and manifests itself through
computers where the individual can remain basically formless
through either pseudonyms, or just the relative anonymity that
comes from no-one knowing what they "look like". (Brain Scott
Wilson: CuD #3:01).
Martin Freiss, a German hacker, concurred with this assessment
of the role anonymity plays in increasing misogny in computing:
What often happens when a female appears on the network is
that the male majority "jumps" on her. The fact that many
networks allow a user to hide his real name, i.e. cloak a user in
anonymity, seems to cause many males to drop all semblance
of civilization. Sexual harassment by e-mail is not uncommon,
both in universities and commercial institutions [not excluding
the company I work for] (E-mail interview).
The world of computing may be also be less appealing to
women as a result of the fact that their small numerical presence
produces the 'threatening situation' of disproportionate interest and
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friendliness from the male computer scientists keen to meet a female
peer. Thus 'Mercury' relates how, "My wife runs a couple of AT&T
3B2s and so she belongs to a UNIX user group. She never lacks for
attention when she goes to meetings! So you can't say that hackers
are 'anti-female'. (Mercury:e-mail interview)
However, the loosening of sexual mores and inhibitions
afforded by the anonymity of the Internet is thus seen as producing
the threatening and unattractive situation that women wishing to
participate in the computer underground have complained about. An
illustration of this atmosphere is provided by a poem, published
without any accompanying criticism in CuD:
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DOES SHE DO THE VULCAN MIND MELD ON
THE FIRST DATE?
By Nick Herbert. From MONDO 2000, the
magazine for cyberspace.
"I want your bra size, baby,
Fax number. E-mail address,
Modem com code, ID,
Phone machine access.
Give me you thumb print, password,
Blood type and credit check;
Give me your anti-body spectrum,
Your immune response spec.
Let's break bread together baby,
Exchange cryptographic primes;
Let's link up our parallel ports;
And go on-line in real-time.
Let's indulge in covalent bondage;
Let's communicate in C.
Let's merge our enemy bodies
And bob in the quantum sea.
I wanna swim in your gene pool, mama;
Snort your pheromones up close range;
Tune in your neurotransmitters,
Introduce you to Doctor Strange.
I wanna surf in your quantum potentia;
Mess with your thermostat;
Wanna tour your molecular orbits;
Wanna feed your Schrodinger cat.
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Let's surgically merge our organs;
Our kidneys, our lungs and our hearts;
Let's read our physics journals together
And laugh at the dirty parts.
Let's Bell-connect our bellies
With some quantum-adhesive glue;
Let's do new stuff to each other
That Newton never knew.
I wanna feel your viscosity, honey,
Melt my rheological mind;
Let your female force-field vortex
Deform my male spacetime." (CuD#4:17)
(iv) Hacking and the role of sexuality
John Perry Barlow (1990) described the motivations of hackers
as, "exploration and thrill-seeking. Young men are hard-wired with
an urge to violate the forbidden. Over the millenia, they've found
numerous surrogates for the "real thing" they're most motivated to
violate, computers only being the most recent". A spokesman for a
group calling themselves "Toxic Shock" seems to add weight to any
Freudian-based theories that hackers may hack in order to fulfil
some deep-rooted desire to penetrate and violate, with his 'orgasmic'
description of hacking:
It doesn't happen like Wargames shows it. Oh no, it is so much
different. The geek in the movie ... he had it so easy. No real
hackers would exist if it was that easy (perhaps therein lies the
solution to the "problem"). No, we hack and hack at a system
like a man on safari, clearing away the vines of the jungle with
his machete, trying to forge ahead to a destination he cannot
yet see. We keep on, torturing our brains and pounding our
fingers on the keyboard until at last ... oh at long, sweet last ...
we are in (Toxic Shock- CuD 2:06).
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Keller further explores the sexually-based motivational
explanation of hacking initiated by "Toxic Shock": "In the sense that
hacking is a solitary and non-constructive activity, it might be
termed masturbatory. The pleasure or interest is confined to the
activity itself, and has no object, such as a lover, and no objective,
such as a demonstration of affection" (Keller 1988: 57).
(v) Hacking and machismo
Reflecting some of the above perceptions that hacking may be
motivated by gender and sexual factors, Keller (1990) explains
hacking as a manifestation of machismo: "hacking is an aberrant
behaviour related to machismo ... Machismo is an exaggerated form
of male posturing designed to demonstrate a high degree of
masculinity through the accomplishment of acts of proof, with the
object of exciting the admiration of others and (perhaps also)
demonstrating contempt for the less masculine" (Keller 1990: 58).
Using this definition of machismo to explain and conceptualise the
activity of hacking is problematic, however. For example, Keller
attempts to argue that hackers succumb to the macho vice of only
enjoying glory which accrues to the individual and is unshared. She
compares hacking to bull-running at Pamplona and argues that, "It is
necessary to act alone, to dare the bull as an individual, without the
help of others. As I have observed, the hacker is also solitary." (ibid:
59) Two of the Dutch groups interviewed, however, seemed to have
a closely-knit collective approach to their hacking activities, each
hacker tending to have their own delineated areas of specialism
which contribute to the overall group effort. For this limited sample
of groups at least, there did not seem to be an innate need to
appropriate individual glory. Keller also claims that hackers, in a
fashion similar to that seen with serial killers, generally seek
recognition of their cleverness from such establishment figures as
the law enforcement people out to catch them.
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Gongrijp and Ralph, however, both argued that the most
accomplished hackers are those whose exploits are least known. The
hackers who are most publicised tend to be those who have been
caught through technical carelessness and are sneered at by others in
the hacking community for such carelessness. From the sample of
hackers interviewed, (especially the "Zoetermeer Gang"), the desire to
receive recognition seemed to be limited to their immediate peer
group of hackers. It has already been noted that the hackers
interviewed were self-selecting in that they were willing to talk in
the first place. They were therefore interested, to some extent at
least, in receiving recognition for their activities. Although it is
difficult to gauge objectively, the extent to which their willingness to
talk about their hacking may have been due to this desire, they did
not seem to suffer from a disproportionate tendency towards
publicity-seeking. Rather there seemed to be amongst them a wish
to rectify the situation whereby their abiding interest of hacking had
received scant academic or rigorous non-sensationalised reporting.
4.3 ACADEMIC MOTIVATION THEORIES
Given that hackers are predominantly male and that this fact
may be due to a combination of social and psycho-sexual reasons, the
issue remains as to why hackers male or otherwise hack at all:
There are a lot of people interested in playing around at
hacking out of sheer curiosity and a small group whose interest
is motivated out of mischief and malevolence. There's a macho
prowess to hacking, it's a challenge. (Dr Peter Ross, Deputy
Head of Edinburgh University's Artificial Intelligence Dept.:
Student Thurs 25th Feb, pg 1).
As the above quotation illustrates, there are various and
sometimes interrelated explanations of what motivates hackers to
hack. Two academics who have theorised about the possible
psychological motivations of hacking are Joseph Weizenbaum (1976)
and Sherry Turkle (1984). Both highlight the perception that
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hacking is the preserve of compulsive computer programmers
lacking social skills.
For example, Weizenbaum's portrayal of the act of hacking
provides a seminal description of its obsessional elements:
Wherever computer centres have become established ... bright
young men of disheveled appearance, often with sunken
glowing eyes, can be seen sitting at computer consoles, their
arms tensed, and waiting to fire, their fingers, already poised to
strike at the buttons and keys on which their attention seems
to be as riveted as a gambler's on the rolling dice. When not so
transfixed they often sit at tables strewn with computer print¬
outs over which they pore like possessed students of a
cabalistic text (Weizenbaum 1976: 125).
Turkle also concentrates upon hackers as those programmers
who love the computing machine for itself, as an end in itself, rather
than as a tool, as a means to an end. Her analysis is a powerful
inquiry into the nature of compulsive programming and extreme
psychological identification with the computer as a type of emotional
mirror or even soul-mate. The motivation of the compulsive
programmer derives from the wish to escape from the contingencies
of the real world by revelling in the hygienic safety offered by the
computer.
Turkle and Weizenbaum's concentration upon compulsive
programming emphasises how it is often pursued at the expense of
the ability to conduct "normal" social relations. The stereotypical
"computer geek" therefore, is someone who finds refuge from what
seems to be a hostile world in the safety of a computing
environment. Thus Turkle describes, in language similar to that used
by Shallis in The Silicon Idol, how, "Like Narcissus and his reflection,
people who work with computers can easily fall in love with the
worlds they have constructed or with their performances in the
worlds created for them by others. Involvement with simulated
worlds affects relationships with the real one" (Turkle 1984:78).
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Turkle describes case studies of various personality types that
use the computer as a psychological refuge in this way. There is a
danger, however, that such work leads to a tendency for all hackers,
or anyone deeply enthusiastic about computing, to be predefined as
compulsively or addictively involved in computing to the detriment
of social relations. Whilst computing, along with lots of other
activities, may have its element of compulsive afficionadoes, the
research suggests that hacking and computer addiction are not
mutually inclusive. Shotton (1989), for example, focuses upon the
personalities of 'computer dependents' who may or may not be
hackers, but whom are characterised by the disproportionate amount
of time they devote to computing. She concludes that portrayals of
computer enthusiasts as socially inadequate addicts is inaccurate:
Early readings about 'computer junkies' and 'hackers' suggested
that if I pursued this research I might spend my time with
people who were barely human and who were unable to
converse with others on any meaningful level. How untrue this
proved to be. I met some of the most fascinating people of my
life. They were intelligent, lively, amusing, original, inventive
and very hospitable...They were pursuing an interest which not
only provided intellectual challenge, fun and excitement in
infinite variety, but one which enabled many of them to
improve their career prospects considerably. Many used
computers not only at home but also at work, and true
fulfilment must come to those who are able to combine their
hobby with a means of earning a living (Shotton 1989: Preface).
Turkle is eventually forced to recognise that hacking is not
reducible to compulsive programming. Thus she describes the
concept of "the hack" and separates it from her discussion of
computer addiction: a step that Weizenbaum eschews. Models of
people using computers for psycho-sexual reasons of dependence or
insecurity may give an accurate description of some compulsive
programmers but they are lacking as a full explanation of the causes
and implications of the type of hacking encountered in this study, the
defining quality of which is the desire to achieve a hack.
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4.4 HACKERS' DESCRIPTIONS OFWHY THEY HACK.
Having established what it is to hack, there follow excerpts
from members of the hacking community describing the particular
reasons why they hack. They show how hackers perceive
themselves and their social position, as opposed to the
interpretations of 'outside groups'. The CSI, for example, are accused
of emphasising the vandal-orientated motivations and pathological
psychological aspects of hacking. The limitation of a purely
psychological approach are outlined below by a hacker, 'Mofo the
Clown'. He emphasises the distinction to be made between a hacker
and a 'vandal':
'Hacker' to me is a term which defines an individual who
succumbs to his/her thirst for knowledge (and the computing
power that accompanies that knowledge). A 'hacker' will not
ever maliciously commit or condone and action of destruction
(be it physical or electronic) of computers or data. A vandal
rejoices in his/her ability to wreak havoc upon systems run by
ignorant individuals. Most often such a vandal will not seek to
maintain accessibility to systems that he/she has compromised.
Instead, seeking to destroy data or make life generally more
difficult for users and administrators. Vandals feel the need
for power as manifested in the microcosm of the machine
(Mofo: e-mail interview).
In the course of this study the following main motivations for
hacking were encountered:
1. Feelings of Addiction.
2. The urge of curiosity.
3. Boredom with educational system.
4. Enjoyment of feelings of power.
5. Peer Recognition.
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Turkle, Shotton and Weizenbaum, as we have seen, have
addressed category 1, whilst Keller alone has briefly treated category
5. The other categories have been largely ignored, a gap this study's
fieldwork evidence seeks to fill.
4.4.1 FEELINGS OF ADDICTION
(i) Fieldwork evidence
Evidence of the compulsive behaviour the academic literature
identifies is also apparent from the hackers themselves:
Damn kid. All he does is play games. They're all alike. And
then it happened ... a door opened to a world ... rushing through
the phone line like heroin through an addicts veins, an
electronic pulse is sent out, a refuge from the day-to-day
incompetencies is sought ... a board is found. "This is it...this is
where I belong (The "Mentor". Phrack - Vol 1 Iss 7).
We are addicted to information and knowledge, and our drugs
are withheld from us. We are forced to seek our precious
information and knowledge elsewhere. We have to find
challenge somewhere, somehow, or it tears our very souls
apart. And we are, eventually, forced to enter someone's
system (The Toxic Shock Group CuD no. 2.06).
Addictive affinity with computers is illustrated often by the
choice of words hackers use to express themselves. President of the
French Computer Chaos Club, Jean-Paul Condat:
All the hackers that I know in France, have (or have had
serious problems with their parents. Some speak only by
computer or only the computer matters. Hacking for a real
hacker is the only reason to live! Without background ideas.
Like drinking water for a human body. The lack of
computers/software to hack make the hacker ill at ease
(Condat: e-mail interview).
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Maelstrom described his urge to hack in terms which in
addition to making use of addictive imagery also lend weight to
Turkle's theory that hackers may use the computer as some sort of
psychological prop:
I just do it because it makes me feel good, as in better than
anything else that I've ever experienced. Computers are the
only thing that have ever given me this feeling ... the
adrenaline rush I get when I'm trying to evade authority, the
thrill I get from having written a program that does something
that was supposed to be impossible to do, and the ability to
have social relations with other hackers are all very addictive.
I get depressed when I'm away from a networked computer
for too long. I find conversations held in cyberspace much
more meaningful and enjoyable than conversing with people in
physical-reality real mode. For a long time, I was extremely
shy around others, and I am able to let my thoughts run free
when I am alone with my computer and a modem hooked up to
it. I consider myself addicted to hacking. If I were ever in a
position where I knew my computer activity was over with for
the rest of my life, I would suffer withdrawal. (Maelstrom: e-
mail interview).
The addictive aspects of hacking, however, only partially
describe an activity that has an array of intermingled motivations.
Feelings of addiction are not the sine qua non of the activity.
Johnson, approached the question of compulsion by making a
distinction between intellectual curiosity and compulsion with the
use of an analogy:
An automobile mechanic when fixing a motor should find the
problem, replace broken parts, and complete the job. If he
indulged his intellectual curiosity, he might take apart some of
the motor, in order to see how it works ... If the mechanic tears
the motor completely apart, or goes home and spends every
waking moment tearing down and rebuilding car motors, then
his behaviour has become compulsive. Will it make him a
better mechanic in the long run? Probably, if he doesn't burn
out (or his wife doesn't kill him). If he starts sneaking into his
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neighbour's garage at midnight to "work on" his neighbour's
BMW, something's dreadfully wrong (Johnson: e-mail
interview).
Johnson makes the point that compulsion does not have to
necessarily equate with hacking. The compulsion that some hackers
show causes a mystique around hacking simply because computers
appear to the public as more mysterious and esoteric than other
technological artefacts with which they have more knowledge and
everyday contact. The 'wizard-like' and addictive images of hackers
portrayed in popular representations of their activity may therefore
lessen as computers becomes less novel and more widely integrated
into society:
We have seen the same kind of compulsive curiosity with
Nintendo video game systems here in the States. Kids will
literally spend days playing a single game, until they master it.
There is nothing inherently compulsive in computers, any more
than in booze, drugs, television, food, work, art or anything
else. Compulsive behaviour is found in people, not in things. A
person can be compulsive about anything. It's just more
interesting when a person is compulsive about computers, than
if they're compulsive about clothes or cars. Hackers are not
necessarily compulsive. Computer addicts are not necessarily
hackers (Johnson: e-mail interview).
Hacking, therefore, does not have to have predominantly
negative effects upon its practitioners, and it is perhaps unfair to
attribute to computers qualities of addiction, whilst similar
behaviour would not be so described in relation to other activities.
In so far as computer/hacking addiction would imply a reduced
ability to socially interact, at least those hackers interviewed seemed
to belie the stereotype of the hacker as the computer geek. Several
of the hackers interviewed had started their own computer security
businesses with an entrepreneurial zeal that sits uncomfortably with
the image of reclusive 'computer geeks'.
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John Butler (Edinburgh University computing officer), provided
his own interpretation of some of the reasons why hacking may
become compulsive or addictive. He related how some course
administrators had asked him to deny internet access to certain
students because they had become "NewsNet Junkies". His
observation was that computing offers "an alternative reality and
there's a disconnection between it and the real world" (Butler:
Edinburgh interview). This disconnection can then prove to be a
source of hacking addiction since hackers working for many long
hours in such an "alternate reality", may begin to have increasing
difficulty distinguishing between their reality and the real world.
A specific reason why hackers may be viewed as compulsive
by outsiders to their "alternative world" was described by Mike who
argued that the speed of change of the computing environment,
identified earlier as a distinctive part of hacking culture, means that
they have to approach their past-time with above average
application:
No, it's not compulsive, but if you stop, if you don't do it for one
week then things change, the network always changes. It
changes very quickly and you have to keep up and you have to
learn all the tricks by heart, the default passwords, the bugs
you need. If you want to get into a system you have to try
anything, so you have to know every bug (Utrecht interview).
Hackers, therefore, have an immediate tendency to involve
themselves with their alternative reality to a greater extent than
that contemplated by more 'nine-to-five-minded' computer people.
(ii) The Bedworth case
"COMPUTERS TURNED MY BOY INTO A ROBOT" -Daily Mirror headline
Mar 18th, 1993.
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Below is the Independent newspaper's editorial response to the
most recent significant hacking incident: the prosecution of an
Edinburgh University Student, Paul Bedworth, the first prosecution
under the 1990 Computer Misuse Act. The case ended in an acquittal
on March 17th, 1993:
It was agreed that Mr Bedworth had broken into numerous
computers in Britain and abroad by calling from the BBC
microcomputer in his bedroom; that he had changed the data
inside those computers; and that he had made more than
50,000 calls for which he had not paid. But his counsel found
an expert witness to convince the jury that the hacker had no
intent to commit the crimes, because he was so addicted to his
computer that he was no longer responsible for his actions (The
Independent: Thurs, March 1993).
This case is the best example to date of the issue of addiction
and hacking. It also returns us to some of the issues discussed in
Chapter 3 regarding the potentially dehumanising effects of
computer technology. Bedworth's barrister, Mr Alistair Kelman
argued that: "Mr Bedworth was ... someone who had grown up with
computers and been damaged by them. 'When a kid's best friend
becomes a computer rather than a member of their family then you
are courting trouble' " (Independent March 1993). The extent of this
trouble is illustrated in the following description:
Paul Bedworth is small and slightly built but he was strong
enough to push his mother down a flight of attic stairs when
she tried to stop him using his computer ... So great was Paul's
obsession that the only way Mrs Bedworth could force him to
take a break was by switching off the electricity supply at the
mains ... Only sheer exhaustion would force Paul to stop. His
mother would find him slumped across the keyboard or face
down on the carpet where he had collapsed. 'It was so
worrying because he would be lying there with his nose in the
carpet looking like he had fainted or was dead' (Scotsman
18.3.1993: pg 3).
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Professor Griffith-Edwards from the Addiction Research Unit in
London, was called as an expert witness. His description of Bedworth
was, "One is looking at a young man with monstrously abnormal
behaviour. I would classify him as suffering from a mental disorder,
as distinct from a mental illness, but a very serious one" (The
Scotsman 18.3.1993: pg 3). The response to the Bedworth case,
although predominantly emphasising his obsessional nature also
added weight to Johnson's assessment of compulsive hacking being a
particular example of a single-mindedness apparent in various
otherwise harmless endeavours. Prof Osborne from Swansea
University Psychology dept, consulted after the verdict argued that:
"Computer addicts may sit in their bedroom for long hours but I am
not sure there is any different personality trait here than in a
compulsive gardener", whilst Shotton, replying to the accusation that
hackers tend to be disproportionately introverted, makes the point
that: "This is quite normal behaviour. Not all people are gregarious
and raving extroverts. Heaven help the world if everyone was" (The
Times 18.3.1993: pg 5). Furthermore, the intellectual aspects of
hacking mean that it is more likely to be excusable as a type of
commendable attempt to exercise the mind, than it is to be
condemned as a solitary obsessive waste of time.
4.4.2 Curiosity - humans and technology
What a hacker does primarily is relentlessly pursue an answer.
Computers naturally lend themselves to this sort of pursuit,
since they tend to be patient when asked a lot of questions
(Goldstein: CuD 5.43).
Hackers emphasise the innate curiosity with which all human
beings approach technology and from which technological
improvements and adaptations are ultimately derived. The 'hacker
mentality' therefore is seen as a positive attribute which drives
forward technological development. The fact that hacker culture is
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replete with artefacts, results in hackers having more opportunities
to indulge their curiosity:
Oppression is our only reward ... yet if it were not for people
like us, all of you who wake up each day to an alarm clock, or
drive to work in your fine new car after cutting on your
security system, while drinking that cup of coffee you didn't
have to get up to prepare, would still be living in a cave,
somewhere near Africa, grunting and reproducing, eating the
raw meat of some beast you hunted down with clubs, trying to
ignore the cold that seeps in through the animal skins you
wear, and wondering why some curious person with some
intelligence, creativity, and ingenuity would come along and
invent the wheel (Toxic shock 1990).
4.4.3 Boredom aspects
In contrast to, and as a result of, the hacker penchant for
exploration is a low threshold of boredom for computing activities
not of their own choosing. One of the most common complaints I
encountered when talking with hackers was that they were bored
with the computing education they received in a formal learning
setting such as university or college. The following quotation
illustrates the depth of feeling of hackers have concerning the extent
to which they feel orthodox education methods have failed to
address their needs:
we've been spoon-fed baby food at school when we hungered
for steak ... the bits of meat that you did let slip through were
pre-chewed and tasteless. We've been dominated by sadists or
ignored by the apathetic. The few that had something to teach
found us willing pupils, but those few are like drops of water in
the desert (The "Mentor". Phrack - Vol 1 Iss 7).
The quotation vividly portray the hacker argument that
boredom with the educational system is a contributing factor to their
activity. Related to these feelings of being educationally
circumscribed are those which result from i) lack of mental
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stimulation in computing courses, ii) inadequate access to computing
facilities.
(i) Lack of mental stimulation
Examples of the views articulated in the above quotation
abound in the fieldwork. Thorn Van Os and the Zoetermeer group of
hackers claimed to be signally underchallenged by their assignments
at university. For others, once their boredom is removed and they
are given responsibility, the urge to crack may stop. John Draper
claimed that this was his experience when he was made the manager
of a system used by students, whom he found himself disciplining
and discouraging from destructive acts. The experience of 'Faustus'
seems to verify the idea that removing boredom from the minds of
hackers means that their abilities can be more productively utilised.
He relates how:
kids are bored and feel powerless in a system run by often
unfriendly adults, and cracking is their only way to assert
themselves. Very often a clever cracker is made into a system
manager, and this is a good way to make him stop cracking,
since once he is "part of the system", the frustration that is the
reason for attacking it disappears. When I was a kid (i.e. 16-
18) I spent some time trying to crack systems, but nothing
serious. I quickly became a "manager type" and haven't had
any motivation since then to mess with security (Faustus: e-
mail interview).
Thus added responsibility may limit the need to hack but may
still not satisfy the illicit thrill associated with unauthorised
intrusions. J.C. Van Winkel a software engineer and researcher who
has worked in various "tiger teams", and has been used to test the
security of various sites relates how:
I did hacking because for me it was a way to learn more about
the system, curiosity and not anything else, I wanted to learn
more about it and they didn't give me enough information. I
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mean I was pretty good at that time, I got high grades and
didn't have to do anything about it, so I was bored if I didn't do
anything and together with a couple of colleagues we wrote
programs that were far from what the normal scientists wrote
... I think a lot of it's boredom and people like to have puzzles, I
mean why do people do crosswords?... it's the same thing with
hackers ...We took the most difficult assignments because we
liked to do it, on the other hand, curiosity will never be
satisfied (J.C. Van Winkel: Appledorn interview).
There is perhaps the intractable problem, that whereas hackers
seem to need their curiosity and intellects satisfied, it is likely that
for some people at least such curiosity is insatiable.
(ii) Lack of access
A common complaint encountered in the research from hackers
and dovish elements of the CSI, was that hacking is exacerbated due
to hackers lack of access to computing facilities:
It is my contention that if Robert Morris had a legitimate venue
for exploration, he would not have launched a virus on the
Internet. If the Dark Avenger (who wrote a virus of the same
name) had been given some guidance, he would not have
launched the virus (I have met him and am now convinced that
he is being turned 'to the good side' by several caring people
who saw his plight and are spending the necessary time with
him). I know that many of the 'hackers' I knew when I was
younger would gladly have done their work with permission,
but the paranoia and maniacal attitudes of those in the
computing community prevented the legitimate exercise of
their interests (Dr Cohen: e-mail interview).
The specific experience of Brian Thompsett, a Computer Science
Lecturer at Hull University (formerly of Edinburgh University),
further illustrates the complaint regarding adequate access to
facilities. He experienced what he perceived to be a limitation of
access to computing facilities from Edinburgh University Computing
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Service (EUCS). The dispute centred on whether his work fulfiled the
EUCS regulation of computing access only being given to those whose
requirements satisfied the criteria of "reasonable usage", after a
drawn-out dispute Thompsett was given a machine to do with as he
pleased, he further related how:
Now I had the computer I began to realise that I wasn't the
only victim of the strange rules on computer usage. I decided
to run the donated machine on a laissez-faire basis. This is
working well. The basis of the arrangement is that people can
explore computers on my machine. It acts as a honey-pot
principle. If we let them burn out their nasty tendencies in my
sand-pit then they leave the rest of the EUCS machines alone.
If they mess around in the sand pit the other kids push them
out. Works so far. So it boils down to this. I have a machine
on which lots of users might be considered 'naughty boys'
elsewhere, but on my machine they get to play without
monster nanny breathing down their neck. They manage to
mature quite nicely in a year or so. Some of my kiddies have
now evolved into quite responsible people. Several important
machines in the U.K. are now managed by some people in my
user community (Thompsett: e-mail interview).
Thompsett's open-access machine became known as 'The
Tardis', privileged users/supervisors becoming known as 'Time
Lords', one of whom, Malcom Campbell (Edinburgh interview),
concurred with Thompsett's opinion that the project helps to mature
computer users that might otherwise turn to electronic vandalism.
The argument, similar to those used in 'real world' acts of vandalism,
contends that users who have a stake in the 'system' are unlikely to
jeopardise their user rights. The sanction of exclusion from the
Tardis system proved to be an effective deterrent for would-be
malicious hackers.
Another area of complaint is that even when courses do
stimulate they are accompanied by a lack of access to systems. This
lack of access is compounded by a lack of university courses for
those hackers too young to attend, yet sometimes extremely able.
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The contention is that a lack of access to mailing facilities and the
internet news etc. is a major cause of hacking. A contributing factor
is the cost of using various systems.
Critics of hacking would question the right of hackers to make
use of other people's telecommunication systems without paying for
the privilege. The hackers interviewed, however, claimed that they
had no ethical qualms in using facilities they would not otherwise be
able to afford and that the nature of communication technologies is
such that the marginally increased use of the system by hackers,
does not lead to increased prices for other consumers. Maelstrom
applied this argument to both communication systems and software
copyright protection:
I've learnt a bit about the Unix and VMS operating systems,
have made many friends via TALK and PHONE utilities, and
now know a lot more about computer security than I ever
thought I would. I will have no moral or ethical qualms
whatsoever about system hacking until accounts are available
to the general public for free. MSU's $460 per year charge for
an internet connection for telenetting just doesn't cut it for a
high school or college student who is strapped for cash ... For a
computer enthusiast to go by the law would be to spend
hundreds of dollars per month on programs and various
accounts on systems. Hacking will always exist in some form or
another until a person can do things without losing his shirt
(Maelstrom: e-mail interview).
James Carlson, involved in commercial computing, does regard
most underground activities as due to a lack of access to adequate
facilities:
Nearly all are benign. I did some of this kind of hacking myself
when I was in high school. I think I did it mainly because
there were few facilities available for my use ... and the only
ones that were available (at school) were highly restricted ...
How about just providing better facilities and access for new
users? Why can't ALL people get electronic- mail? Why can't
everyone have access to open systems? These things would
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provide a more-than-necessary distraction for the average
hacker (Carlson: e-mail interview).
Coggans, in addition, argues:
If people were given legitimate access to the systems they
wanted to learn about, and were given the ability to send mail
and communicate with each other interactively, much of the
hacking would subside. Having a legal internet account is what
has saved me. I can still blab with my peers on IRC, I can send
mail to everyone, and I can snoop around via FTP completely
legally on a UNIX VMS or NOS! That in addition to the systems
I am given limited permission to access via clients contracts,
my needs are fulfilled completely, and I have no desire to
access systems which are forbidden to me. I think if people
were given this type of arrangement early on, it would curb
the urge to break into other sites (Coggans: e-mail interview).
Rop Gongrijp, further argued that the technical knowledge of
increasingly young hackers sits ill with the lack of opportunity that
those young hackers have to exercise that knowledge. They are
aware of the internet, which will not be accessible to them until they
are 19-20:
I mean I know a few kids that I associate with, they have no
option, they are 14, they can't wait, what do I tell them? "Well,
just be good for a while, put up with the fact that they have
nothing but boring assignments for you, and it'll be five years
before you have any assignments at all ... And then in five
years you might be able to work in a completely censored
environment ... Am I supposed to say that to 14 year olds that
want to explore? Great prospect, so I tell them, go ahead, hack,
don't break anything but explore what you want to explore,
grab your computer and modem and see what's out there, I
mean if that takes breaking into systems that they don't want
you into for the next five years, do it. I think there is a moral
right for that kid to go out and explore keeping people away
from technology or anything that long does not work (Gongrijp:
Amsterdam interview).
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4.4.4 Eniovment of feelings of power
Becoming computer literate, comments Paul Kalaghan, dean of
computer science at Northeastern University, 'is a chance to
spend your life working with devices smarter than you are,
and yet have control over them. It's like carrying a six-gun on
the old frontier (Roszak '86: 67)
Linked to the previously mentioned notion of machismo in
hacking culture is the motivational factor of power. Journalistic
investigations of hacking have tended to concentrate on the "power"
element behind hacking activity. Without doubt, however, feelings
of power do complement the main motivation of curiosity, in Beating
the System Edward Singh is reported as confessing that:
Part of it was a sense of power. You were running an informal
network of about 250 computers and no-one else outside your
close circle of friends knew about it. The final goal was total
world domination, to have everything under control. It was
the ultimate game on the ultimate scale. You got a thrill out of
knowing how much power you had. It was possibly hitting
back at society. There was a sort of political anarchism
involved. The main thrill was beating the system (Bowcott and
Hamilton 1990:42).
From Singh's rather dramatic analysis of his own actions
Bowcott and Hamilton derived the title for their book on hacking.
Immediately after the above 'confession', however, they admit that
on another occasion Singh accounted for his actions as being
primarily motivated by intellectual enjoyment. To a limited extent,
there was acceptance of the concept of power as a motivating factor
by the hackers interviewed. Thus Thorn Van Os of the "Zoetermeer
gang" of hackers commented, "Most of the hackers do it for the kicks,
I suppose. Breaking into a bigger or more important system, or
acquiring root-status can give you a real feeling of power and you
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seem to have proved yourself better than the system administrator"
(Zoetermeer interview).
In the unusual interviewing situation referred to in the
methodology chapter, the issue of power as a possible motivation of
hacking was raised with Kevin Mitnick: 'the dark-side hacker'
portrayed as determined to make nefarious use of the power
computers offered over other people. Mitnick denied the suggestion
that he was ever motivated by any sinister factors such as strong
yearnings of power, but recognised that some hacking is carried out
for criminal gain. Instead, he hacked because:
You get a better understanding of the cyberspace, the computer
systems, the operating systems, how the computer systems
interact with one another, that basically, was my motivation
behind my hacking activity in the past, it was just from the
gain of knowledge and the thrill of adventure, nothing that was
well and truly sinister such as trying to get any type of
monetary gain or anything (Mitnick: telephone interview,
Holland - USA).
Another example of hackers deriving what could be labelled as
a hypothetical, as opposed to a malevolent sense of power, is their
collection of potentially destructive information for the simple act of
collection rather than any particular use to which it could be put.
Hack-Tic shares with such publications as Phrack and TAP, the
characteristic of containing much esoteric, yet potentially dangerous
information. Thus throughout issues of Phrack are instructions on
how to make various explosives such as Nitro-Gylcerine. To most
people outside the hacking world, such information and its
promulgation would seem, at best, of dubious value and, at worst,
extremely irresponsible. The fact that hackers spread, but would be
extremely unlikely to use such knowledge for any concrete purpose,
is indicative of their general ethos that purports information to be of
value or interest in its own right. This may partially explain the fact
that much hacking activity does not seem to have any "useful"
eventual purpose. The activity is an end in itself and the intellectual
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exercise of gaining knowledge is its own justification. Rop explains
this tendency of his magazine and those like Phrack of disseminating
diverse forms of technological knowledge irrespective of the possible
uses or value of that information, as follows:
the information is out there and the people who are going to
make bombs have the information anyway, if you want to
make a bomb you can get all the information on how to build a
nuclear bomb if you want to, you just look in the library, and
it's just that so many people enjoy reading about something
they will never do just for the sake of reading about it. I mean
if I publish a scheme on how to rob ATM's (automatic telling
machines) and I make the scheme real elaborate, where it
takes video cameras and organisation, nobody's probably going
to do that except the people that already knew how to do that
anyway. It's only for the sense of adventure of the people that
read that and think "wow! this is great: a sense of power"
(Gongrijp: Amsterdam interview).
The informational content of such magazines as Hack-Tic,
however, can be of practical use. It is generally concerned with
electronic gadgetry and 'blue-box technology' for phreaking free
phone calls. The magazine has, for example, gained some notoriety
by giving details of how to make free phone calls from public pay-
phones, and this has called into question some of the above claims of
the disinterested publication of information.
4.4.5 Peer recognition and hacking culture
The final motivational category is that of a sense of peer
recognition. One example of an individual looking for recognition
outside of a group of hackers is that provided by the account of
Gerry Santoro from Penn State University:
About two years ago a teaching assistant (T.A.) for my
Computing in the Humanities class figured out the password for
one of my mainframe disks. He then proceeded to copy files
from me, including a file that listed all students and their
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passwords. When the T.A. was caught he denied having done
this, claiming that he didn't know how he got the files. At the
same time, other members of the student computing
community reported that he was bragging about how he had
'outsmarted' the computer center and that no files were safe
from his intrusion if he desired. I believe this particular
student did if for the peer-group status that it afforded. This
particular student did not have much of a social life outside of
classes, and therefore this was a realistic route for obtaining (in
his mind) a positive self-image (Santoro e-mail interview).
Hackers themselves admit to this element of peer-encouraged
behaviour. Maelstrom admitted that:
Peer recognition was very important, when you were
recognised, you had access to more. For instance, on chat
systems where private channels could be set up and people
could only enter by invitation, you had to be known and
respected before you got to join the discussion. Also, many
people hacked for fame as well as the rush. Anyone who gets
an informative article in a magazine (i.e. Phrack, NIA, etc) can
be admitted to bulletin boards. Finding new user passwords
requires only a few contacts, and contacts can be found on chat
systems (even public non-hacker ones) (Maelstrom e-mail
interview).
Direct personal experience of such peer recognition was hard to
gain from the fieldwork because interviews, with the exception of
the Zoetermeer group and the hackers at the headquarters of Hack-
Tic, were only carried out on a one to one basis. This largely
precluded the possibility of gauging the extent to which status
amongst their peers motivates hackers to hack. The Zoetermeer
group's activity was largely based upon their university contact with
each other, and their individual hacking was encouraged by there
being a receptive audience amongst both an inner and outer group of
admirers:
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Hacking can be rewarding in itself, because it can give you a
real kick sometimes. But it can give you a lot more satisfaction
and recognition if you can share your experiences with others.
Next to that it is very useful if you operate in a group, because
many know more than one alone. I think the group nature is
important because of the recognition you can get from the
group; doing bigger and better hacks clearly distinguishes you
from other people. Here at my school the group nature is also
very important in providing a competitive environment which
proves very motivating. Without this group I would never
have spent so much time behind the terminals digging into the
operating system. Our group consists of a core of about 6/7
people and lots of people hanging around (in blind admiration
;-) ) (Zoetermeer interview).
4.5 CONCLUSION
The analysis of hacking culture prepares the ground for the
explanation contained within the subsequent chapters of the process
by which society responds to hacking. Having given a full account of
the nature of the CU, it is then possible to evaluate more accurately
the conditions that allow hacking to continue; the extent to which it is
of potential benefit or poses a threat to the computing industry; and
the likely success and implications of measures taken to eliminate it.
This chapter's portrayal of hacking culture was predominantly based
upon hackers' own descriptions of their milieu, added to which are
the identifiable elements of the culture encountered during the
course of the fieldwork. This 'internalist' account of hacking can be
compared later in the study to the various ways in which groups
outside of hacking perceive the activity: the 'externalist account'. It
is the conflict between the two perceptions that gives rise to the
process of closure.
The chapter identifies various elements of hacking culture.
Building a definitive picture of such a culture, however, is inherently
unachievable. The CU presents itself as a 'gossamer framework' of
contacts and communication networks, the insubstantiality of which
is exacerbated by computer networking's anonymous qualities. It is
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further heightened by the climate of secrecy resulting from the fear
and suspicion that arose after various legal crackdowns on hacking.
In conjunction with the additional motivational categories of
addiction and power-seeking, this chapter has expanded upon the
issues raised in Chapter 3 regarding the nature of the relationship
between human beings and technology. The implications of the
relationship are ambivalent. It forms both a rebuttal to, and
confirmation of, concerns that technology dominates people instead
of vice versa. Hackers reject technological domination to the extent
that they revel in any opportunities they find to demonstrate their
power to control computer systems; yet they also reinforce concerns
of technological determinism in the instances where they epitomise
addictive reliance on artefacts. Apart from the strength with which
hackers such as Maelstrom express their feelings and their
accompanying use of addictive language, their statements are
interesting for the emphasis they give to the social aspects of
hacking. Hacking on the one hand has qualities symptomatic of an
addictive pastime, with all the accompanying connotations of
enervation, and yet at the same time, it can actually be a positive
influence on developing more sociable personality traits, as shown by
Maelstrom's account of how he feels much less shy and inhibited
conversing by computer than he does in 'physical reality mode'. The
common depiction of hackers as people who have personality
difficulties due to their obsessive use of computers may therefore be
too simplistic. Hacking may attract a disproportionate amount of
people with a predisposition to shyness and a lack of social skills.
The overall effect of hacking upon such people, instead of
exacerbating such traits, may in fact counter them.
Despite the various weaknesses of the 'Machismo model', the
evidence does suggest that deep-rooted gender differences account
for the overwhelming predominance of men as opposed to women
who exhibit "Nintendo perseverance" and the destructive tendencies
of some virus-writers. The reason why gender differences still
persist in less destructive areas of hacking is more likely to be due to
societal factors which, in turn, are more liable to be eventually
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rectified to produce conditions more favourable to increased female
participation. The extent to which such psychological factors as those
identified by Turkle persist, will obviously limit the extent to which
improvements in these conditions can be made.
The preponderance of men in hacking implies the dominance of
'hard' mastery over its more feminine 'soft' counterpart. The fact
that hard mastery relies heavily upon objectivity and instrumental
reasoning would seem to reduce the alternative culture status of
hacking, since these two qualities are aspects of technological usage
that are typically criticised in calls for technologies that embody
more humane values. The danger of some computer users exhibiting
addictive tendencies towards their activity also undermines
arguments for hacking's technologically liberating potential.
It is important to have a balanced understanding of what
motivates hacking, especially if policies are to be developed with
which to tap it, channel it in other directions, or to reduce it. The
thorough examination of motivations in this chapter, has
demonstrated that there is a complex mix of factors underpinning
hacking, although many of these tend to be ignored by the academic
studies that emphasise its more obsessional aspects. The fact that
the factors motivating hacking are frequently intermingled
complicates the task facing policies aimed at combatting hacking. For
example, one of the apparent causes of the activity, is the coexistence
of hackers' intelligence with what they perceive to be the boredom of
an educational environment that fails to stimulate. A logical
response aimed at limiting the incidence of hacking, therefore, would
be to increase the interest quotient of the courses. However, even if
this could be achieved, the illicit thrill of exercising anti-bureaucratic
power would still make it likely that hacking would continue to some
extent. The evidence would thus seem to predict that no one solution
aimed at eliminating hacking will succeed in addressing the mix of
possible motivations that fuel the act.
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5.6 CONCLUSION
5.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines the state of security within computing
and why it has weaknesses that allow hackers to access other
peoples' computer systems. It analyses the problems of adequately
structuring programs associated with the 'software crisis' and how
those problems are reflected in both the earliest and current forms
of hacking. The chapter outlines the extent to which security flaws
exist; the reasons they are not eliminated; and the potential role
hackers might have as correctors of such faults.
From both the quantitative and qualitative fieldwork, there
was a general consensus of opinion from the CSI and CU that there
are large and continuing security faults in many systems. The
reasons given for such flaws are both technical and commercial:
computer systems are intrinsically insecure in the sense that they
cannot be guaranteed, a priori, to be totally impervious to intrusion;
commercial pressures are such that there is a tendency to skimp on
the security measures and procedures that do exist; and similarly,
education about computer security suffers from a low profile in both
the academic and business sectors.
Once it has been established that there is a fundamental need
for security improvements within computing, the chapter looks at
hackers' claims that they have real technical knowledge that could be
used to provide them. The question then arises as to why
cooperation between the CSI and the CU does not occur on a larger
scale and why hackers do not now have the level of acceptance
enjoyed in their early MIT days. Chapter Six describes how the first
hackers were largely tolerated because their knowledge was valued
and useful despite its often unusual methods of acquistion. What
was once tolerated in the academic pursuit of knowledge, however, is
no longer tolerable in the increasingly commercial environment of
computing, the changing nature of which has led to a hardening of
attitudes towards hackers. As a result the CU's expertise in security
is not generally utilised by the CSI. Generally poor quality of security
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within computing coexists with the potential for technical fixes from
the hacking community. This leads to the assumption that hackers
are being marginalised away from a core of influence within
computing and that this is due primarily to social rather than
technical reasons: an example of a technology's development being
caused by a deliberate process of social shaping. This chapter
therefore provides the initial evidence for the argument that a
process of closure and stabilisation has occurred within computing.
The chapter also adds to the description of the constituency of
computing initiated in the previous chapter, by describing the nature
of the computer security 'industry' and the way in which their
external view of hacking compares with the hackers' internalist
account. The previous analysis of the hacking community has
illustrated the way in which it defines itself and how elements of its
behaviour may set it apart from other members of the computing
community. Culture formation is an on-going process and the
delineation of boundaries between the CU and the rest of computing
depends upon this active differentiation from others. Elements of
the CSI wholeheartedly oppose hacking and its purported ethic, and
the subsequent exercise of closure whereby it undertakes to isolate
the CU is also part of the process by which the CSI promotes its own
identity.
This identity, however, is not unequivocally established. In
contrast, to the amorphous nature of the CU, the CSI consists of those
who live in the institutional worlds of business or academia.
Although the CSI therefore has more of an institutional setting, it too
lacks an identifiable culture in the sense that it has no official
professional structure. People gain a reputation as computer
professionals with security expertise, expertise often gained on an ad
hoc basis. The term 'CSI' is thus used guardedly, there are, for
example, various figures that have changed their nominal group
status: previous members of the CU are now involved in the
provision of security services, a phenomenon characterised as 'the
poacher-turned-game-keeper' scenario, and academics such as
Herschberg straddle both main groups. Within the CSI itself, there
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are two broad, conflicting strands of opinion regarding hacking: the
'hawks' and the 'doves'. As the two phrases imply, the former
strongly oppose hackers whilst the latter advocate listening to their
views and in some cases actively cooperating with them in order to
improve computer security. These two groups are two extremes of a
spectrum of opinion with regard to hackers. The rationale behind
both their views is explored in preparation for the next chapter's
analysis of the specific processes by which the CSI forms its opinions
about hackers.
5.2 THE EXISTENCE OF SECURITY WEAKNESSES
5.2.1 Qualitative evidence
The hackers interviewed related their experiences of their
unauthorised intrusions into computer systems. Their accounts
illustrated computing's poor state of security. In addition, the
general impression encountered in the fieldwork from members of
the CSI was one of resignation as to the continued future likelihood
of serious security breaches:
I have been in more systems than one can imagine, ranging
from military installations, financial installations, to soda
companies. I have seen insider-trading information, had access
to transferrable funds, had the ability to manipulate credit
information and have had complete control over phone
networks (Chris Coggans: e-mail interview).
I obtained a whole slew of accounts on Eastern Michigan
University's VAX/VMS system. I've also gotten into very
critical test-creation accounts at colleges and unversities. It's
amazing how easy it often is to get into important accounts that
many instructors access (Maelstrom: e-mail interview).
The fact that computer systems are vulnerable to attack is
ironically underlined by the fact that hackers have been criticised for
seldom, if ever, making use of original, previously unknown security
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weaknesses. The incident of the Internet Worm, for example, was
often referred to as 'an accident waiting to happen'. To compound
matters, even when specific technical fixes have been produced for
some of the threats posed by hackers, the incremental nature of
much software development is such that hackers can make use, not
only of technical weaknesses in systems, but also the logistical
problems encountered in attempting to fix them:
Hackers rarely exploit the full spectrum of IT risks! Apart
from a few instances, such as worm technology and stealth
viruses), hackers actually use rather primitive methods to
access systems, program and data. E.g. the NASA hack
exploited a hole in a DEC VMS version when this hole was in
prinicipal already patched; while DEC customers had received
(and hopefully installed) the patch when the attack was
undertaken, the hackers used a second-hand system (not
bought directly from DEC) whose existence was not known to
DEC, and where the patch was not sent! (Brunnstein: e-mail
interview).
Coggans illustrates the relative ease with which unauthorised
access can be gained to computer systems. In his description of
several of his break-ins, he claims to have seen:
The advertising campaign outlines for 'new' Coke months
before its release; insider stock trading information in mail on
Citibank computers, electronic fund transfer systems; military
systems with 'sensitive' non-classified information, phone
company computers that allow you to listen in on any
telephone call in that area; credit computers; the ministry of
treasury system in South Africa (whose MOTD [Message Of The
Day] changed to "end apartheid now" as if by magic) (Coggans:
e-mail interview).
Maelstrom and Coggans also both described the way in which
their phone-phreaking activities combined with their computing
knowledge to enable them to enjoy unbilled international
129
teleconferencing, in addition to the ability to eavesdrop at will on
other peoples' telephone calls. Maelstrom recounted how he:
learnt to use the Michigan C/NA (Customer Name and Address)
bureau, which allowed me to dial up a computer and, after
entering a passcode, use touch tones to get information on the
owner of any Michigan telephone number. Some of my friends
from around the world would start AT&T Alliance
teleconferences every so often, and we would talk throughout
the night, sometimes for as long as 12 hours at a shot (which
was probably not good for grades at school). On one
memorable conference Cellular Phantom demonstrated a
REMOB number (REMote OBservation) which allowed us to
listen in on any phone line in the country at will ... I learned
quite a bit about how much privacy people REALLY have as
opposed to what they THINK they have ... (Maelstrom: e-mail
interview).
Whilst Coggans argues that:
I know all too well how simple it is to view and alter consumer
credit, to transfer funds, to monitor telephone conversations
etc. ... I can monitor data on any network in existence, I can
obtain root priveleges on ANY Sun Microsystems UNIX. If I, a
22 year-old, non-degreed, self-taught individual can do these
things, what can a professionally taught, profit motivated
individual do? THERE IS NO PRIVACY ... People need to know
the truth about the vulnerabilities of the computers they have
entrusted their lives to (Coggans: e-mail interview).
The vulnerability of computer systems to intrusions was also
recognised by members of the CSI. Their resultant concerns about
the potential of hacking to cause damage fuels the sense of antipathy
that exists between the CSI and the CU.
Maybe I'm a bit old-fashioned but in my mind once a criminal,
always a criminal ... I reject utterly the idea that they browse, I
reject utterly and completely that because I don't believe they
know. Many installations wouldn't know because they don't
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keep that type of record ... there's lots of crashes in many
systems ... further over in North Wales, they had a system
crash, they never found out why that system crashed, I made
several suggestions as to why it had crashed, they didn't want
to know. I reckon the DP manager knew damn well what had
happened, somebody had mucked about with the software
(Tozer: Hawarden interview).
A similar, but more conclusive, experience was recounted by a
computer security officer from a U.S. military site, Thomas
Zmudzinski:
Back in 1989, another nearby facility was penetrated, and the
intruder gained control of an industrial process. The product of
this process is so specialized that there is no other source.
Fortunately, it was local enough that we could trace him. He
was still playing with his new 'toy' when the police broke down
his parents' (!) door. The raw materials he used were worth
more than one million U.S. dollars, and everyone involved
thought it was a minor miracle that he hadn't destroyed the
plant! [It really happened, I was there, believe it!] (Zmudzinski:
e-mail interview).
To add to the alleged vulnerability of systems to outsiders is
the added danger of hacking from insiders intimate with the working
details of particular systems. The view that concern over the
vulnerability of systems to outside intrusion generally fails to take
into account intrusions from people working inside systems, was
underlined by several interviewees who asked to remain anonymous
because they did not want their employers to become aware of the
fact that they hacked. The point that familiarity with a system
increases the potential for unauthorised use and hence increases the
vulnerability of a system to 'internal hacking' would seem to be
underlined by Appendix l's statistical data.
An illustration of the vulnerability of systems is the generic
nature of hacking. That is, often the ability to hacking into one
computer system can be applied to a whole class of systems.
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Herschberg pointed out that when he accepts a documented hack as a
Masters' Thesis, the penetration described within the thesis should
be for a class of systems as opposed to just one individual system:
"it's always a class ... hack one, hack all, otherwise it doesn't count,
proper penetration is generic" (Herschberg: Delft interview). This
generic nature of hacking, however, also causes great concern for the
CSI due to the resultant failure of distance to contribute to a system's
security. Once a flaw has been found in a system it is then
vulnerable not just to local hackers, but the world-wide community.
Coggans related how: "today hackers have everything documented
for them on the usage of a plethora of systems by past hackers".
(Coggans: e-mail interview). Holbrook explains why this situation
can cause concern about security threats to assume paranoid
proportions:
I would go back to the analogy about physical tresspass. In
that realm, the amount of damage that an intruder can use is
usually related to how much effort they put in, how much
expertise they have, and so forth. People are very comfortable
with what kinds of threats exist in the 'real world' and how to
deal with them. There is no similar comfort level in the
computer world. With the breakdown of physical barriers
surrounding computers that the network brings, organisations
have equal risk from malicious local users and from crackers
half way around the world. Intruders can compromise and
damage a system with information that could be found on a
cracker bbs. Most computer systems don't have any levels of
security. Any gap is sufficient to compromise the entire
system. So some paranoia is warranted! (Holbrook: e-mail
interview).
The generic quality of hacking, in addition, may exacerbate the
vulnerability of systems to damaging security breaches, over and
above, the deliberate damage of malicious hackers because of the
tendency of non-malicious but careless system intruders to
inadvertantly cause damage. Coggans relates:
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In my own experience, I was VERY cautious in the early days.
I didn't just barge in to a system like the stereotypical 'bull in a
china shop' and I imagine most people keep this level of
alertness. Even with this heightened sensitivity to the
potential disasters, some people still executed programs they
shouldn't have, edited sensitive data, etc ... Today it seems
many hackers just don't care, but then again, today hackers
have everything documented for them on the usage of a
plethora of systems by past hackers, so perhaps armed with
these instructions they feel overly confident from the onset
(Coggans: e-mail interview).
5.2.2 Statistical evidence
The main available statistical evidence 1 relating to computer
security breaches are the Audit Commission's Survey of Computer
Fraud and Abuse 1990 of 1500 organisations, and the National
Computing Centre's Survey of Security Breaches 1991 of 883
organisations. The evidence from these survey's is supplemented in
this study by a Quantitative Questionnaire of 200 respondents, full
details of which are given in Appendix 1. The evidence from the two
national organsiations makes the following main points:
1. Various forms of logical breaches were experienced in the
following proportions according to the official surveys. Of the
respondents in this study's quantitative questionnaire 83% have
experienced one of the forms of logical breach. Unless this is widely
unrepresentative, for some reason such as biased sampling, then the
assumption must be that logical breaches are widely under-reported
in official studies.
1 The Audit Commission's Survey of Computer Fraud and Abuse 1990, National Computing
Centre's Survey of Security Breaches 1991, Quantitative Questionnaire (c.f. Appendix 1)
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Nature of logical Breach % of total incidents
Disruptive software 35%
Unchecked software 14%
Unauthorised access via corporate terminals 11%
Staff misuse of resources 11%
Computer operator error 10%
Hacking 8%
User error 5%
Fraudulent input data 5%
Diversion of output data 1%
100%
(NCC 1991:56)
Logical breaches bv industry sector % of sector suffering
Breach
Distribution 43%
Transport and utilities 41%
others 36%
IT 34%











(Derived from Table 1 Audit Commission 1990: 9)
2.
Reported incidents of unauthorised access to systems via
corporate terminals (i.e. by staff or contractors) were much
more prevalent than external hacking (NCC 1991:12).
The following data adds weight to charges that the legislative
response to hacking has been diproportionate to the actual threat it
poses. The statistics show that the majority of security breaches are
carried out by personnel inside organisations rather than external
hackers.
Malicious action by outsiders - 14%
Damage attributable to staff or ex-staff - 61%
(NCC 1991:57).
Audit Commission figures for the identity of the perpertrators of18
reported hacking incidents




3. The costs incurred due to hacking also tend to be significantly
lower than incidents of insider-based breaches^, computer viruses,
and traditional forms of fraud that make use of a computer. This is
both as a percentage of overall incidents reported and as a
percentage of each category reported. That viruses are also more
likely to be introduced by insiders (either accidentally or
deliberately) exacerbates this fact.
Degrees of cost associated with categories of security breach as a % of
total incidents reported for all categories
Costs of checking Hackers Insiders Viruses
Not significant 8% 68% 24% 100%
Minor 8% 56% 36% 100%
Major 7% 45% 48% ioo%
(Data compiled from NCC tables 5.6: B.94)
2 Defined as: access via corporate terminals, deliberate misuse by staff, fraudulent input data
(e.g. invoices), Diversion of output data, Introduction of incorrect software, central operator
error, user error.
136
Degrees of cost expressed as a % of each individual category's total
number of incidents











(Data compiled from NCC table 5.6: B.95).





Impact of logical breaches Hacking Viruses Inside Action
Serious impact 25% 17% 58% 100%
Significant losses 13% 42% 45% 100%
Easily absorbed 7% 34% 59% 100%
Minimal impact 5% 36% 59% 100%
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5.2.3 Quantitative questionaire data
The evidence from the qualitative fieldwork seemed to
emphasise the perceived widespread weaknesses of computer
systems. This study's quantitative data are explored in detail in
Appendix 1, from which the following main points can be distilled:
Only 25% of people felt their systems to be inadequately secured
(Question 5). This may be explained, however, by the tendency of
programmers to underestimate the weaknesses of the systems in
their own environment.
The fact that much computing work is carried out by people
without formal qualifications was mentioned in the main body of this
study. Of the respondents 41.5% (Question 6) had no formal
qualifications. This can be seen as due to both a lack of adequate
levels of education in the computing industry, but also illustrative of
the value of computing knowledge derived from practical hands-on
experience rather than formal training.
Only 17% of respondents (Question 7) had no experience of
some kind of security breach, 64% of respondents thought that
insiders within an organisation posed more of a risk to its security
than outsiders, whilst only 7.5% thought the converse (Question 14).
The number of respondents who thought viruses and system
breaking could be potentially useful was high. 40.5% and 67%
respectively (Questions 15 and 16). Of the respondents 73% thought
that the number of security breaches would increase in the future,
compared with only 7% who thought they would decrease (Question
17).
Figures 4a-c show how both academic and commerical
organisations experience hacking to a similar extent (62 and 63%
respectively), although the academic sector is almost twice as likely
to experience viruses. In general there is quite a high level of
security breaches, with 25% of the academic sector experiencing all
types of breaches and the commercial sector 18%. The data for those
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experiencing no breaches is correspondingly low: academic sector
10%; commercial sector 25%.
The data also show that both the academic and commercial
sectors did not view hacking or viruses as particularly serious
threats (6% and 7% respectively in figures 4d and 4e). Hacks and
viruses are perceived as constituting a similar level of threat, 9% of
hacks/browses being thought to be serious and 7% of viruses (figures
4f and 4g). There are relatively high and comparable figures for the
number of repeated breaches of both hacks/browses and viruses.
17.5% of hacks and 16.5% of viruses had been experienced more than
10 times (figures 4h and 4i). Finally, as a reflection of the perception
that breaches are not a serious threat figures 4f-k show how 66% of
both academic and commercial sectors think that their security is
adequate.
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5.3 REASONS FOR SECURITYWEAKNESSSES
5.3.1 The software crisis
Within computing, worries about security weaknesses can be
seen as part of wider concerns regarding the nature of software
production. These concerns are encapsulated in the phrase 'the
software crisis'. There are various elements to the software crisis
including the threats posed by computer viruses and the problems
caused by the proliferation of different standards, shortages of
skilled programmers etc. Pelaez argues that, despite varying
interpretations of what actually constitutes the software crisis, it is
the: "gap between expectations and demands placed on software, on
the one hand, and actual achievements of software, on the other"
(Pelaez 1988:178). There are two different explanations for this gap.
One explanation emphasises the problem of the relative immaturity
of the software industry: "We build systems like the Wright brothers
build airplanes - build the whole thing, push it off the cliff, let it
crash; and start all over again" (Pelaez 1988:179). The second
explanation of the gap between ambitions and achievements relates
to the pressures imposed by the commercial environment: "users'
illusions were actively promoted by the computer industry itself,
especially by its marketing people ... Software was being produced in
an environment of unreality, a fetishised even fraudulent
environment ... " (Pelaez 1988: 181).
The software crisis gave rise to a debate over how software
should be produced and tested. The debate has been characterised
as the 'science' versus 'craft' view of software development. The
former emphasises how the production of software should emphasise
the use of formal design methods to prove that the program will do
exactly what it says it will, and so avoid the gap between
expectations and performance. The craft approach prefers to
emphasise the ways in which programs need to be responsive not
only to mathematical proofs but also to the requirements of
implementation in the real world.
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Computing, in an attempt to overcome the software crisis, has
increasingly evolved from the craft-like approach to the more
scientific reliance upon standardised procedures. The knowledge
involved has become increasingly codified, and the process of
software production has increasingly concentrated upon what
software should do and the internal consistency of those
specifications. This has two main implications for hacking. First, the
movement away from a craft approach has meant that those
programmers of a creative but ill-disciplined bent have been
increasingly marginalised. Wiezenbaum, for example, related how
there were many examples of programmers at MIT who could
produce concise and elegant solutions to programming puzzles
(Brighton interview). Problems were encountered, however, due to
the fact that the programs were produced by original, inventive, but
sometimes idiosyncratic methods. In a commercial environment the
utility of such programs could be severely diminished because of
their lack of explanatory documentation. Upon the departure of the
author, the remaining programmers would not be able to maintain or
adapt the programs due to the fact they were not privy to the
private logic of the initial author.
The second implication is that despite computing's increasingly
more formal programming environment, the limitations of the
engineering approach mean that hacking knowledge is still of
potential relevance to security. Whilst the science-based approach
enables verification as to whether a program will meet its
specifications, the craft approach points out that there is no way of
formally proving that they are correct. In other words, it prefers to
emphasise the 'messiness of the real world' which mathematics alone
cannot tame. Hence, the security of systems cannot be proved in
advance because their implementation takes place in a changing
environment. It is possible to assert, for example, that a system is
invulnerable to certain types of attack but it is impossible to
anticipate all the potential threats a system might face, particularly
when human interaction with systems is involved. This inherent
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inability to guarantee total security is illustrated by the various
security weaknesses of which hackers make use.
5.3.2 The software crisis and the origins of hacking
Chapter 1 mentioned how the word 'hack' evolved from
originally referring to a quick bit of work that achieves its aim, but is
not done particularly well. The word became associated specifically
with clever programming techniques. The meaning of the word
evolved as it became more and more associated with the ingenuity of
programmers forced to modify programs on an ad hoc basis until
they met the often vaguely expressed requirements of the customer.
This led to the originally perjorative dictionary definition of the
word, assuming a more positive connotation as programmers'
methodologically unstructured, 'trial and error' hacks achieved
desirable practical results. Thus the origins of the activity of hacking
itself stem from this craft-like quality of programming. This explains
the origins of the first generation of hackers and hacking's lasting
appeal to subsequent generations:
For the craftsperson, results are achieved through clever tricks,
and professional excitement is derived from 'not quite
understanding what he is doing. In this streamline age, one of
our most undernourished psychological needs is the craving for
Black Magic and apparently the automatic computer can satisfy
this need for the professional software engineer, who is
secretly enthralled by the gigantic risks he takes in his daring
irresponsibility (Pelaez 1988: pp 201-202).
The image of programming, and by extension hacking, having
elements akin to Black Magic is thus encouraged by the seemingly
intrinsic baroque complexity of computing in the face of which
anyone exhibiting practical knowledge receives the awe of the
'uninitiated':
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For thousands of years, man has been captivated by magic.
People, gathered around campfires, would be spellbound by
sorcerers. Using a wand and some exotic artefacts they would
produce startling effects and the innocent would gaze on in
amazement ... many of the sorcerers' techniques have been
acquired by the mechanically adept ... Computer
communication is still a black art, even to those in the
computer world. For those in the know, this can be exploited ...
The communications expert is, in his or her own way, a
magician, able to conjure up vast reserves of memory and
computing power at the touch of a button (Gold 1990: pp 47-
48).
The Black Magic quality of hacking is also encouraged by its
image of being a mysterious night-time activity and hackers'
conceptualisation of themselves. An example of both of these points,
is provided by a hacker who calls himself, the 'Dark Adept':
A wizard is a person who believes everything is interrelated
and attempts to find the interrelation and controls his universe
by it. One such branch of wizardry is the Computer
Underground ... I chose the handle The Dark Adept because I
believe that out of darkness comes light. Out of the darkness of
lies and oppression comes the light of truth and freedom. One
just needs to be Adept enough to catalyse the reaction (The
Dark Adept, CuD 2.15).
5.3.3 The problem of anticipation and the role of testing
(i) Intrinsic insecurity and serendipity
The frontier-like status of computing resulting from its relative
immaturity is described below:
The computer underground of today is the group that would
have been the HAM RADIO operators of yesteryear. These
radio operators could have made public radio impossible to
hear if enough "EVIL" HAM radio operators would have
decided to do this. In the long term commercial radio won out,
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because everyone benefitted by the law and order that
developed. The computer underground is just the group of
people that always test the limits of the developing advances.
They are the Lewis and Clark or Buzz Aldrin of this new
territory. How we draw the maps, rules and laws of the future
will depend on how and what they find (Forbush: e-mail
interview).
The difficulty of anticipating a priori threats to security helps
hackers expose security weaknesses by 'testing the limits of the
developing advances'. A general quality of technological change is
that the impact of advances may be double-edged. New car-brake
technology, for example, may defeat the original objective for
increased safety by providing a rationale for increasing cars' power
and speed. Similarly, in computer security, new technical advances
do not guarantee improved security. An example of this
phenomenon is the use of fibre-optics in the transmission of
electronic data. Fibre-optics were seen as reducing the potential for
the tapping of data or 'electronic eavesdropping', however, hacking
methods have already succeeded in compromising its security^.
Counter cultural groups are often associated with the cutting edge of
technological developments, for example, Sterling (1993) describes
how the new communications technologies were largely pioneered by
criminals, so much so, that: "In the early years of pagers and
bleepers, dope dealers were so enthralled by this technology that
owning a bleeper was practically prima facie evidence of cocaine
dealing" (Sterling 1993: 183).
That security weaknesses in systems are seemingly inevitable
is reflected in the experience of hackers' serendipitous opportunism.
Schifreen, for example, was known as the 'Prestel hacker', for
hacking along with his associate Steve Gold into the Duke of
Edinburgh's private electronic-mail box:
I was playing with some software one day and found out that if
you typed ten 2's for an id number on Prestel it was a valid
3 c.f. Sterling 1993 p208
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account. Just by pure chance (emphasis mine), I was just
testing some terminals, I wasn't actually trying to get in. I hit
the 2 button, ten times and it said 'yeah, fine what's the
password?', so I thought 'this is easy, I know passwords are
four characters so I'll try 1234', tried 1234 and it let me in and
it turned out to be an internal BT account that let me access
loads of closed areas on the system (Schifreen: London
interview).
Schifreen's description of 'just happening' to find something out
about a technology is related as a result of 'playing around' with it.
What he perceives as attributable to chance, however, is largely
based upon such basic security failings as inadequate user
identification log-in procedure. Once he had gained initial access,
subsequent entry to privileged accounts became possible because
security was not maintained throughout the system. Information
that allowed further progress was left lying around on the
assumption that no one could have gained access because of the
initial security measures.
Making a system relatively secure requires security measures
at different levels of a system, thus taking into account that some of
the first level security measures may be broken. However, even if
systems are designed assuming that at any one stage previous
security barriers may have been broken, total and 'pre-emptive'
security for some artefacts may still be effectively impossible; as we
have seen from the above discussion of the software crisis, it is in
the nature of security that weaknesses cannot always be foreseen.
They may only come to light as a result of the imaginative
manipulations of hackers. The heterogenous curiosity of hackers
allied with their 'instinct' for security flaws results in them
eventually finding security loopholes in all kinds of technological
artefacts. Thus Dell relates how he always keeps his eyes open for a
hacking opportunity:
If I work or am on holiday I also see things where I think, "hey
yeah, that's possible, last year I was in Miami and I found a
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way to park for absolutely free ... just by chance I found that if
you put a dime in and turn the parking meter all the way up,
as far as possible, and let it go all at once, because of the speed
the meter goes, for one dime you can park the whole day. You
develop an intuition, an instinct (Utrecht interview).
It is this instinct which is conducive to serendipitous discovery
that security measures may always be struggling to contain, since the
initial security breakthrough may not be due to the type of logical
strategy that can be most easily anticipated within security
measures.
(ii) The state of computer security knowledge and education.
Indicative of the security weaknesses of systems is the
perceived lack of knowledge in the field of computer security:
Contemporary insecurity and unsafety are basically built into
today's IT architectures, but only very few people understand
this (there is *no theory of secure and safe systems*!). Some
hackers deliberately intend to demonstrate the apparent
insecurity of contemporary systems (e.g. CCC), while others
produce negative impact during unconscientious experimenting
with parts of the technology (e.g. Morris' INTERNET worm) ...
we have serious problems to understand what security and
safety means, and we have *no theory of safe and secure
systems*. In general terms, this has also been true for
industrial systems where such measures had to be developed
later (and the consequence of missing security and safety even
being felt today, see: pollution). (Prof Brunnstein: e-mail
interview).
Computer security ignorance is compounded by the tendency of
those within computing to regard its effects as being overwhelmingly
positive. This seems to be reflected in the way in which the
technology is approached by software engineers:
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The general taboo behind contemporary IT is that everybody
regards these systems as *positive*; only few users and even
fewer experts realize that there is a positive side of the coin
('useful': Chip Chip Hurra!) connected with a negative one (bugs,
viruses ... ). Following the implemented moral categories,
engineers regard technology as 'morally neutral', and they do
not feel responsible for faults or misuse as they regard these as
tasks of the users; unfortunately, users cannot understand
today's very complex systems (mega bits of
data/programs/data flow ...) to control the adequacy of IT
results! (Prof Brunnstein: e-mail).
A general lack of education in the knowledge that does exist
contributes to the continued existence of security weaknesses that
could otherwise be repaired. Comparing it to a 'leaky sieve' Dr Cohen
argues:
The leaky sieve comes from the fact that OS designers don't
know about protection, and treat it as an afterthought. Like
most after-thoughts, the retrofit doesn't really fit. Why don't
they know? Because they aren't taught about it in school.
Universities rarely teach anything about protection. The
average computer science graduate has only 15 mins on
protection - that in an OS course where they are taught how to
keep processes separate in memory. On the other hand, about
4% of the GNP is lost each year in most industrialized nations
due to computer integrity problems. (According to some
Lloyd's underwriter and several confirming research studies).
Ignorance is not bliss - it is suicide (Dr Cohen: e-mail
interview).
Cohen describes the effects poor education on the quality of
security in industry:
Crackers do not provide a service by breaking in - we know the
situation is bad, and we know why - it is because computer
professionals are ignorant and the fault should lie squarely
with our educational system ... Computer security issues are
ignored - or worse misstated by our teachers, and as a result,
we have many people going in random directions making 20
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year old mistakes ... Most crackers are simply using trivial
holes left by ignorant programmers. I think any computer
professional should be taught the limitations of computer
systems and be given assignments to demonstrate these flaws
in school. The situation now is like teaching how to fly
airplanes but not teaching pilots that engines sometimes fail.
Your system depends on your knowledge for its proper
operation, just as an airplane does. We don't accept pilots that
can't handle minor mechanical failures, why do we accept
computer professionals that can't handle minor protection
problems? (Dr Cohen: e-mail interview).
The consensus amongst hackers also emphasies the poor state
of the conventional eductation system. They frequently describe
their reliance upon self-taught or peer group-derived knowledge of
computing and its security features. Schifreen, for example,
describes the self-taught nature of his own computer knowledge:
I didn't go to university, I did computing at school until o-level
and that was basically the only computing education I got, the
rest of it was self-taught for enthusiasm ... the knowledge you
need for a computing job, doesn't correspond to the course
work you've done at University or College. They're not
teaching the things that are right for jobs (Schifreen: London
interview).
(iii) Calls for hands-on experience
The perceived failure of the education system and the CSI to
fully address security and operational weaknesses has led to calls for
more practical 'hands-on' security knowledge. It is claimed that
hacking may provide practical experience and a de facto education in
computing and its security measures^. Herschberg, for example,
defends hacking's status as an intellectual exercise that contributes
to both theoretical and practical knowledge:
4 c.f. Vinten 1990 p8
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Well, before I became a professor I was given many
opportunities to do it myself, but that was in the very early
days. The last time I attacked one with my own lilly-white
hands must have been about 13 years ago, so I'm certainly to
be counted amongst the first generation of hackers, as to being
sympathetic, yes, I do accept, a technically satisfactory piece of
hacking in lieu of the formal oral exam, providing it's well
documented, providing it's not a trivial system and provided no
harm has been done ... the proof of the pudding is in the
hacking (Herschberg: Delft interview).
Herschberg is an example of those who believe that hackers'
expertise at breaking into systems could be utilised in order to
improve security knowledge. He and his students have been invited
by various Dutch companies to attempt to access their systems and to
give a full report of any security weaknesses found. His seemingly
idiosyncratic views on the benefits of hacking are fuelled by the
contention that computing is in great need of a combination of both
academic theory and 'hands-on' direct experience of computer
security. He describes how he has:
a continuous trickle, it's not more than one or two firms at a
time, who want me to investigate the only way there is, which
is penetration. As an academic, I have one continuous
complaint about security: there is no theory; almost no theory.
There is some theory, there is cryptography which is quite
respectable academically and therefore has a great deal of
worthwhile interesting theory, there are a few other areas, say
inference from systems one may interrogate interactively.
Again, the problem lies, as Dorothy Denning has pointed out,
that, by putting the right questions the user may reach
information or may infer information he was not meant to
possess. That at least has the beginnings of a theory behind it.
For the rest, let's say the general penetration attempt is hardly
covered by the theory, so that the only way to find out about it
is to take the experimental approach: wade in, do it
(Herschberg: Delft interview).
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Thus, Prof Herschberg argues that the theory will only come
through the lessons gleaned from practice: 'wading in', and like Rop,
he sees computing and the hacking of systems as still very much a
frontier activity, the best comparison to be made:
would be with the early days of say radio. Marconi
successfully transmitted accross the Atlantic before there was a
theory of terrestrial radio-wave propagation. The Wright
brothers flew by the seat of their pants, theory came much
later. I think it's fair comment that any new technology must
go through the stage in which theory lags far behind practice.
It is true for security except for shreds and patches, so I see no
other way than actually to attack a system in order to make a
valid statement about it's penetrability (Herschberg: Delft
interview).
The actions of hackers, whether deliberate or not, serve to
illustrate security weaknesses in an area where theoretical
knowledge tends to be subsumed under the exigencies of practical
applications and interactions of programs and computer systems:
As the importance of IT will grow further, we will need better
understanding of risks inherent in IT (e.g. concepts of
inherently safe and secure systems), as well as risks from its
use and misuse. Only IT-inherent risks may be analysed
independently of its application; the terms 'safe' and 'secure'
(which are semantic categories, rather than syntactic ones!),
may only be defined in terms of an application, and therefore a
theory of safe and secure applications may only be defined
after hands-on experiments (Prof Brunnstein: e-mail
interview).
Herschberg's view that security knowledge could be improved
by analysing the techniques of hackers, draws attention to the issue
of the correct degree of responsibility and blame to attach not just to
the perpetrators of security breaches, but also their victims. The
ethical issue for Herschberg centres more upon the moral
requirement facing those in charge of systems to maintain security,
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than to blame those that breach security. Hackers are criticised
because without their existence, there would be much less need for
security in the first place, and therefore on balance they amount to a
waste of resources. Herschberg's rejoinder to this emphasises the
practical safety issues hackers give rise to, rather than the waste of
resources that may be attributed to them. A successful hack, defined
as gaining super-user status in a system, means that the hacker may
obtain complete control of a financial or a safety-critical system:
The fact is that you can't by their actions, at least not easily
and not from the outside, tell a hacker from a criminal and you
never know at what stage criminals do get interested. Quite
apart from the fact, at least all major enterprises, and that
includes the entire financial scene, have a vital concern to have
no intruders, whatever their origin, or whatever their purposes
... that point that if there were no hackers there would be no
need for security, does not follow since there always is a prima
facie suspicion of somebody being out to, let's say, distort the
uses you put your system to; you better employ a hacker
because your criminal might have designs on you. An ounce of
prevention is better than a pound of cure (Herschberg: Delft
interview).
5.3.4 The knowledge gap
An illustration of the perceived need for more hands-on
experience is the alleged knowledge gap that exists between the CSI
and CU. For the first time, a new generation of young people are
growing up completely at home with computers and their
capabilities. Herschberg claims that:
What we are confronted with is a generation that has lived
with computers virtually from the cradle, and therefore have
no trace of fear, not even a trace of reverence. To me, a
computer is still, well, something to be revered. When I
started my career in computing, there was'nt really computing
at that time ... there were about three of them, you had one
shot at a run a day if you were lucky. It was sacrosant, it no
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longer is to those kids, you go in, have a bash at the keyboard,
they're convinced by experience that nothing much can go
wrong. (Herschberg: Delft interview).
One manifestation of the fundamental nature of the perceptual
divide between hackers and the establishment is vividly described
by John Perry Barlow in "Crime and Puzzlement". The hacking
community, having grown up with computers almost 'from the
cradle', stands in opposition to an establishment of law-enforcers
largely ignorant of computing. Ignorance leads to mystification of
the opponent, for example, in Barlow's dealings with hackers he
described how, "I have since learned that while getting someone's
TRW file is fairly trivial, changing it is not. But at that time, my
assessment of the crackers' black skills was one of superstitious awe.
They were digital brujos about to zombify my economic soul."
(Barlow 1990: 47). Barlow proceeds to describe the implications of
such fear and ignorance when it emanates from the establishment.
He was interviewed by an FBI agent, Agent Baxter, in connection
with the 'stealing' by a hacker of proprietary Apple Macintosh source
code on behalf of a group opposing the commodification of software:
the Nu Prometheus League. Agent Baxter's lack of knowledge was
typified by his frequent references to the 'Nu Prosthesis League':
Poor Agent Baxter didn't know a ROM chip from a Vise-grip
when he arrived ... You know things have rather jumped the
groove when potential suspects must explain to law enforcers
the nature of their alleged perpetrations ... he took to ... saying
'My eight year old knows more about these things than I do.'
He didn't say this with a father's pride so much as an
immigrant's fear of a strange new land into which he will be
forcibly moved and in which his own child is a native. He
looked across my keyboard into Cyberspace and didn't like
what he saw (Barlow 1990: pp 53-54).
Mischievous rebelliousness is typical of the hacking fraternity.
It is consistently evident in the way hackers' minds perceive
unorthodox ways of manipulating any given technical situation. Due
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to increased technical outlets for this inventiveness, the latest
generations from which modern hackers draw their numbers have a
qualitatively different experience of computing to those who tend to
be in charge of systems, and responsible for the creation and
implementation of legislation designed to stop hackers.
Authors such as William Gibson are popular with hackers, along
with films such as "Brazil". Two aspects of both these works that the
hackers find affinity with are the way they represent individual
opposition to a monolithic technological order and their portrayal of
the contrast between life "on the street" and life sheltered by the
priveleges of power and/or money. This concept of "street life" has
been internalised by parts of the computing community. Urban
teenagers base their experiences and subsequent feelings of isolation
from authority on the fact their lives involve a level of "street-cred"
ignored by, and foreign to, the establishment. Hackers, too, due to
their lifestyles and single-minded approach to their activity, distance
themselves from "the suits" or "neck-ties" (two phrases frequently
encountered in interviews with hackers).
To the extent that computer security is lacking in a theoretical
grounding, the only true way to test security is to actually attempt to
breach a system. This requirement for practical knowledge has put
pressure upon some of the conventional "experts" in the field of
computer security. In this area, theoretical knowledge tends to be
gained at the expense of detailed specific knowledge. Often a
"security expert" with a good grasp of the general tendencies of most
computer systems is at a disadvantage when it comes to the question
of the exact details of a specific system. A hacker will research his
narrowly defined area of specialism in an exhaustive and
comprehensive manner, in an amount of time and to a degree not
feasible for a computer security consultant. Onderwater from the
Dutch Criminal Research Institute recognised this and pointed out
that it was impossible to know everything about every system, and
in his job, he relied heavily upon networks of specialists to obtain the
exact information he needed. This specialism is the quality most
prized in the hacker community and inevitably not obtainable for
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computer security professionals working within the confines of a
conventional job-structure. Similarly, Kevin Mitnick, the 'dark-side'
hacker, when asked whether hackers tended to have an edge in their
'skirmishes' with the CSI, described how:
They've got the motivation and don't forget, computer security
people go to their job from nine to five, for hackers it's a
hobby. You dedicate more time to that hobby than you would
a job, when you're done with your job, you want to get out of
there, go home to your wife, play golf, go work out at the gym.
You don't want to sit there and deal with it, usually. But
hackers, on the other hand, devote hours and hours to learning,
so a lot of them are more talented in maybe that narrow area
of computers (Mitnick Amsterdam-USA phone interview).
This type of knowledge gap between the specific knowledge of
the hacker and the general knowledge possessed by the computer
professional is reflected in their different interpretations of
particular incidents and the lack of shared values between the
professional security experts and the hacker. Gene Spafford has
been described as one example of a well-known and influential
figure on the net who amongst the hackers I spoke to, is a figure of
derision, a man they view as largely out of touch with the reality
they experience: "Yeah, well, he's an ass-hole" (Mitnick: Amsterdam
interview).
Schifreen describes the knowledge-gap with respect to his
ambivalent relationship to the CU and CSI:
I'm bridging the gap because that's the way it's got to be done.
Yes, you've got the security consultants like a big city
accounting firm that will come and talk to you, and they know
the theory because they've read the books and talked to the
manufacturers and certainly they can give you some good
advice. But they're not involved in the real world, they sit at
their desks writing articles, books and reports, they don't talk
to hackers, they have'nt been on the end that I have. They
don't keep their ears to the ground, they don't know what's
going on, they know what's going on by reading product
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reviews and certainly there there are management principles
that you can go around telling people and they are always
relevant, but unless you've got the mind of a hacker and you
think as a hacker thinks, you won't realise where the loop¬
holes are in people's security systems (Schifreen: London
interview).
This shows how the 'knowledge gap' is rooted in the difference
between theoretical concepts and guidelines to security and the 'nitty
gritty' of real world computing situations where security weaknesses
exist in the rich texture of incrementally growing and adapting
computer systems.
5.3.5 Commercial pressures and security holes
One of the underlying reasons for the level of ignorance
described in previous sections is the perennial problem of scarce
resources. Spafford, for example, complains that education in
security issues has suffered as a result:
We're producing students that don't know enough about
software engineering, about safety of software systems ... I
have to teach them on equipment that is very often several
years out of date, that is underpowered, that is lacking in basic
tools that they will be using when they go out into industry ...
there are institutions that are producing students whose sole
education is done either on PC's using MS-DOS or some kind of
batch-operating system, I know of places that are still using
punch cards (Spafford: e-mail interview).
Thus commerical factors contribute to the continued existence
of security holes:
It's because the bottom line in any company today is making
profit, you've got no time to do anything that doesn't bring you
money or makes you profit. British industry in general is in a
hell of a mess and in particular all the staff who could be
squeezed out of work in any enterprise, have been squeezed
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out. There's no time for non-productive work which is the
security issue ... everything in the computing industry like
everywhere else is done in a hell of a hurry to get it done
yesterday. A lot of rather poor programs get written (Dr Frank
Taylor: Knutsford interview).
Specifically, the following six factors create conditions
conducive to the continued existence of security holes.
(i) Commerical pressures - job structure
Commercial pressures are evident with respect to the way in
which computer security jobs are structured. Detective Harry
Onderwater of the Dutch Criminal Research Institute's Computer
Crime Squad, complained that computerisation has taken place
within companies with scant attention being paid to adequately
educating those given jobs involving close contact with computers.
He described the informal and ad hoc way in which he found himself
involved in the issue of computer security:
I got system manager next to my job at the Drugs Squad,
because there was no system manager and I was the only one
who could work with computers, so I did the computing ... I
think if there had been somebody specialised then, they could
have done the job better than I. It's hobbyism of the guys who
work there, it's a problem also with the money involved...they
won't make a system manager but leave you at your old job
and do that next to it. Courses are very expensive...it's a job
you do next to your own job, a lot of functions should be
divided over more people, maybe a system manager should
never be the same man as a data-base administrator, but
because it's a small firm, the guy is a system manager, a data¬
base administrator, a security officer and he's also the book¬
keeper (Onderwater: Hague interview).
Schifreen also draws attention to the ad hoc way that jobs are
structured for security personnel, arguing that it helps contribute to
the generally security-ignorant nature of computing in industry:
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apart from most people not knowing what they're doing ...
another problem is that, let's say you've got a large company
and they suddenly read a book and it says 'make sure you've
got a security manager'. And they think, 'right, who's next in
line in promotion to manager? So and so down the corridor.
Get him in, congratulations, you're now a manager. 'What of?'
'Security: go and read this book.' The average security
manager according to recent research, as they say, has been in
the job for 8 months, so there's no way that they've got the
experience to know what the risks are, and reading a
theoretical book is not going to tell you where the risks are
(Schifreen: London interview).
Thus there is a prevalence of underqualified personnel
attempting to deal with security problems. In addition there are the
poor administration practices that exist in many organisations:
I am forced to agree that most computer managers are just
about as incompetent as most crackers; they merely apply
'formula' solutions to problems with no real understanding of
what they are doing. To the extent that crackers are exposing
this lack, perhaps they are doing a service to the industry and
perhaps we will eventually see truly professional computer
managers and security staff hired by companies, rather than
the 'clerks' that they use now (Bickford: e-mail interview).
The reason why those in charge of security are often
particulary unsuited to the job is the result of the low esteem in
which security work is often held.
(ii) Low profile of security
Computer security in the commercial sector adopts an
inevitably low-profile because any successes are negatively defined.
If a conscientious security officer presides over a trouble-free
system, then it:
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unfortunately creates the impression, a very negative
impression, of no actual achievement to point to. The proof of
the achievement, if any, is in the absence of penetrations or
penetrations come to light, which is a different thing ...
virtually everybody's successes are more visible than those of
the security officers. Therefore, it is good for your career
development, not to be the security officer or whatever title he
may bear in the organisation (Herschberg: Delft interview).
(iii) The constant need to update
It is also common that even when technical fixes have been
made to fix security flaws, the latest update of the system
incorporating the fix is not utilised by an organisation. If
organisations use the very latest operating system from a vendor it
tends to be relatively secure. However, to avoid the expense of
constantly updating, earlier versions of operating systems tend to be
used and left untouched and may not have been upgraded for a
number of years:
The best example of this is SunOS 3.5. There are many, many
holes in that system. And there are many, many sites that still
run it, because the upgrade to SunOS 4.0 just wouldn't run on
many systems without expensive upgrades. Even on newer
systems, finding the resources to do something as simple as
pulling over a patched version of a vendor's utility can be
difficult to get done (Holbrook: e-mail interview).
The ever-present commercial pressure of limited resources
leads to ad hoc alterations of systems in order to increase their
perfomance, but this may lead to an intrinsic mismatch between a
system's nominal security and its actual secureness, taking into
account the way the system actually functions on a day to day basis.
In addition, few if any systems have been designed from the bottom
up with security as a primary objective. The quality that sell
computers (as with cars) is raw power rather than security features.
The following quotation highlights how such pressures interact:
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Yes, Von Neuman architecture is *inherently insecure*, as
concepts of 'security' and 'safety' have not been fully realised
(or even reflected) in its basic concepts. Example: while a
secure system would deny illegal services *in its innermost
kernel*, contemporary security is implemented *on top of
today's system*; if you succeed to penetrate the shell, the
kernel is open for any action. As the current trend optimizes
performance (more storage, faster processing, broader and
faster channels and devices), concepts of safe systems are
forgotten even where some hardware features (such as:
protection bits) are available (Brunnstein: e-mail interview).
Rob Nauta, a Dutch hacker, illustrates how agreement over
failure to fix holes spans both the CU and the CSI. He gives the
following example of the ways in which the activity of hacking may
be beneficial to the computing industry, by drawing attention to
program holes, even if it is not particularly original:
The OS is being sold by a company, not the programmers.
Hence the company weighs profit and minimising costs (avoid
updates) against loss of sales due to bad publicity (the general
image of the OS as good, or bug-ridden). Thus patches and
updates are only released when necessary. A company like
SUN listens much to the customers, which are academic sites
and research companies. Most bugs are found for SUN's since
they are the most used computers, but all get fixed soon.
Companies that sell to business managers deal with the
management who don't follow the news and are more
influenced by advertisements than by word of mouth. Hence
HP-UX (HP-SUX is its nickname), IBM's AIX and DEC's ULTRIX
are notorious for the time it takes to fix anything (Rob Nauta:
e-mail interview).
(iv) The problems of updating: the responsibility of the vendor
Closely allied with the expense of updating is the time-
consuming technical problem of upgrading future releases of a
system. Moreover, it is seen as neither commerically desirable nor
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financially possible for sites to maintain the expertise needed to
constantly identify and fix bugs, as their main job is seen as
providing the users of a system with various facilities. The real job
of maintaining bug-free systems is, SMB contends, that of the system
vendors:
Most individual sites are not in a position to fix bugs. Even if
you have source, you generally don't want to make any more
changes to the distributed system than are absolutely
necessary. I'm speaking here from my vantage point as a
former systems' programmer -- the more you diddle, the
harder it is to upgrade the next release ... The real
responsibility is with the vendors. They need to provide more
secure systems. It's hard, because security is always a tradeoff
with convenience. But they have to stop taking shortcuts in
their system architectures (Smb: e-mail interview).
(v) The exaggerated claims of marketing
The potential for security breaches is exacerbated by the
exaggerated claims of marketing. They lead to a lack of
coordination/symmetry between what a system is promised to do
and what it can actually be made to do: "Marketing, of course, and
the way business is run in general, have a lot to answer for. Promise
anything, *then* figure out how to (or if you can) deliver. Make the
sale. If that involves telling people that all they have to learn to
perform an incredibly complex task is to push one button, then tell
them that." (Rob Slade: e-mail interview)^ Marketing puts pressure
upon technical staff to produce improved systems. These systems
may work, but the hurried nature of their construction means that
adequate security features are often lacking. Dr Cohen describes
these marketing pressures which guarantee the continued existence
of the 'leaky sieve':
5 c.f Pelaez's (1988) description of the marketing of IBM's 360 family of computers.
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So many holes because so few 'experts' know about them. So
many holes because making things work right takes more skill
than making them barely work at all, which is what the
research people do- get things prototyped. Unfortunately,
prototypes go into production so fast that we cannot get them
fully sorted out, so we leave big holes so we can fix operational
features - leaving enormous protection holes in their place ...
there are surely many reasons - but I think the most important
is a marketing reason - people won't pay to make themselves
safe - they would rather buy the newest upgrade of the
wordprocessor. They can buy insurance from an insurance
company (Dr Cohen: e-mail interview).
(vi) Apathy and hype
There was, in the view of a broad cross section of interviewees
from both the CU and the CSI, a general feeling that approaches to
computer security were also often apathetic. Tozer used the example
of motorway accidents: on the stretch of motorway following the
scene of a recent crash drivers only temporarily slow down in
reponse to the safety concern caused by the sight of the crash.
Similarly, after a computer security breach has received large
coverage in the media, organisations tend to be more concerned
about their security, a concern which quickly fades once the short
term memory of the breach has faded. The result tends to be
alternating periods of apathy and over-reaction with regard to
computer security services. Even when attention is focused upon
such holes it may often fail to address the underlying security
weakness, due to the exaggerated and misdirected nature of the
response.
Efficient security work seems destined to pass unrecognised
and unrewarded in any commercial career structure. The converse
of such low profile security work is the 'hype' that surrounds those
that have made a deliberate decision to make security their business:
Let's try and distinguish between people who look after
security in the usual organisation and people in the security
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service industry selling computer services. The people in fact
in the user industry have got to keep a low profile and have
their job done well when no-one hears about them. When
someone hears about them and a breach has been made, then
they get a high profile which is destructive to their job. The
essence of their success is having a low profile because they've
protected the systems they're responsible for. In contrast, the
service industry is concerned with publicising, hyping up any
breaches of security that have occurred, so that they can sell
their various protection devices; anti-virus guns and the like
(Taylor: Knutsford interview).
The computer security industry has thus been accused of
promoting fear about security breaches in the form of hacking and
viruses in order to increase its business. The exaggeration of the
risks of security breaches can, for example, take the form of using
dubious figures for the incidence of computer crime. A more specific
example of the deliberate manipulation of information concerning
computer security is the instance reported by Dr Cohen. An article
he had written on the subject of the possibility of the development of
benevolent viruses was altered by the publishers:
they mangled it to promote the protection business. The main
point of the article ... was that benevolent viruses are possible
and that only the computer security industry wants to claim
that they are not - and the reason is so that they can scare you
into paying them ... there is a tremendous risk in an
uncontrolled protection racket that goes by the name of
'computer security'. If I told you your house would burn down
unless you paid me $100/year, you would probably report me
to the police (and wonder why I charged so little). If someone
in the protection racket tells you your computer will crash and
you will lose all your data unless you pay them $100/year,
how is that any different? (Dr Cohen, RISKS 13:53).
The prevalence of ignorance regarding security measures can
give rise to an exaggerated response to the issue of security. It can
also, however, give rise to apathy. This ambivalence was apparent in
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the quantitative questionnaire response to question 17: 23% of
respondents thought the computing industry's response to hacking
was excessive or hysterical whilst 26% thought that it was
insufficient.
Tozer, as an educator in security issues, expressed his constant
frustration concerning the lack of care organisations take over their
security, and consistent with the examples given previously, he
underlines the manner in which the way jobs are structured affects
how the provision of security is approached:
I still blame a lack of professionalism amongst Data Protection
(DP) managers, for allowing things to occur. It's their job ... but
you get very few DP people at the board level anyway, even
though DP penetrates everywhere. So even if they do know
what they're doing they don't even get a chance to put it at the
same strength as the others ... For years I've been trying to find
out what's needed to trigger peoples' minds in the right
channel. Last week for example, I got a phone call from a very
well known company. Could I give a course, a data-protection
course?..he said these are people at the top, so I said it
shouldn't be too difficult ... I'll send you a sheet and fill in a few
questions and we'll see how long it'll take. "Oh, well, they've
only got two hours!...I mean a day, yes, for senior people, but
two hours? (Tozer: Hawarden interview).
Security weaknesses are often an integral part of the computer
system as it networks with other systems. Nauta accuses the
vendors of paying scant attention to security considerations in the
design stage and responding apathetically to the need to rectify such
faults when they are identified:
Most bugs are found in networking code, since it runs at the
system level, yet it is accessible by user programs. Most
network protocols were designed without concern for security.
NFS has no security at all, but SUN now allows to require (sic) a
reserved port, which is a first step. NIS (YP) is also a good
example. I wrote a program called YPX which could retrieve
the password file from any machine, it has caused a SUN patch
to be issued. Other vendors haven't announced anything,
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people are already complaining, I wonder if the other
companies will ever bother to fix it (Nauta: e-mail interview)
5.4 THE RATIONALE FOR HACKERS
(i) The potential for cooperation
Faced with the extent of security problems described, hackers
sometimes make dramatic claims regarding the extent to which their
activity improves standards of security within computing:
Without hackers, computing would be a boring, drudgerous tool
people would use because they need to get something done
that they don't want to do. Hackers are computer enthusiasts
more than anything else; it is through their enthusiasm for
computers that they were able to find security bugs. If you
consider a 'hacker' someone who unlawfully enters systems,
then without hackers the nation would be nakedly awaiting
serious attack from thieves and foreign agents. I have no
doubt in my mind that the existence of hackers in this country
has been a beneficial one except for certain well-documented
cases; cases which would have been much worse if it had not
been for hackers before them who have been able to close off
the more wide-open security flaws/bugs (Maelstrom: e-mail
interview).
This argument can then be further divided into the claims that
hacking can be either a direct or an indirect benefit to computing.
Direct benefits would stem from innovations in programming
methods and security, along with hardware developments. An
example of this would be Levy's first generation of hackers.
With regard to the indirect benefits of cracking, it can be
claimed that the existence of hacking has led to a general climate of
improved security consciousness and that this has led to 'trickle
down', indirectly related improvements in data security. Thus, for
example, potentially crucial data can be lost to a business due to the
usually insured risks of fire, flood or theft, but it can also be lost due
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to a system failure that coincides with poor back-up storage
procedures for data. An indirect benefit of hacking, therefore, is that
faced with the fear of external threats to the security of a system
and its data from hackers, system operators are more liable to make
regular back-ups than they might usually otherwise make. These
regular back-ups can then provide insurance against accidental
losses of data from events other than hacking incidents. The system
becomes more secure than it would have been originally, due to
awareness of the possibility of being hacked.
An additional argument in favour of greater cooperation with
hackers is that greater access to systems tends to make 'hacker-
types' more responsible computer users, who are then more liable to
make productive use of the security knowledge they have gained
illicitly. In the case of John Draper, this actually led to him
'punishing' users on the system he was in charge of, in the event that
their hacking led to behaviour which adversely affected other users
on the system. From his experience as a system manager, he claimed
that:
it is clear that by closely working with potential hackers and
students, you can go a long ways in cutting down malicious
hacking. I took a firm hand in keeping them in check, while at
the same time, I tried to direct their energies into useful
productive work. One thing I remembered was a HACKING
CONTEST (under tight supervision) where I challenged them to
break into the library account, and if they succeeded (and told
me how they did it), they would get three months free usage ...
Several people broke in, and I had about 2 people dedicated to
helping me, and found a security flaw in the system. In this
case, BOTH were winners. So yes!! There can be a positive
lesson learned here, and that is to adopt a less fascist approach
when dealing with hackers, and be less 'Punitive', but firm
when dealing with them (Draper: e-mail interview).
Mofo also gave the following detailed account of his
experiences of the potential that exists for cooperation between those
in charge of security and those who enjoy testing it. His description
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reinforces the previous discussion of the significance and desirability
of direct 'hands-on' experience of security issues:
I've gained knowledge on how to make computers and their
operating systems more secure. Instead of complain about it
and act foolishly (i.e. involving Keystone Kops), I took a
proactive role to determine intent and repair the situation as
best I could. My preference is to deal with intruders as human
beings. In my experience, 'crackers' have been very receptive
toward that attitude. Since my systems are always backed up
on a regular basis, the few destructive 'cracking' attempts have
been relative non-events. The admin community as a whole
seems to be quite paranoid about security information and
their highbrow attitude leaves experience as the only expert
tutor (Mofo: e-mail interview).
A more damning indictment than the charge of being 'high
brow' is made by Coggans, ex-Legion of Doom member, and now one
of the founding members of ComSec Ltd., a computer security firm
staffed by ex-hackers. His claim is that:
The computer security industry is a farce, the key players who
hold the majority of clients are the big 6 accounting firms, with
Deloitte & Touche and Coopers and Lybrand in the lead. I
wouldn't ask a mechanic to perform a triple-bypass on me just
because he understands valves, no more than I would want an
accountant auditing my computer security just because he does
the financial audits of my accounting programs ... One company
we contacted had an audit by one of the accounting firms. An
auditor was onsite for 10 hours a day for 8 weeks. The report
came back saying that they should put an exit sign in the
computer room. This same company had a PBX controlled by
computer, a dial-out option on the PBX active with the code
1234, and an AS-400 with poor password management. I
noticed this upon initial contact. But the accounting firm had
already turned them off to outside security audits, so their
problems still exist. $100,000 for a damn exit sign (Coggans: e-
mail interview).
166
This feeling that 'legitimate' computer security providers are
out of touch with the practicalities of intrusion prevention is an
important element of the rationale that hacking should be recognised
as a valuable resource to improve computing standards^.
(ii) The industry benefit argument
In Chapter One, we saw the various generations of hackers that
have evolved since the earliest days of computing. Hacking, defined
loosely as the inquisitive manipulation of computers, has historically
played a major part in the development of both computer hardware
and software. The energies of hackers helped to revolutionise
computing from the cumbersome valve-dominated technology of its
early days to the mass proliferation and dispersion of personal
computers by such pioneering hackers as Steve Wozniak of Apple
Computers. The contribution to positive technical developments
from the latest generation of hackers, crackers, is perhaps less easy
to identify due to their largely underground status. An example, of
some of the practical benefits the computer industry can gain from
the most contemporary form of hackers, however, is given by Jean-
Bernard Condat of the French Computer Chaos Club who describes
how:
When a hacker works, three months after, the bug that he uses
will be discovered and/or repaired. In France, it's 75%
translation of bugs from American programs and 20% of
normal password indiscretions. Some of my members are
building a well-known program (available in three months)
that help end-users or customers of great computers to find
easy-to-understand password ... but-hard-to-find, too. The
dictionary of such a program is terribly important and these 5
boys are using all the available time to build this extremely
useful program^ ... already sold to two big companies in Paris!
(Condat: e-mail interview).
6 It forms part of what has been previously referred to in Chapter 5 as 'The Knowledge Gap".
7 The usefulness of such a program is tacitly conceeded by the experience of security personnel,
one of whom, John Holbrook, from the Computer Emergency Response Team, is quoted in the next
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Substantive criticisms are made of the ability of non-hacker,
establishment-type firms to provide an adequate appraisal of the
security status of a system:
In theory, actual hacking would be the best way to 'debug'
security procedures. In practice, only outsiders can look at a
system from an unbiased viewpoint, so this opens up potential
security problems. Part of what we do at ComSec we call
system penetration testing. This is an audit of external
security practices currently in effect by subjecting them to a
hacking attack. I personally think this is THE ONLY WAY to get
a snapshot of security problems to get a foundation of what
needs to be fixed, but only an outsider can do it accurately. We
go in with only a release form. No passwords, no dialups, no
information at all. We return a report outlining all dialups,
passwords, and information gained. This leads indirectly to an
internal audit to fix the internal errors that left the systems
vulnerable to outside attacks (Coggans: e-mail interview).
(iii) Potential underestimation of the role of hackers
It has been shown that security weaknesses can be due to
incremental alterations of a system as a response to commercial
pressures which can inhibit the full realisation of security
improvements. Also, there is the problem that even if a system is
technically relatively secure, it may be vulnerable to manipulations
of its human element: that is, the 'social engineeering' of operators
and employeess that interact with the system. Hackers, it can
therefore be argued, are a means of drawing attention to either
previously unknown security weaknesses, such as the poor
interworking of programs or vulnerability to social engineering, or to
known security problems that have not been addressed due to
commercial pressures.
chapter as attributing 75% of the security breaches he encountered as due to poor password
choice and maintenance.
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One reason why this potential may have been underated is the
fact that hackers do not generally publicise their findings of security
weaknesses in conventional channels. Those that notice hacking
information on their bulletin boards, however, may then report the
faults the hackers have documented, a fix will then occur, but
hackers will not receive recognition for the impact of their activity:
In general: finding errors in installation (mostly bad file
protections), as done by a tool like COPS, is useful, since
beginning crackers (sic) use these. Bug fixes are hard to do
yourself, and just a bug report won't get the bug fixed, enough
people must complain about it. That's why publicity about
bugs is a good thing. Whether to report them is another thing,
I inspired 2 SUN bug fixes with my programs (cover.c, which
used a fault in telnet, and ypx which uses YP design
oversights), yet I don't get credited, but the people who saw
my programs and sent them to SUN do. It's a strange world ..."
(Nauta: e-mail interview).
Thus the belief that hackers are unoriginal and contribute little
to security knowledge may, to some extent at least, result from a
failure of such knowledge to be correctly attributed and accredited to
a hacking source. A failure that may be exacerbated by a reluctance
upon the part of hackers to freely publicise and disseminate their
knowledge due to fears of prosecution and general hostility from the
CSI and legal establishment.
5.5 RATIONAL FOR NON-COOPERATION - 'THE HAWKS'
There are two main strands of the CSI that stand in identifiable
distinction from the computer underground, and whom therefore, do
not contain some of the confusing inter-group qualities of the
'poacher-turned-game-keepers'. These two strands of the CSI could
be characterised as the 'hawks' and the 'doves'. The basis for the
different interpretations of the character of hacking rests upon two
main aspects. Firstly, the hawks and doves dispute the ethical
content of hacking activity, the subject of the next chapter. Secondly,
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they dispute the extent to which hacking is technically relevant to
computing, the extent to which cooperation with hackers could
potentially produce technical benefits.
(i) Technical arguments against hacking
The ad hoc and largely unsolicited testing methods of hackers,
do not fit well into the professional structure and requirements of
the computing industry. The unorthodox aspects of hacking are not
conducive to establishing a rapport between those obtaining
knowledge about the security of systems, by illicit, unauthorised
means, and those in charge of maintaining the systems who could
benefit from such knowledge. This is due to two main reasons.
Firstly, the nature of much hacking activity does not sit well with
members of the computing industry who tend to inhabit a
technological environment where discipline of method and obedience
to instructions tend to be valued more than evidence of unstructured
and generally un-documented technical brilliance. Secondly, the
unsolicited nature of illicit hacking means that systems are being
used without the prior permission of the owners. These two factors
lead to a situation that gives rise to an immediate lack of affinity
between hackers and the CSI.
The call for more emphasis upon the practicalities of security
stands in opposition to those calling for a more formal approach to
security. One criticism of the idea that hackers provide a useful
research and development resource is the contention that hackers
very seldom make use of any original security weaknesses. In
addition there is the contention of Prof Spafford that:
All that breaking into a system teaches is how to break into
systems. It's very similar to testing software with random
testing, for instance. If the procedure fails, what knowledge
has been gained? Does it mean that the system is secure? Does
it mean that the cracker didn't try hard enough? In testing, if
a set of random test fails, we cannot conclude the software
under test is correct (I can give you, scores of references on
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this). It is only a crude approximation, and is viewed as 'real'
testing only by the uninformed (Prof Spafford: e-mail
interview).
Coggans (e-mail interview) points out that some computer
systems are safety-critical to the point that human death may be a
result of any system failure. In so far as this chapter has shown that
hacking offers the potential to provide useful information with which
to remedy some security weaknesses, the question remains as to
why more use is not made of hackers' expertise. Fuller cooperation
with hackers to use this expertise may be problematic as illustrated
by the practice of 'security through obscurity' whereby the CSI avoid
cooperation with hackers. This is because cooperating with hackers
may provide security practioners with useful information with which
to fix security holes, yet it also threatens to increase the knowledge
of hackers by offering them more access to potential hacking targets
and opportunities for social engineering®. Unsolicited hacking
activity is also problematic because it threatens to damage the
delicate nature of many modern inter-connected systems.
Hacking can provide us (information security, audit, vendors,
etc.) with information about vulnerabilities. Yet, the problem
today is that the stakes are too high for this type of teaching to
continue. Specifically, the interconnected world is too fragile to
allow 'volunteers' to test the security of organizations without
being invited to do that (Sherizen: e-mail interview).
This leads directly to the subject of whether cooperation should
be encouraged between hackers and the CSI, or whether computing
is for the forseeable future to be characterised by a confrontational
situation of 'them and us'. The idea that there should be cooperation
between hackers and the CSI is hotly contested by some members of
8 Defined as tricking legitimate personnel into aiding illicit intrusions, for example, by
deceiving a telephone operator into giving security information by pretending to be a telephone
company engineer.
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the CSI who argue that the educational benefits to be derived from
hacking are exaggerated:
I think it's a misconception to believe that most (emphasis:
'most') hackers have expertise that's particularly worthwhile.
Many, of course, work from cookbooks, lists of known holes.
While such lists are useful to the vendors and to CERT, they're
in some sense, uninteresting — few, if any, show any degree of
conceptual novelty (Holbrook: e-mail interview).
Despite such a contention, diverse figures from the hacking
community have used their hacking ability in the wider computing
community. Thus Schifreen, Van Os, Coggans and Mofo, have all
utilised their knowledge for commercial purposes by starting up
computer security firms, whilst Prof Herschberg and his students
have acted on a consultancy basis for a 'steady trickle' of
corporations willing to have their security tested by 'hands-on'
methods. In contrast to this experience, however, Prof Spafford puts
forward the following argument:
A true computer security specialist learns about more than just
weaknesses - she/he should learn about issues in software
engineering, formal methods, testing theory, operating systems,
language design, human factors, risk assessment, the law,
networking, cryptography, and a number of other topics.
Breaking into a system teaches NONE of these things - it simply
serves to illustrate how poorly configured many systems are,
and how poorly tested the software is. But that should be
obvious to anyone studying software engineering or security!
(Prof Spafford: e-mail interview).
Cohen also emphasises the point that within computing there is
a general awareness of widespread inadequacies and faults in many
systems, and so hackers' actions provide little original security
information:
I've never seen a 'cracker' who broke into a system in a
particularly novel way. Every attack of this sort is one we
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have known about for 20 years and just not acted on. It's like
taking candy from a baby. What we need is fewer computer
security babies and more well-educated experts (Dr Cohen: e-
mail interview).
This tendency for the majority of hackers to make use of
unoriginal security weaknesses is recognised by some of the hackers
themselves. Thus Nauta agrees that:
Most crackers are beginners at the OS, and use standard tricks,
well known bugs, and most of all, bad installation or
management. As delivered, the system has some faults and
bugs, but when used, the security may weaken due to
installation of extra programs, changing file permissions, etc.
Finding out new holes is something for 1) luck or 2) an expert.
Experts generally know how to crack a system but don't find it
challenging, worth the trouble (Nauta: e-mail interview).
Thus the criticism of technical justifications for hacking relies
on the charge that the knowledge it produces, is very seldom, if ever,
original. Whilst Cohen's view still allows for some benefits to stem
from hacking in the sense that hackers may 'cut their horns' (sic) by
gaining practical, if not particularly original, knowledge. The thrust
of his argument is that such knowledge does not aid the development
of computing and could be obtained in more orthodox ways. His
criticism, along with Spafford's, who claims that the poor security of
systems: "should be obvious to anyone studying software
engineering", fails to resolve the problem of why, if such holes are
well known, they are not fixed.
(ii) The question of trust - the case of Robert Schifreen
An important factor mitigating against increased cooperation
with hackers is the practical consideration of being able to trust both
the integrity and obedience of workers within an
industrial/commercial setting. Tozer and Taylor were both at pains
to emphasise the need for employers to be able to expect their
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workers to only do the task given to them without allowing their
curiosity to divert themselves. A 'vicious circle of trust'9 can
develop, however, whereby the only way to achieve specific
knowledge of security issues is to indulge in illicit hacking activity,
but the ownership of such knowledge subsequently debars the
holder from being legitimately employed in the CSI.
One example of the general reluctance of the CSI to cooperate
with, or to employ, hackers is given by 'smb', a U.S. security
consultant, His reason why hackers' knowledge is not better used by
the computing establishment is:
Because they can't be trusted. I'm perfectly serious - would
you hire someone for a sensitive position without good
evidence that they weren't going to abuse their position? The
hackers are either directly criminal, in which case you'd be a
fool to hire them, or they're simply demonstrating a great deal
of immaturity. In that case, why do you think they'll grow up
if they get a new job? ... I'm not speaking in absolutes, of
course. Circa 20 years ago, when I was working for a
university computer center, I was faced with two students
engaging in questionable activities. A brief investigation
showed that both primarily wanted access to computing - but
one of them was doing some fairly dubious things with his
access. We turned that case over to the dean, and hired the
other (Smb: e-mail interview).
These examples show that in previous times, hackers were
valued for their technical ability and less concern was shown to such
issues as trust or formal education in programming methods. With
the more widespread dispersal of computers within the business
world there has been a disproportionate increase in antipathy
towards hackers, considering the act itself has remained constant. Dr
Taylor gave the following explanation of his lack of trust for hackers:
Well, it's the old, old story, if you employ someone who is close
to your system security who is known to have a sort of
9 c.f. Appendix 2 for a full account.
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criminal background or past criminal background, you don't
know what they're going to do in terms of passing on
information to third parties, because criminals have the wrong
sort of information networks ... there's just this fear that
they're going to pass to some of their friends, associates and so
on, the information to hack into a system or some information
they extracted out of it. If you let a hacker look around your
system, they're bound to look into all sorts of confidential
information like company plans for the next five years, which
are on most big computers. It's the fact that they can't be
trusted (Dr Taylor: Knutsford interview).
Despite the fact that hackers have at least a potentially useful
role in the elimination of security holes, the issue of legitimacy
mitigates against cooperation between the CU and the CSI. There are
pragmatic considerations of whether hackers should be trusted with
access to a company's systems, such as the possible litigious
ramifications resulting from allowing known hackers access to
systems that might subsequently be damaged. Mercury highlights
the 'cover your back' type of approach to security, which arguably
concentrates more upon fulfilling institutional and legal expectations
than it seeks the best possible technical fix to a given security
weakness. He describes how:
I once sent out letters to hospitals offering my services. I
included a xerox of an article about lax computer security in
hospitals. Having been employed by a local software supplier
to these hospitals, I was able to identify a couple of obvious
examples. No takers. One system manager told me that it
might be true that I knew more about computer security than
a Big Eight Accounting Firm. 'But they bring other things to the
table', he said. He meant that if he got an expensive audit from
a Big Eight Firm and someone died anyway, he would be
covered from liability (Mercury: e-mail interview).
Apart from the issue of trust, there is also the question of
keeping the innate curiosity of a hacker in check. Both Dr Taylor and
Mr. Tozer emphasised that in a commercial setting one of the most
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important requirements they demand from their workers is a
discipline to strictly follow instructions, and that they did not believe
hackers would have such discipline. Thus Mr Tozer stated that:
If these people aren't layabouts, if they've been looking for
jobs, then the industry is desperate for people who have a good
discipline and good technical ability. But have they got good
discipline? In other words, could you ever use a hacker to do a
proper job or would he want to go off on his own and do what
he wants to do ... I think it must be a lack of discipline
somewhere. You tell someone to go away and write a program
to do something, not to do part of it and not to do all of it plus a
bit more ... (Hawarden interview).
Finally, Prof Spafford is noted within the internet community
for his more acerbic articulation of the belief that there should be
minimal cooperation between those who are professionally
responsible for the security maintenance of systems, and hackers.
Everyone I know in major corporations, when faced with a
choice between: a) a student whose resume brags about all the
machines he's broken into over the network; or b) a student
whose resume lists courses in cryptography, law, and software
engineering would hire (b) and avoid (a) like the plague. If
someone has already demonstrated a contempt for privacy and
property rights, why would you want to hire them into a
sensitive position working with important company data? It's
like hiring a confessed arsonist to install fire alarms, or hiring
an admitted paedophile as a teacher (Prof Sapfford: e-mail
interview).
Robert Schifreen was arrested in 1984 for breaking into the
Duke of Edinburgh's electronic mail account, the case and its
subsequent publicity providing impetus for the subsequent drafting
of the Computer Misuse Act of 1990. He now owns a computer-
magazine publishing firm, and speaks at conferences, disseminating
information about hacking in a guide that he has published. His
actual security consultancy is more limited than he would wish or
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had originally planned; reinforcing the points previously made about
lack of hands-on knowledge in computer security. His experience
illustrates the antagonism between the CSI and the CU and is a
specific example of the subsequent lack of trust that exists between
the two. It is of particular interest because he has had such direct
and "test-case" status in the field of computer security and the
"establishment's" attempts to deal with it. He is possibly the most
famous example of the blurred division between the CU and the CSI
referred to in journalistic language as, "the poacher turned game¬
keeper".
Acknowledging that CSI figures are often hostile to and
denigrate the usefulness of hacking knowledge, Schifreen relates how
he sometimes finds it difficult to find a receptive audience for his
expertise:
which is why I tend to speak at conferences and put things in
writing rather than act as a consultant and go and talk to
people face-to-face, or go and look at their computer systems
and say "I wouldn't do that if I were you". Because yes, I can
understand their reticence. They'll come and talk to me and
ask me questions, general questions, nothing too specific, but
there's a lot of knowledge out there that's either wrong or
incomplete or non-existent and if I can scratch the surface and
try and educate people, then I'll try and do so (Schifreen:
London interview).
Thus, Schifreen's account of his reception within the CSI
emphasises the willingness of firms to listen to general warnings
concerning security weaknesses, yet a lack of trust and reluctant to




This chapter set out to analyse the following main issues: the
extent to which security weaknesses exist; the reasons they are not
eliminated; and the potential role of hackers in providing security
expertise. Evidence from both the qualitative and quantitative
fieldwork has illustrated the depth of security weaknesses within
computing. The statistical analysis has further suggested that
reported weaknesses are likely to be understated in official reports.
The reasons why security flaws are not eliminated are linked
to the factors that give rise to their existence in the first place. Both
the qualitative and quantitative fieldwork evidence illustrate the two
main causes of the existence of security weaknesses and the
accompanying gap between programming's achievements and
expectations; computing's relatively immature status as an industry
and the pressures caused by the demands of marketing. The former
gives rise to a scarcity of theoretical knowledge surrounding
computer security. Thus the fieldwork recounted various calls for
more 'hands-on' experience of security from which theory can be
garnered. The commercial pressures that exacerbate weaknesses
have also been recounted. The CSI figures emphasise their
frustration at the lack of adequate provision made for security as a
result of the commercial desire to avoid expense, whilst both the CU
and CSI perceive poor levels of security, in some instances at least,
as being evidence of apathy.
Hawks and doves respond differently to the fact that the
nature and motivation of a computer intruder is hidden from those
in charge of the system. Whereas such figures as Taylor, Tozer and
Jones, use the unknown nature of intruders as an argument for
having to treat all intruders as if they were criminals, Herschberg
emphasises that the ethical desire to castigate is supplanted by the
technical responsibility of system operators to maintain their
systems' security. It behoves operators to accept help from
whatever quarter it is offered from. This failure to fully address
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computing's inherent security and operational weaknesses is what
leads Herschberg to bemoan the computing industry's aversion to,
and subsequent lack of, practical 'hands-on' security knowledge. It is
the same failure, however, that also leads hawkish figures to press
for the stigmatisation of hackers and their subsequent exclusion from
influence within computing.
This chapter's analysis of the software crisis is significant for
the way in which it describes the potential role hackers have in
helping to provide better security, and also its relevance to the
origins of the marginalisation of hackers within computing. Hackers'
potential to provide useful information about security weaknesses is
likely to remain, despite criticism from the hawks, due to the fact
that there are always likely to be difficulties in attempting to
anticipate the possible sources of security breaches. Hackers' hands-
on approach to testing is a practical way of providing that
information. In addition, it is likely that hacking will survive in
some form or another, considering it exhibits aspects of the craft
qualities of programming that have not been (and are unlikely to be)
eliminated as programming develops towards more science-based
methods. Despite the fact that these qualities have not been totally
eliminated, the pressures within computing to adopt more rigorous
methods of software development have contributed to the
marginalisation of the more craft-based hacker-type programmers.
This has provided the origin of the 'them and us' scenario: the subject
of the next chapter.
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Hackers are like kids putting a 10 pence piece on a railway line
to see if the train can bend it, not realising that they risk de¬
railing the whole train (Mike Jones: London interview).
The technical objections of the hawks to hacking, which reject
the argument advocating cooperation with hackers, are
supplemented by their ethical objections to the activity, explored in
this chapter. Previous chapters have shown that there is some
interplay and contact between the hacker community and the
computer security industry, as well as the more subsidiary group:
the academics1. The much more common relationship between
hackers and the computer security industry, however, is the thinly-
veiled or open hostility evident in the opinions of the hawks.
This chapter examines the basis of this hostility. The groups'
contrasting ethical stances are highlighted, and their origins
explained. The technical evolution of computing is shown as creating
new conditions that demand ethical judgements to be made with
respect to what constitutes ethical use of computer resources. The
CU and the CSI have different ethical interpretations that are
expressed in a process of debate. This debate then becomes part of a
boundary forming process between the two groups. Two identifiable
influences upon such ethical judgements are the age of the person
making the judgement, and the extent to which technology plays a
part in the situation about which an ethical judgement has to be
made.
Elements of the CSI and the CU stand in identifiable opposition
to each other. This chapter shows how this opposition is maintained
and exacerbated as part of a boundary forming process. Ethical
1 Thus Eric Coggans and Robert Schifreen (as well as several other hackers encountered in the
fieldwork) have started their own computer firms; Professor Herschberg has contacts with and
produces interaction between hackers and the security industry by means of his consultancy
work, and the authorised and unauthorised (in the case of accepting a documented hack in lieu
of a dissertation) use of students to test systems.
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differences between the two groups are espoused, but examples are
given of the extent to such differences are still in a process of
formation within computing's nascent environment. Thus the type of
mentality within the CU that fails to accept any ethical implications
from phone-phreaking or hacking is sharply opposed by the CSI,
whose typical sentiment is that computer users such as hackers
have forgotten "that sometimes they must leave the playpen and
accept the notion that computing is more than just a game"
(Bloombecker 1990: 41). This contention that hackers have failed to
psychologically "come out of the playpen" is illustrative of some of
the marked ethical differences between the two groups.
This chapter, however, draws attention to examples of the
more ambiguous and blurred ethical situations within computing,
and how an on-going process of negotiation, group differentiation
and boundary formation, is required to maintain such differences
between the groups. The ethical complexities surrounding computing
are becoming increasingly important as it becomes a more prevalent
aspect of everyday life. The CSI, as a part of a dominant social
constituency of business and political interests, is involved in a
process of attempting to impose its interpretation of such ethical
issues upon computing. Advocates of different ethical approaches
find themselves increasingly separated by moral boundaries that
have become codified into professional regulations and government
legislation.
The "them and us" scenario caused by the contrasting ethical
stances is fuelled by the media's portrayal of hackers as unethical
outsiders. The most obvious manifestation of this is the evolution of
attitudes held towards hackers by the dominant social constituency.
The 'true hackers' of MIT were active from the late 1950's and were
instrumental in the development of both hardware and software,
whereas hackers are now largely perceived as a problem to be
legislated away. This evolution in perceptions is simultaneously a
result of the emergence of the CSI as a constituency, and a causal
factor in that development. To illustrate the process of boundary
formation we note comparisons of the debate surrounding Robert
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Morris Jr's intrusion into the internet system with the language and
attitudes displayed during the Salem Witch trials (Dougan and Gieryn
1988). The press, in particular, has been particularly active in the
process of stereotyping and sensationalising hacking incidents, the
process helping to produce a deviant group status for hackers.
The chapter also includes analysis of one of the most
interesting aspects of the boundary forming process between the CSI
and the CU, namely, the way in which physical comparisons are made
between situations that arise in computing and the real world. These
metaphors are used as explanatory tools and also in the production
and maintenance of the value systems that separate the two groups.
The physical analogies used seem to fulfil both of these functions.
They allow what would otherwise be potentially complicated
technical and ethical questions to be approached in a more
manageable and everyday manner, yet they also contribute directly
to the formation of ethical boundaries due to their particular
suitability as a means of sensationalising hacking issues.
Public commentators such as Gene Spafford have made various
polemical statements of what hacking and its implications are:
employing a hacker, is like making 'an arsonist your fire chief, or a
paedophile a school teacher.' The actions of hackers are thus
forcefully taken out of the realms of 'cyberspace' and reintroduced
into the concrete realm of threatening real world situations. If the
comparison is accepted, then the danger and harm to be suffered
from such actions are more readily understood and feared, and
hackers as a group may then be effectively viewed as moral pariahs.
With reference to Woolgar's (1990) attempt to link computer virus
stories with the prevalence of 'urban/contemporary legends', it can
be pointed out that the physical analogies used by the CSI in
discussions of computer ethics emphasise the transgressive 'breaking
and entering' qualities of hacking2. In contrast, the CU reject such
dramatic analogies and prefer to emphasise the intellectual and
pioneering qualities of hacking which we will subsequently analyse
2 Fear of boundary transgression is vividly portrayed in such urban legends as 'The Mexican
Dog' and 'The Choking Doberman', c.f. Woolgar (1990).
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with respect to their chosen analogies: comparisons of hacking's
intellectual nature and frontier ethos to a game of chess and the Wild
West, respectively.
6.2 BOUNDARY FORMATION - 'THEM AND US'
Dougan and Gieryn (1988), like Meyer and Thomas (1990),
have compared the process of boundary formation within computing
with the historical examples of formalised witch trials. This is an
extreme process of 'boundary formation' whereby groups
differentiate themselves by marginalising other groups thereby
establishing their own identity. "Witch hunts" occur in periods of
social transition and we have seen in Chapter 3 that IT is undergoing
a period of social change. The economic order is attempting to
impose property relations upon information, yet its changing nature
undermines its properties as a commodity.
Computer counter-cultures are increasingly perceived as a
threat to the establishment's ability to control technology for its own
purposes. The initial awe and even respect with which hackers were
originally viewed as 'technological wizards' has given way to the
more frequent hawkish perception that they are 'electronic vandals'.
Dominant social groups initially mythologise and then stigmatise
peripheral groups that do not share their value-structure. In the
case of hackers, this tendency has been exacerbated by the fear and
ignorance encouraged as a result of hacking's covert nature and the
difficulties of documenting the activity.
Dougan and Gieryn (1988), amongst others, point out that such
concepts of deviancy have a function. Put simply, a community only
has a sense of its community status by knowing what it is not.
Distancing themselves from outsiders helps members within that
group feel a sense of togetherness. Furthermore, cultures that
emphasise certain values over others will tend to label as deviant
those activities which threaten its most prized value. In the
particular case of hackers, their stigmatisation and marginalisation
has occurred because they have threatened, with their information-
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sharing culture, one of the basic crutches of the capitalist order:
property rights. The facilitating feature of the boundary forming
process between the CU and the CSI is the sense of otherness and
lack of affinity with which they confront each other: the "them and
us" scenario.
6.2.1 The evidence - hawkish strength of feeling
Direct access to the debate between the CSI and CU can be
obtained by looking at examples of e-mail correspondence known as
'flames'. These are strongly worded, and often insulting electronic
mail messages. They serve to illustrate the antagonism that exists
between the CSI and CU. The following are examples of the
expressions used on e-mail to describe hackers and hacking:
I am for making the penalties for computer trespass extremely
painful to the perpetrator ... Most administrators who've had to
clean up and audit a system of this size probably think that a
felony rap is too light a sentence. At times like that, we tend to
think in terms of boiling in oil, being drawn and quartered, or
maybe burying the intruder up to his neck in an anthill (Bob
Johnson: RISKS electronic digest, 11:32).
electronic vandalism (Warman: e-mail interview).
Somewhere near vermin i.e. possibly unavoidable, maybe even
necessary pests that can be destructive and disruptive if not
monitored (Zmudsinki e-mail interview).
Mostly they seem to be kids with a dramatically
underdeveloped sense of community and society
(Bernie Cosell: e-mail interview).
Opposition to hacking practices has become increasingly non¬
specific and moralistic, an example being Spafford's argument that
using hackers' knowledge on a regular basis within the computer
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security industry is equivalent to employing a known arsonist as
your fire-chief, a fraudster as your accountant, or a paedophile as
your child-minder. The technical insights that they could provide or
could be derived as a by-product of their activities become
subordinate to the need to express opprobrium against the morality
of the actions themselves. The language of blame and morality is
consistently used by hawkish members of the CSI to refer to hackers
in what they would argue is a process of 'blame displacement'. The
CSI are accused of using moral condemnation as a means of
deflecting any responsibility and blame for security breaches that
might be attached, not just to the perpetrators of intrusions, but also
their victims. As Herschberg said:
The pseudo-moral arguments and the moralistic language
certainly cloud the issue in my view. I think it obscures the
fact that system owners or system administrators have a moral
duty to do at least their level best to stop penetrations. They
are very remiss in their duty, they couldn't care less and
therefore at least, there is quite an understandable tendency to
blame the penetrator rather than blaming themselves for not
having taken at least adequate counter measures, in fact in
some cases counter measures have not been taken at all ... if it
is proved to you that you haven't done your homework, then
you almost automatically go into a defensive attitude which in
this case, simply amounts to attacking the hacker, blaming him
morally, heaping opprobrium on his head ... yes, the fear factor
is involved (Herschberg: Delft interview).
This undercurrent of moral censure was a recurrent quality of
the field-work interviews with members of the CSI, for example:
I've been in this game ... this is my 36th year, in the interests
of hacking as a whole I think hacking is something which is
derogatory; to be played down, to possibly in fact, be treated as
a minor form of criminal activity ... the last thing you want to
do is to make hackers into public figures; give them publicity.
I think it needs to be played down when it occurs, but it
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shouldn't occur ... I wouldn't have them, no, under any
circumstances (Taylor: Knutsford interview).
Dr Taylor and others interviewees, involved in the provision of
computer security, had had surprisingly little direct contact with
hackers. I asked him about this lack of direct contact/interplay and
his perceptions of the motivations of hackers:
Well, there shouldn't be [any interplay] because the industry
doesn't want to hear about hackers and certainly doesn't want
to see the effects of what they do ... To me I'm not concerned
with what the hacker does, I'm more concerned with keeping
him out to start with ... You've talked to what are called the
more ethical members of the hacking community for whom it's
an intellectual challenge, but there are in fact people who are
psychopaths, and Doctor Popp3 is one of these, where they just
want to level a score with society which they feel has been
unfair to them ... A chap called Whitely has just gone to prison
for four years for destroying medical data at Queen Mary's
hospital, London. He just destroyed utterly and he wasn't just
a hacker that was browsing, he was a psychopath almost
certainly (Taylor: Knutsford interview).
In contrast, and as an illustration of the negative perceptions
each groups has of the other, a hacker, Mofo, argues that psychotic
tendencies are not the sole preserve of the hacking community:
my experience has shown me that the actions of 'those in
charge' of computer systems and networks have similar 'power
trips' which need be fulfilled. Whether this psychotic need is
developed or entrenched before one's association with
computers is irrelevant. Individuals bearing such faulty
mental health are present in all walks of life. I believe it is just
a matter of probability that many such individuals are
3 Joseph Lewis Popp: he was charged in January 1990 with using a trojan horse hidden within a
diskette to extort money from recipients whose systems had subsequently become infected. The
trial did not come to court, however, because his defence argued that he was mentally unfit to
stand trial. They described how he had taken to putting hair curlers in his beard and wearing
a cardboard box on his head in an apparent attempt to protect himself from radiation.
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somewhat associated with the management of computers and
networks [as well as intrusion into computer systems] (Mofo: e-
mail interview).
Taylor is wary of the damage to computing that greater
publicisation of hacking could cause, yet as the above reference to Dr
Popp and Nicholas Whitley shows, ironically, he seemed to be
dependent upon the most publicised cases of hacking for his
perceptions of hackers. A further argument that prevents the CSI
accepting hackers as potentially useful fault-finders in systems is the
simple charge that without the existence of hackers in the first place,
there would be very little need for extensive security measures.
Even if hackers are of some use in pointing out various bugs in
systems, such a benefit is outweighed by the fact that a large amount
of computing resources are 'wasted' on what would otherwise be
unnecessary security measures. For example, Dr Taylor's view is
that:
hacking is a menace that stops people doing constructive work
... A lot of money get's spent today on providing quite complex
solutions to keep ahead of hackers, which in my view should
not be spent ... They're challenging the researchers to produce
better technical solutions and they're stimulating the software
service industry which provides these solutions and makes
money out of it. But you answer the question for me, what's
that doing for society? (Taylor: Knutsford interview).
Thus one reason for the use of moral language is in order to
displace blame from those in charge of the systems where security is
lax, to those who have broken that lax security. Irrespective of the
state of security of systems, there is a project of group formation
whereby those who implement computer security wish to isolate and
differentiate themselves from the CU, in a process that highlights the
inherent differences that exist between the two groups. This project
is vividly illustrated in the following excerpt from the keynote
Turing Award acceptance speech given by Ken Thompson:
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I have watched kids testifying before Congress. It is clear that
they are completely unaware of the seriousness of their acts.
There is obviously a cultural gap. The act of breaking into a
computer system has to have the same social stigma as
breaking into a neighbor's house. It should not matter that the
neighbour's door is unlocked. The press must learn that
misguided use of a computer is no more amazing than drunk
driving of an automobile (Thompson 1984: 763).
This degree of sentiment was consistently expressed amongst
some of the most prominent and accomplished of those figures from
the computer security industry who were generally opposed to
hackers:
Unfortunately ... it is tempting to view the hacker as something
of a folk hero - a lone individual who, armed with only his own
ingenuity, is able to thwart the system. Not enough attention is
paid to the real damage that such people can do...when
somebody tampers with someone else's data or programs,
however clever the method, we all need to recognise that such
an act is at best irresponsible and very likely criminal. That
the offender feels no remorse, or that the virus had unintended
consequences does not change the essential lawlessness of the
act, which is in effect breaking-and-entering. And asserting
that the act had a salutary outcome, since it led to stronger
safeguards, has no more validity than if the same argument
were advanced in defense of any crime. If after experiencing a
burglary I purchase a burglar alarm for my house, does that
excuse the burglar? Of course not. Any such act should be
vigorously prosecuted (Parrish 1989).
Several of the above quotations are notable for their heavy
reliance upon the visual imagery of metaphors comparing the ethical
issues arising from computing with real-world situations, a topic that
will be looked at shortly.
6.3 REASONS FOR THEM AND US'
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6.3.1 Ethical differences between the CSI and CU
Having identified the strength of feeling of hawkish views of
hacking, this section explores the ethical basis of that antagonism.
The following quotation from a member of the CSI illustrates the
stark difference between the ethical outlooks of certain members of
the computing constituency. Elements of the CSI vehemently oppose
the "playpen attitude" advocated by elements of the CU.
Presupposing that no harm is done, hackers tend to believe that it is
not wrong to explore systems without prior permission, whilst those
concerned with the security of those systems would characterise
such a belief as offensive:
Just because YOU have such a totally bankrupt sense of ethics
and propriety, that shouldn't put a burden on *me* to have to
waste my time dealing with it. Life is short enough to not have
it gratuitously wasted on self-righteous, immature fools...If you
want to 'play' on my system, you can ASK me, try to convince
me *a priori* of the innocence of your intent, and if I say "no"
you should just go away. And playing without asking is, and
should be criminal; I have no obligation, nor any interest, in
being compelled to provide a playpen for bozos who are so
jaded that they cannot amuse themselves in some non-
offensive way (Cosell CUD 3:12).
When we examine the factors underpinning the CSI's and CU's
contrasting ethical interpretations we find an important feature is
the tendency of the CSI to denigrate, or devalue the ethics articulated
by hackers. Bob Johnson, a Senior Systems analyst and Unix System
Administrator at a US military installation criticises the justifications
used by hackers as an example of the modern tendency to indulge in
"positional ethics". Referring to the Internet worm case he states:
The majority of people refuse to judge on the basis of "right
and wrong". Instead, they judge the actions in terms of result,
or based on actual damages, or incidental damages or their own
personal ideas. In my mind, Morris was WRONG in what he
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did, regardless of damages, and should therefore be prepared
to pay for his deeds. Many others do not suffer from this
"narrow frame of mind". By the way, positional ethics is the
same line of reasoning which asks, "When would it be right to
steal a loaf of bread?" I believe that the answer is "It may
someday be necessary, but it's never right" (Bob Johnson: e-
mail interview).
The "hawkish" elements of the CSI are unequivocal in their
condemnation of hacking and its lack of ethics. They argue that the
lack of ethics shown by hackers is indicative of a wider societal
decline. Thus Smb characterises the alleged degeneration of the
average persons ethics, not as a breakdown in morality, but rather as
a spread of amorality: "I'm far from convinced that the lack of ethics
is unique to hackers. I think it's a societal problem, which in this
business we see manifested as hacking. Amorality rather than
immorality is the problem" (Smb: E-mail interview). Similarly, Bob
Johnson argues that:
In a larger sense, I view them [hacking and viruses] as part of
the same problem, which is a degeneration of the average
persons ethics - i.e. integrity and honesty. There's a popular
saying in America - 'You're not really breaking the speed limit
unless you get caught. I believe an ethical person would
neither break into systems, nor write viruses (Bob Johnson: e-
mail interview).
Cosell takes this argument further, the "degeneration of the
average person's ethics" is applied to a loss of respect by hackers for
property rights:
The issue here is one of ethics, not damages. I'll avoid the
"today's children are terrors" argument, but some parts of that
cannot be avoided: the hackers take the point of view that the
world at large OWES them amusement, and that anything they
can manage to break into is fair game [an astonishing step
beyond an already reprehensible position, that anything not
completely nailed down is fair game] (Cosell: e-mail interview).
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A study into social and business ethical questions was carried
out by Johnston and Wood (1985, cited by Vinten 1990) for the
British Social Attitudes Survey. Apart from their major conclusion
that the single most important factor influencing the strength of
people's ethical judgements was age, it seems difficult to point to
clear ethical boundaries and guide-lines in relation to many of the
situations that arise in the modern world, especially in the realms of
business. Thus in his summary of the report Vinten describes how:
"In situations ranging widely from illegitimate tipping of dustmen to
serious corruption, no clear-cut boundaries emerged as between
'right' and 'wrong' ... Sub-group variation was greatest where
situations were complicated by motivation questions, and by being
remote from everyday experience" (Vinten 1990: 3). Hacking fulfils
both of these criteria.
The advent of "virtual reality" or "cyberspace" tends to divorce
computing from "everyday experience". This leads directly to an
ambiguous ethical status for many computing situations and a
concomitant need to assert ethical standards by the dominant social
constituency if it is to succeed in exerting control over computing.
Vinten's study of computer ethics (1990) points out that ethical
judgements tend to be harsher, the older the person making the
judgements. Members of the CSI consistently have strongly critical
views of the ethical stance taken by hackers. They tend to be older
than hackers, having been involved with computers, as a career, for
many years. Hackers, in contrast, tend to use computers more as a
hobby and may hack in order to gain access to systems which their
youth precludes them from obtaining access to by legitimate means.
This age difference is perhaps one reason why there are such
fundamental differences in the ethical outlook of members of the CSI
and CU4.
6.3.2 Fear of Anonymity
4 c.f. Appendix l's summary of the fieldwork's statistical evidence of the age factor.
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One of the common themes that stems from the CSI's
perception of hackers is their tendency to assume the worst intent
behind the actions of intruders, a tendency encouraged by the fact
that hacking is intrinsically anonymous:
There is a great difference between trespassing on my
property and breaking into my computer. A better analogy
might be finding a trespasser in your high-rise office building
at 3 AM, and learning that his back-pack contained some tools,
some wire, a timer and a couple of detonation caps. He could
claim that he wasn't planting a bomb, but how can you be
sure? (Cosell: e-mail interview).
Another vivid example of the doubt caused by the anonymity
of hackers is the comparison below made by Mike Jones of the DTI's
security awareness division. I pointed out that many hackers feel
victimised by the establishment because they believe it is more
interested in prosecuting them than patching up the holes they are
pointing out with their activity. Jones accepted that there was
prejudice in the views of the CSI towards the CU. That prejudice,
however, is based upon the potential damage that hackers can
cause. Even if there is no malicious intention from the hacker,
suspicion and doubt as to what harm has been done exists:
Say you came out to your car and your bonnet was slightly up
and you looked under the bonnet and somebody was
tampering with the leads or there looked like there were
marks on the brake-pipe. Would you just put the bonnet down
and say "oh, they've probably done no harm" and drive off, or
would you suspect that they've done something wrong and
they've sawn through a brake-pipe or whatever... say a
maintenance crew arrived at a hanger one morning and found
that somebody had broken in and there were screw-driver
marks on the outside casing of one of the engines, now would
they look inside and say "nothing really wrong here" or would
they say, "hey, we've got to take this engine apart or at least
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look at it so closely that we can verify that whatever has been
done hasn't harmed the engine" (Jones: London interview).
These two quotations proffer an important explanation of the
alleged paranoid and knee-jerk reactions to hacking activity from the
computing establishment. The general prejudice held by the CSI
towards the CU is heightened by the anonymous quality of hacking.
The anonymity encourages doubts and paranoia as a result of being
unable to assess the motivation of intruders and the likelihood that
any harm that has been committed will be difficult to uncover.
In addition to these points, the anonymity afforded by
Computer Mediated Communication (CMC) encourages hackers to
project exaggeratedly threatening personalities to the outside world
and media. Barlow (1990) describes meeting some hackers who had
previously frightened him with their aggressive e-mail posturing.
When Barlow actually came face to face with two of the hackers they:
were well scrubbed and fashionably clad. They looked to be as
dangerous as ducks. But ... as ... the media have discovered to
their delight, the boys had developed distinctly showier
personae for their rambles through the howling wilderness of
Cyberspace. Glittering with spikes of binary chrome, they
strode past the klieg lights and into the digital distance. There
they would be outlaws. It was only a matter of time before
they started to believe themselves as bad as they sounded.
And no time at all before everyone else did (Barlow 1990: 48).
The anonymity afforded by CMC thus allows hacking culture to
indulge in extravagant role-playing which enhances the perception of
it in the eyes of outsiders as being a potentially dangerous
underground movement. Hacking groups generally choose colourful
names such as "Bad Ass Mother Fuckers, Chaos Computer Club, Circle
of Death, Farmers of Doom"5, and so on.
6.4 THE ETHICAL BASIS OF THE THEM AND US' SCENARIO
5 Sterling 1993: 95
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6.4.1 Blurred and vestigial ethics
Cracking, virus writing, and all the rest, fall into the realm of
possibility when dealing with intelligent, curious minds. The
ethics of such things come later. Until then, users of computers
remain in this infancy of cracking, etc. (Kerchen: e-mail
interview).
The ethical edges demarcating legal and illicit acts have a
higher tendency to be blurred whenever technology has a significant
presence in the context of the act. The acts of such figures as Captain
Crunch have been received with a combination of admiration and
condemnation. Opposition to attempts to commodify and
institutionalise informational property relations can exist in such
rebellious manipulations of technology; but also more 'respectably' in
the intellectual and political platforms of such figures as Richard
Stallman and the League for Programming Freedom. Activities
involving the use of computers have given rise to a number of
qualitatively new situations in which there is a debate as to whether
the act in question is ethical or not. These activities tend to centre
upon such questions as whether the unauthorised access to and/or
use of somebody's computer, system, or data can be adequately
compared to more traditional crimes involving the physical access or
manipulation of material objects or property.
An example of such ambiguity is the fact that whereas the
idiosyncratic behaviour of the early hackers of MIT was benignly
tolerated now hacking is portrayed in the press as having evil
associations and is subject to legal prosecution. This apparent change
in social values has occurred despite the fact that the motivations
and lack of regard for property rights associated with hacking have
remained constant over time. Examples of the previously ad hoc
morality with respect to computers abound. The first generation
MIT hackers engaged in such illicit activity as using equipment
without authorisation (Levy 1984: 20), phone phreaking (pg 92),
unauthorised modification of equipment (pg 96) and the
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circumvention of password controls (Pg 417)6. Bloombecker gives
the example of how authority's reaction to the behaviour of small
school children may represent society's ambivalent response to the
computing activities it originally encourages. Definitive ethical
judgements can prove difficult to make in certain situations:
Think of the dilemma expressed unknowingly by the
mathematics teacher who spoke of the enthusiasm her 9 and
10-year-old students exhibited when she allowed them to use
the school's computers. "They are so excited" she said, "that
they fight to get onto the system. Some of them even erase
others' names from the sign-up lists altogether". The idea that
this was not good preparation for the students' moral lives
seemed never to have occurred to her ... Unfortunately, both
for society and for those that need the guidance, there is no
standard within the computer community to define precisely
when the playing has got out of hand. If a student uses an
hour of computer time without permission, one university
computer department may consider it criminal theft of service,
while another views it as an exercise of commendable
ingenuity (Bloombecker 1990: 42).
This ambiguous ethical status of some computing activities is
due to the relatively recent advent of computing as an area of human
endeavour; this has led to a lack of readily agreed-upon computing
mores: "Indeed, if we were to devise a personality test designed to
spot the computer criminal, the first and most difficult task would be
to create a task that did not also eliminate most of the best minds
who have made computing what it is" (Bloombecker 1990: 39).
There is the further complicating factor, that to some extent at least,
society encourages "getting hooked" upon computing, since it is
perceived as representing a beneficial outlet for intellectual
endeavour. We now turn to more specific examples of computing's
ethical complexity.
6.4.2 Industry examples of blurred ethics
6 references taken from CuD 4.11
196
There is often a lack of agreement even amongst computer
professionals as to what constitutes the correct procedures with
which to confront certain research and educational issues within
computing. A specific example of this lack of agreement is the
debate caused by the publication of an article by Cohen, entitled
"Friendly contagion: Harnessing the Subtle Power of Computer
Viruses" (1991). In the article, Cohen suggests that the vendor of a
computer virus prevention product should sponsor a contest
encouraging the development of new viruses, with the provisos that
the spreading ability of the viruses should be inherently limited, and
that they should only be tested on systems with the informed
consent of the systems owners. Spafford responded with the charge
that: "For someone of Dr Cohen's reputation within the field to
actually promote the uncontrolled writing of any virus, even with
his stated stipulations, is to act irresponsibly and immorally. To act
in such a manner is likely to encourage the development of yet more
viruses "in the wild" by muddling the ethics and dangers involved"
(Spafford 1991: 3). Furthermore, even the publication of "fixes" can
be viewed in certain instances as an unethical act, leading to what
has been previously described as the phenomenon of "security
through obscurity". Spafford argues that: "We should realize that
widespread publication of details will imperil sites were users are
unwilling or unable to install updates and fixes. Publication should
serve a useful purpose; endangering the security of other people's
machines or attempting to force them into making changes they are
unable to make or afford is not ethical" (Spafford 1990:12).
The disagreement over some of the ethical questions thrown up
by hacking was also in evidence in the aftermath of the Internet
Worm when a debate raged amongst computer professionals as to
the ethical and technical implications of the event. The debate
tending to support the above argument positing ethical sub-group
variation and a general lack of clear-cut moral boundaries as typical
of the modern ethical environment, especially when there are
contrasting opinions as to the originating motivations behind specific
197
acts. Such a debate was reflected in the "Communications of the
Association of Computing Machinery (ACM)" Forum of Letters, where
even the ACM's president received quite strident criticism for his
position indicated in the title of his letter: "A Hygiene Lesson", that
the Internet Worm could be viewed as beneficial in so far as it
increased awareness of security practices. The president's view was
described by one contributor to the forum as, "a massive error in
judgement which sends the wrong message to the world on the
matters of individual responsibility and ethical behaviour ... [it] is
inexcusable and an exercise in moral relativism" (Denning, Peter
1990: 523). Similarly, another writer illustrates the disparate nature
of the feelings produced by the Internet Worm incident when he
pointedly remarks:
while Spafford praises the efficacy of the "UNIX 'old boy'
network" in fighting the worm, he does not explain how these
self-appointed fire marshals allowed such known hazards to
exist for so long ... If people like Morris and people like him are
the greatest threat to the proper working of the Internet then
we face no threat at all. If, on the other hand, our
preoccupation with moralizing over this incident blinds us to
serious security threats and lowers the standards of civility in
our community, then we will have lost a great deal indeed
(Denning, Peter 1990: pp 526 +7).
6.4.3 Technology and ethics
Underlying some of these problems with ethics has been the
tendency identified by Spafford (1990) to "view computers simply as
machines and algorithims, and ... not perceive the serious ethical
questions inherent in their use" (Spafford 1990: 12). Spafford points
to the failure to address the end result of computing decisions upon
people's lives, and hence the accompanying failure to recognise the
ethical component of computing. As a result, he argues, there is a
subsequent general failure to teach the proper ethical use of
computers:
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Computing has historically been divorced from social values,
from human values, computing has been viewed as something
numeric and that there is no ethical concern with numbers,
that we simply calculate values of 0 and 1, and that there are
no grey areas, no impact areas, and that leads to more
problems than simply theft of information, it also leads to
problems of producing software that is also responsible for loss
and damage and hurt because we fail to understand that
computers are tools whose products ... involve human beings
and that humans are affected at the other end (Spafford US
interview).
This is due to the fact that often the staff of computer faculties
are uncomfortable with the subject, or don't believe it's important.
Their backgrounds are predominantly in mathematics or scientific
theory and hence they don't adequately understand how practical
issues of use may apply to computing. Spafford suggests that
engineering provides a more appropriate model of computing than
science in so far as it addresses the human as well as the scientific
dimensions.
Computer science is really, in large part an engineering
discipline and that some of the difficulties that arise in defining
the field are because the people who are involved in
computing, believe it's a science and don't understand the
engineering aspects of it. Engineers, for a very long time, have
been taught issues of appropriateness and ethics and legality
and it's very often a required part of engineering curricula ...
computing is more than just dealing with numbers and
abstractions, it does in fact have very strong applications
behind it, a very strong real-world component (Spafford US
interview).
The extent to which computing has a non-material dimension,
however, constantly mitigates against Spafford's desire for
computing to be ethically approached in a similar manner to an
engineering discipline. There is a fundamental difference between
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the 'real world' and the 'virtual world' of computing, and it is this
difference which makes the literal transposing of ethical judgements
from the former to the latter, difficult, if not untenable. The correct
balance with which to transpose ethical judgements from one realm
to another is debateable.
6.5 BOUNDARY FORMATION - ROLE OF THE MEDIA
This section debunks some of the sensationalising, demonising,
and mythologising of hacking that has occurred with the recent spate
of books, articles and television programmes dealing with the issue.
It also corrects the overwhelming tendency of most of the writings
on the subject of hacking to concentrate on the minutiae of the
activities and life histories of hackers or their adversaries.
Frequently, but superficially, deep-rooted psychological
abnormalities are offered as explanations for hacking activity, whilst
ignoring the ethical and political implications of those acts. The
overall effect of the media portrayal of hacking, it could be
suggested, is a continuation by other means of the CSI's project of
stigmatisation and closure.
(i) 'Hacker best-sellers'
Two examples of the tendency towards sensationalism are The
Cuckoo's Egg by Clifford Stoll and Cvberpunk by Hafner and Markoff.
An example of the many uses of hyperbole in their choice and tone
of language is their consideration of the issues at stake in the hiring
of a hacker for security work. "But hire such a mean-spirited
person? That would be like giving the Boston Strangler a
maintenance job in a nursing-school dormitory" (Hafner and Markoff,
1991: 40). Both of these books made a large impact on the
computing public and yet both seem self-indulgent in their reliance
upon trivial and tangential details in the narration of different
hacking episodes. In The Cuckoo's Egg, for example, we are given
various descriptions of the author's girlfriend and seemingly
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irrelevant details of their shared Californian lifestyle. In Cyberpunk,
many unsubstantiated conjectures are made as to the state of mind
of the hacker. Thus the authors write about Kevin Mitnick:
When Kevin was three, his parents separated. His mother,
Shelly got a job as a waitress at a local delicatessen and
embarked upon a series of new relationships. Every time
Kevin started to get close to a new father, the man disappeared.
Kevin's real father was seldom in touch; he remarried and had
another son, athletic and good-looking. During Kevin's high
school years, just as he was getting settled into a new school,
the family moved. It wasn't surprising that Kevin looked to the
telephone for solace (Haffner and Markoff 1991: 26).
This somewhat arbitrary assignation of motivation leads the
authors to label Kevin Mitnick as the "dark-side" hacker, whereas
their analysis of Robert Morris, author of the Internet Worm, is much
less condemning despite the fact the latter was responsible for much
more damage and man-hours of data-recovery time.
(ii) Press and Television
The media faces, in its reporting of computer security issues,
the perennial problem of how to report technical issues in a both
accurate and entertaining manner. Generally, the media has tended
towards reporting those stories that contain the highest degree of
'electronic lethality' and it has exaggerated the 'darkness' of hacking
motives. For example, a Channel Four television documentary
"Dispatches" entitled its investigation of hacking "The day of the
Technopath", whilst the February 1991 edition of GQ magazine
concerned the growth of virus writers in Bulgaria and was called
"Satanic Viruses".
Along with the above two treatments of the computer security
issue I will also look at a Sunday Correspondent article of the 17th
December 1989 entitled "A Bug in the Machine" and part of the
transcript of an episode of the U.S. current affairs/chat-show
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programme, "Geraldo", for a sample of media treatments of the
hacking issue. The television portrayals of the problem of computer
security seem to be the most superficial and dependent upon
sensationalising techniques. Newspaper and magazine articles to
give relatively thorough and accurate technical descriptions of what
it is to hack/write viruses but still make disproportionate use of
'dark-side' imagery7.
"A Bug in the Machine"
This article is an example of the tendency of the press to
concentrate upon the "sexy" elements of computer security stories. It
contains a cynical description of Emma Nicholson M.P.'s
unsubstantiated claims that hacking techniques are used for terrorist
purposes by the European Green movement amongst others and her
emotive description of hackers as: " ... malevolent, nasty evil-doers
who fill the screens of amateur users with pornography" (Matthews
1989: 39). Yet whilst dispelling some of the alarmist tendencies of
such claims, the example of a hacker chosen by the journalists is that
of the "computer anarchist Mack Plug". Apart from making their
own unsubstantiated claim that "Nearly all hackers are loners" (a
contention refuted by my interviews with groups of Dutch hackers),
their description of his hacking activity seems to deliberately over¬
emphasise the more "glamorous" type of hacking at the expense of
describing the more mundane realities and implications of everyday
hacking:
At the moment he is hacking electronic leg tags. "I've got it
down to 27 seconds" he says, "All you have to do is put a
microset recorder next to the tag and when the police call to
check you're there, you tape the tones transmitted by the tag
and feed them on to your answering machine. When the cops
call back again, my machine will play back those tones. I'll
have a fail-safe alibi and I can get back to hacking into MI5
(Matthews 1989: 39).
7 As shown with the title of Paul Mungo's article: "Satanic Viruses" (c.f. bibliiography)
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Geraldo Programme8
On September 30th 1991, the Geraldo chat-show focused on
hacking. It involved a presentation of various hacking cameo shots,
one of which showed Dutch hackers accessing US Department of
Defense computers with super-user status. The studio section of the
show involved an interview with Craig Neidorf (alias Knight
Lightning), who underwent a court case in the U.S. for having
allegedly received the source code of the emergency services
telephone computer programs. Also interviewed was Don Ingraham
the prosecuting attorney in Neidorfs case.
Below I include excerpts from the dialogue that ensued as an
example of the extent to which hacking is presented in the media in
a superficial, trivialised and hyperbolic manner. In the introductory
part of the show, excerpts from the film "Die Hard II" are shown in
which terrorists take over the computers of an airport. The general
tone of the show was sensationalistic with one of the guest hackers
Craig Neidorf being repeatedly called the "Mad Hacker" by Geraldo
and Don Ingraham consistently choosing emotive and alarmist
language as shown in the following examples:
Geraldo: Don, how do you respond to the feeling common
among so many hackers that what they're doing is a public
service; they're exposing the flaws in our security systems?
Don: Right, and just like the people who rape a co-ed on
campus are exposing the flaws in our nation's higher education
security. It's absolute nonsense. They are doing nothing more
than showing off to each other, and satisfying their own
appetite to know something that is not theirs to know.
And on the question of the punishment of hackers:
8 c.f. CuD 3:37
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I don't think they're being punished very much at all. We're
having trouble even taking away their gear. I don't know one
of them has done hard time in a prison. The book, Hafner's
book on Cyberpunk, points out that even Mitnick who is a real
electronic Hannibal Lecter ... did not get near any of the
punishment that what he was doing entitled him to.
Finally, at the very end of the show, Geraldo asks Ingraham to
give, in 30 seconds, a worst case scenario of what could result from
the activities of hackers. To which he replies: "They wipe out our
communications system. Rather easily done. Nobody talks to anyone
else, nothing moves, patients don't get their medicine. We're on our
knees."
Dispatches - "the day of the technopath"9
Emma Nicholson M.P. interviewed in the Dispatches
programme, states, "A really good hacker could beat the Lockerbie
bomber any day, hands down" and, "Perhaps only a small fraction of
the population dislikes the human race, but they do, and some of
them are highly computer-skilled".
The following is another example taken from the programme's
voiced-over commentary:
Until now the computer hacker has been seen affectionately as
a skilled technocrat, beavering away obsessively in his den, a
harmless crank exploring the international computer networks
for fun. But today it's clear that any computer, anywhere, can
be broken into and interfered with for ulterior motives. The
technocrat has mutated to the technopath ... government and
business are reluctant to admit that they're fragile and
vulnerable to such threats, frightened of either the loss of
public confidence or of setting themselves up as targets for the
technopaths who stalk their electronic alleyways.
9 Channel 4 Television, November 1989
204
6.6 BOUNDARY FORMATION PROCESS AND THE USE OF ANALOGIES
The previous sections of this chapter have established that the
ethical issues surrounding computer usage are both complex and
liable to fundamentally contrasting interpretations by the members
of the CSI and the CU. The debate that subsequently occurs between
the two groups has been shown as part of a boundary forming
process by means of which both groups reinforce their own
identities. This section analyses the way in which analogies are used
within this process as both explanatory tools with which to examine
some of the issues in the ethical debate over hacking, and also as a
method of conveying the strength of opinion that is held.
The role of physical analogies in the ethical debate over
security issues has already been illustrated with the CSI's use of
them to express fears of the anonymous nature of the threat hackers
pose. The general ease with which physical analogies are used and
the strength of feeling behind them is vividly illustrated by Jerry
Carlin's response to the question, "Have system breakers become the
'whipping boys' for general commercial irresponsibility with regard
to data security?" He replied, "It's fashionable to blame the victim
for the crime but if someone is raped it is not OK to blame that
person for not doing a better job in fending off the attack!" (Carlin: e-
mail interview) Sherizen was one of the few interviewees to refrain
from using analogies in his discussion of hacking, contending that:
Usually, arguing by analogy is a very weak argument. When it
comes to discussing the law, non-lawyers often try to approach
arguments this way. I don't think that we can go very far to
determine appropriate behaviours if we rely upon analogies.
What we need to develop are some social definitions of
acceptable behaviour and then to structure "old law for new
technologies." The physical analogies may help to score points
in a debate but they are not helpful here at all (Sherizen e-mail
interview).
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The grey and indeterminate ethical quality of computing makes
it difficult to establish such a code of 'acceptable behaviour', and it is
in an attempt to do so that physical analogies are used. Goldstein
(editor of Hacking magazine 'Phrack') explores the ethical
implications of hacking by questioning the use of an analogy that
likens hacking to trespass:
Some will say ... 'accessing a computer is far more sensitive
than walking into an unlocked office building.' If that is the
case, why is it still so easy to do? If it's possible for somebody
to easily gain unauthorised access to a computer that has
information about me, I would like to know about it. But
somehow I don't think the company or agency running the
system would tell me that they have gaping security holes.
Hackers, on the other hand, are very open about what they
discover which is why large corporations hate them so much
(Goldstein 1993).
The moral debate about hacking makes frequent use of such
physical analogies of 'theft' and 'trespass'. The choice of the physical
analogy reflecting the initial ethical position of the discussant and
will be biased towards the point that the discussant is attempting to
establish, and hence certain emotive images such as rape and
burglary are repeatedly used.
(i) Property issues
Members of the CSI tend to emphasise the authorisation and
access rights criteria relating to information. Such criteria are held to
be fundamental to an ethical outlook on computing issues because of
they stem from the basic belief that information and computer
systems are the sole property of their owners, in the same way that
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property rights exist in material objects. Physical analogies become a
means to restrict the computer security debate: "to questions about
privacy, property, possessive individualism, and at best, the excesses
of state surveillance, while it closes off any examination of the
activities of the corporate owners and institutional sponsors of
information technology (the most prized 'target' of most hackers)."
(Ross 1990: 83). This is a rather partisan interpretation of the role
analogies play in the socially shaping boundary formation occurring
within computing. A less controversial assessment, would be that in
contrast to the CU, the CSI emphasises the property rights of system
owners with its use of analogies that are often dramatic and vivid:
"As far as the raison d'etre for attackers, it is no more a valid
justification to attack systems because they are vulnerable than it is
valid to beat up babies because they can't defend themselves. If you
are going to demonstrate a weakness, you must do it with the
permission of the systems administrators and with a great deal of
care" (Cohen: e-mail interview).
The difficulty faced with analogies that seek to emphasise the
way in which hacking tends to transgress property rights, centres
upon what we have already seen as the increasingly immaterial
aspects of information and which is also shown in Chapter 7 to create
various problems for drafting effective computer misuse legislation:
"copyability is INHERENT in electronic media. You can xerox a book
but not very well and you don't get a nice binding and cover.
Electronic media, video tape, computer discs etc., do not have this
limitation. Since the ability to copy is within the nature of the media,
it seems silly to try to prevent it" (Mercury: e-mail interview).
Software copying is an example of how duplication within computing
is inherently more easy than with physical commodities: copyability
is intrinsic to the medium itself. For example, Maelstrom contends
that he: "can't remember a single analogy that works. Theft is taking
something else that belongs to someone without his/her permission.
When you pirate you don't steal, you copy" (Maelstrom: e-mail
interview). Similarly, in the case of cracking:
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In absolutely no case can the physical analogies of 'theft' and
'trespassing' be applied in the matter of computer system
'cracking'. Computers are a reservoir for information expressed
in bits of zeroes and ones. Homes and property have things far
more intrinsically valuable to harbour. Information protected
properly whilst residing on a system is not at issue for 'theft'.
Encryption should have been a standard feature to begin with
and truly confidential information should not be accessible in
any manner via a remote means (Tester: e-mail interview).
(ii) Analogies - breaking and entering
In order to emphasise the potential harm threatened to
systems by anonymous intruders the physical analogies used tend to
concentrate upon the fear and sense of violation that tend to
accompany burglaries. The dispute between the CSI and the CU as to
whether it is ethical to break into systems is most often conducted
with reference to the analogy of breaking and entering into a
building. Because of the divergence between the real world and
cyberspace, however, even such a simple analogy is open to varying
interpretations: "My analogy is walking into an office building,
asking a secretary which way it is to the records room, and making
some Xerox copies of them. Far different than breaking and entering
someone's home" (Cohen: e-mail interview).
Cosell presents the following scenario with which he attempts
to frame the ethical issues surrounding hacking:
Consider: it is the middle of summer and you happen to be
climbing in the mountains and see a pack of teenagers roaming
around an abandoned-until-snow ski resort. There is no
question of physical harm to a person, since there will be no
people around for months. They are methodically searching
EVERY truck, building, outbuilding, shed etc., trying EVERY
window, trying to pick EVERY lock. When they find something
they can open, they wander into it, and emerge a while later.
From your vantage point, you can see no actual evidence of any
theft or vandalism, but then you can't actually see what they're
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doing while they're inside whatever-it-is (Cosell: CuD 3:12 April
1991).
From this scenario, various questions arise, such as: do you call
the Police? what would the intruders be charged with? and would
your response be different if you were the owner of the resort?
Someone more sympathetic to the hacker point of view illustrated
the fundamentally different way in which the two groups, CSI and
CU, conceptualise the ethical issues and the corresponding use of
physical analogies. He responded that:
Of course you should call the cops. Unless they are authorised
to be on the property, (by the owner) they are trespassing, and
in the case of picking locks, breaking and entering. However,
you're trying to equate breaking into a ski resort with breaking
into a computer system. The difference being: 99 times out of
100, the people breaking into a computer system only want to
learn, have forgotten a password, etc. ... 99 times out of 100,
the people breaking into the ski resort are out for free shit
(Rob Heins CuD 3:13).
The CU accuse the CSI of preferring to use physical analogies in
order to marginalise a group, rather than make use of their
information for improving the security of systems:
When you refer to hacking as 'burglary and theft' ... it becomes
easy to think of these people as hardened criminals. But it's
just not the case. I don't know any burglars or thieves, yet I
hang out with an awful lot of hackers. It serves a definite
purpose to blur the distinction, just as pro-democracy
demonstrators are referred to as rioters by nervous political
leaders. Those who have staked a claim in the industry fear
that the hackers will reveal vulnerabilities in their systems
that they would just as soon forget about (Emmanuel Goldstein:
CuD 1:13).
This is one explanation of why, if physical analogies are
inevitably only crude analytical approximations and rhetorical
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devices with which to conceptualise computing issues, they are
frequently used by the CSI in their discourse. Johnson argues in
response to the claim that hackers serve a useful purpose by
pointing out security faults that:
If a policeman walks down the street testing doors to see if
they are locked, that's within his 'charter'- both ethically and
legally. If one is open, he is within the same 'charter' to
investigate - to see if someone else is trespassing. However, it's
not in his 'charter' to go inside and snoop through my personal
belongings, nor to hunt for illegal materials such as firearms or
drugs ... If I come home and find the policeman in my house, I
can pretty well assume he's doing me a favour because he
found my door unlocked. However, if a self-appointed
'neighbourhood watch' monitor decides to walk down the street
checking doorknobs, he's probably overstepped his 'charter'. If
he finds my door unlocked and enters the house, he's
trespassing ... Life is complicated enough without self-
appointed watchdogs and messiahs trying to 'make my life safe
(Bob Johnson: e-mail interview).
Thus, hackers are seen to have no 'charter' which justifies their
incursions into other peoples' systems, such incursions being labelled
as trespass. Even comparisons to trespass, however, tend to be too
limited for those wishing to identify and label hacking as an immoral
act. Trespass is a civil and not a criminal offence. Onderwater,
makes this distinction with his particular use of analogies:
"Trespassing means in Holland if somebody leaves the door open and
the guy goes in, stands in the living room, crosses his arms and
doesn't do anything." In contrast, hacking involves the active
overcoming of any security measures put before hackers,
Onderwater sees it as more analagous to the situation whereby:
you find somebody in your house and he is looking through
your clothes in your sleeping room, and you say 'what are you
doing?' and he says 'well, I was walking at the back of the
garden and I saw that if I could get onto the shed of your
neighbour, there was a possibility to get onto the gutter, and
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could get to your bathroom window, get it open, that was a
mistake from you, so I'd like to warn you ... You wouldn't see
that as trespassing, you would see that as breaking and
entering, which it is and I think it's the same with hacking
(Onderwater: Hague interview).
(iii) Rejection of breaking and entering analogies - hackers use of
physical analogies: chess vs breaking and entering
Gongrijp's description of the motives lying behind hacking was
typical of the hackers I met. He concentrated on the intellectual
stimulation it affords as opposed to any desire just to trespass onto
computer systems . He emphasised the chess-like qualities of
computer security, and was at pains to reject any analogies that
might compare hacking to physical breaking and entering. Gongrijp
contended that:
Computer security is like a chess-game, and all these people
that say breaking into my computer systems is like breaking
into my house: bull-shit, because securing your house is a very
simple thing, you just put locks on the doors and bars on the
windows and then only brute force can get into your house,
like smashing a window. But a computer has a hundred
thousand intricate ways to get in, and it's a chess game with
the people that secure a computer... it's their job to make the
new release of their Unix system more secure, and it's the job
of the hackers to break in (Gongrijp: Amsterdam interview).
Coggans turns the burglar analogy on its head when he argues that:
People just can't seem to grasp the fact that a group of 20 year
old kids just might know a little more than they do, and rather
than make good use of us, they would rather just lock us away
and keep on letting things pass them by ... you can't stop
burglars from robbing you when you leave the doors open, but
lock up the people who can close them for you, another burglar
will just walk right in (Coggans 1990).
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The implication of these combined views, is that the analogy
comparing hacking with burglary fails because the real world
barriers employed to deter burglars are not used in the virtual world
of computing. Such preventative measures are either not used at all,
or are of a qualitatively different kind to the 'doors' and 'locks' that
can be used in computing. Such barriers can be overcome by
technologically knowledgeable young people, without violence or
physical force of any kind. The overcoming of such barriers, has a
non-violent and intellectual quality that is not apparent in more
conventional forms of burglary, and which therefore throws into
question the whole suitability of such analogies.
(iv) Problems of using physical analogies as explanatory tools
The following excerpt is a newspaper editorial response to the
acquittal of Paul Bedworth case. It compares computer addiction to a
physical addiction for drugs:
This must surely be a perverse verdict ... Far from being
unusual in staying up half the night, Mr Bedworth was
just doing what his fellows have done for years. Scores of
universities and private companies could each produce a
dozen software nerds as dedicated as he ... Few juries in
drug cases look so indulgently on the mixture of youth
and addiction (Ind 18.3.93: editorial p. 25).
This editorial emphasises how such analogies are utilised in an
attempt to formulate ethical responses to an activity of ambiguous
ethical content. As Goldstein pointed out, it becomes easier to
attribute malign intent, if using such analogies succeeds in making a
convincing comparison between hacking and an activity the public
are more readily inclined to construe as a malicious activity. The
adaptability of this technique is shown by the way the editorial
continues to utilise a physical analogy in order to elicit critical
responses, this time against the victims of the previously maligned
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hacker: "Leaving those passwords unchanged is like leaving the chief
executive's filing cabinet un-locked. Organisations that do so can
expect little public sympathy when their innermost secrets are
brought into public view."
The main reason why physical analogies tend not to succeed in
any attempted project of stigmatisation/'ethicalisation' of hacking
events is the difficulty of convincing people that events that
transpire in virtual reality are in fact comparable and equivalent to
criminal acts in the physical world. We have seen for example the
weaknesses of breaking and entering analogies. They flounder upon
the fact that hacking intrusions do not contain the same threats of
transgression of personal physical space and therefore a direct and
actual physical threat to an individual. With the complete absence of
such a threat, hacking activity will primarily remain viewed as an
intellectual exercise and show of bravado rather than a criminal act,
even if, on occasion, direct physical harm may be an indirect result of
the technical interference caused by hacking.
Thus the use of analogies is fraught with problems of
equivalence. Whilst they may be useful as a rough comparison
between the real and virtual worlds, the innate but sometimes
subtle, practical and ethical differences between the two worlds
mean that analogies cannot be relied upon as a complete explanatory
tool in seeking to understand the practical and ethical implications of
computing:
They simply don't map well and can create models which are
subtly and profoundly misleading. For example, when we
think of theft in the physical world, we are thinking of an act in
which I might achieve possession of an object only by
removing it from yours. If I steal your horse, you can't ride.
With information, I can copy your software or data and leave
the copy in your possession entirely unaltered (Barlow: e-mail
interview).
Information processed by computers is such that previous
concepts of scarcity break down when correspondence is sought
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between the real and virtual worlds. It is not just conceptions of
scarcity that are affected, however, the extent to which information
correlates with the real world is questionable at the most
fundamental levels:
Physical (and biological) analogies often are misleading as they
appeal to an understanding from an area in which different
laws hold. Informatics has often mislead naive people by
choosing terms such as 'intelligent' or 'virus' though IT systems
may not be compared to the human brain ... Many users (and
even 'experts') think of a password as a 'key' despite the fact
that you can easily 'guess' the password while it is difficult to
do the equivalent for a key (Brunnstein: e-mail interview).
Physical analogies are inevitably flawed in the respect that
they can only ever be used as an approximation of what occurs in
'cyberspace' in order to relate it to the everyday physical world.
Thus they attempt to evaluate and understand computing activities
using a more natural and comfortable frame of reference. Hence the
language is often used by the CSI to describe computer attacks, and a
security breach of the academic network with the acronym JANET,
was referred to as the 'rape of JANET'. Spafford admitted to having
one of his systems hacked into at least three times, he argued that
he: "didn't learn anything in particular that I didn't know before. I
felt quite violated by the whole thing, and did not view anything
positive from it."(Spafford US interview [Emphasis mine]). The CU
stresses the differences between the virtual and real worlds and
contends that the use of physical language in such a situation is not
warranted. For example, despite such use of the language of
physicality, it is difficult to conceive of a computer intrusion that
could be as traumatising as the actual bodily violation of a rape. A
second, diametrically opposed, reason for questioning the validity of
physical analogies would be that instead of overstating situations
within computing, analogies used to describe a computer intrusion
actually understate the harm caused by the intrusion due to the
generic aspects of hacking identified earlier.
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In John Perry Barlow's "Crime and Puzzlement" recourse is
made to the metaphors comparing hackers with cowboys from the
nineteenth century USA. This specific comparison of hackers with
cowboys illustrates some of the problems associated with the use of
metaphors. The basis of this metaphor rests upon the view of
hackers as pioneers in the new field of computing, just as cowboys
were portrayed as pioneers of the 'Wild West'. Such a metaphor, in
addition to the above discussion of the applicability of the concepts
of trespass and theft to the world of computing, provides a useful
example of both the suitability and limitations of analogies in
discussions of hacking. Commentators tend to 'customise' common
metaphors used in the computer security debate, in order to derive
from the metaphor the particular emphasis desired to further the
point being argued:
Much of what we 'know' about cowboys is a mixture of myth,
unsubstantiated glorification of 'independent he-men',
Hollywood creations, and story elements that contain many
racist and sexist perspectives. I doubt that cracker/hackers
are either like the mythic cowboy or the 'true' cowboy ... I
think we should move away from the easy-but-inadequate
analogy of the cowboy to other, more experienced-based
discussions (Sherizen: e-mail interview).
The tendency to use the 'easy-but-inadequate analogy' applies
significantly to the orginator of the cowboy metaphor himself. Thus,
when I asked John Perry Barlow his views as to the accuracy of the
metaphor, he replied: "Given that I was the first person to use that
metaphor, you're probably asking the wrong guy. Or maybe not,
inasmuch as I'm now more inclined to view crackers as aboriginal
natives rather than cowboys. Certainly, they have an Indian view of
property" (Barlow: e-mail interview).
More negative responses to the comparison of hackers with
cowboys came from the hackers themselves:
WHO is the electronic cowboy ... the electronic farmer, the
electronic saloon keeper? ... I am not sold. I offer no
215
alternative, either. I wait for hacking to evolve its own culture,
its own stereotypes. There was a T.V. show long ago, 'Have Gun
Will Travel' about a gunslinger called 'Palladin'. The knightly
metaphor ... but not one that was widely accepted. Cowboys
acted like cowboys, not knights, or Greeks, or cavemen.
Hackers are hackers not cowboys (Marotta: e-mail interview).
6.7 THE PROJECT OF PROFESSIONALISATION
6.7.1 Creation of the computer security market and professional
ethos
The creation of the 'them and us' situation forms part of the
process whereby a professional status opposed to the hacking culture
and ethic is established. Examples have already been seen of the
lack of cooperation that exists between the CSI and the CU in Chapter
5, it gave various reasons for the CSI not being able to trust hackers
sufficiently enough for cooperation to be feasible. The antagonism
that exists between the CSI and the CU contributes to a process of
boundary formation, but there is also the widely-held belief that,
along with legitimate reasons for differentiation between the two
groups, there is also an element of manufactured difference. Below
are two examples, one from the commercial sector, and one from the
CU, of people who believe parts of the CSI are involved in creating a
market niche for themselves from which it then becomes necessary
to exclude hackers:
Computer security industry' sounds like some high-priced
consultants to me. Most of what they do could be summarised
in a two-page leaflet - and its common sense anyway. A
consultant - particularly in the U.S. - spends 3/4ths of his or
her effort justifying the fee (Barrie Bates: e-mail interview).
These virus programs are about to make me sick! In two years
of heavily downloading from BBSs, I've yet to catch a virus
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from one. Peter Norton should be drug to a field and shot!
McAffe too (Eric Hunt: e-mail interview).
The veracity of opinions such as those above may be difficult to
separate from their origin in the antagonism that exists between the
CSI and the CU, but allegations that 'viral hype' has been used as a
means of helping to create a computer security market come from
security practitioners themselves:
It's very hard getting facts on this because the media hype is
used as a trigger by people who are trying to sell anti-virus
devices, programs, scanners, whatever. This is put about very
largely by companies who are interested in the market and
they try to stimulate the market by putting the fear of God into
people in order to sell their products, but selling them on the
back of fear rather than constructive benefits, because most of
the products in the industry are sold on constructive benefits.
You always sell the benefit first, this is selling it on the back of
fear which is rather different, "you'd better use our products or
else" (Taylor: Knutsford interview).
The whole process of enforcing and furthering the proprietary
attitude to information outlined in Chapter 3 is further strengthened
by a new language of physicality resulting from the advent of
computer viruses10. Software is infected, and systems are spoken of
in terms of being repeatedly 'raped'. Computer viruses are described
in terms similar to those employed in discussions of the dangers of
promiscuous sex. Prophylactic safety measures are seen to be
necessary to protect the moral majority from 'unprotected contact'
with the degeneracy of a minority group. Ross argues that 'viral
hysteria' has been deliberately used by the software industry to
increase its market sales:
10 c.fWoolgar 1990.
217
software vendors are now profiting from the new public
distrust of program copies ... the effects of the viruses have
been to profitably clamp down on copyright delinquency, and
to generate the need for entirely new industrial production of
viral suppressors to contain the fallout. In this respect it is
hard to see how viruses could hardly, in the long run, have
benefited industry producers more (Ross 1990: 80).
In addition to the practical benefits the CSI has derived from
the concerns associated with viruses, the threat they pose to systems'
security has been used to reinforce ideological opposition to hackers
and their anti-proprietary attitudes:
Virus-conscious fear and loathing have clearly fed into the
paranoid climate of privatization that increasingly defines
social identities in the new post-Fordist order. The result — a
psycho-social closing of the ranks around fortified private
spheres -- runs directly counter to the ethic that we might
think of as residing at the architectural heart of information
technology. In its basic assembly structure, information
technology is a technology is a technology of processing,
copying, replication, and simulation, and therefore does not
recognise the concept of private information property (Ross
1990: 80).
The boundary formation exercise necessitates the exclusion of
hackers from influence within computing, whilst, at the same time,
developing a consistent ethical value system for 'legitimate' security
professionals. An example of boundary formation in action is the
advent of computer viruses and worms and the particular case of
Robert Morris and the Internet Worm. Cornell University published
an official report into the Internet Worm incident, concluding that
one of the causes of the act was Morris' lack of ethical awareness.
The report censures the ambivalent ethical atmosphere of Harvard,
Morris' alma mater, where he failed to develop in a computing
context a clear ethical sense of right and wrong. Most significantly,
the judgement made upon the Morris case was full of implicit
assumptions that betrayed a boundary forming process in the way it
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stressed the need for professional ethics in opposition to those of
hackers.
Dougan and Gieryn (1988), sum up the boundary-forming
aspects of responses to the Internet Worm in their analysis of the e-
mail debate that occurred shortly after the incident. The computer
community is characterised as falling into two schools of thought
with regard to their response to the event. The first group is
described as being organised around a principle of 'mechanic
solidarity, the second, one of 'organic solidarity'. The mechanic
solidarity group's binding principle is the emphasis they place upon
the ethical aspect of the Morris case, his actions are seen as
unequivocally wrong and the lesson to be learnt in order to prevent
future possible incidents is that a professional code of ethics needs to
be promulgated. These viewpoints have been illustrated in this
study's depiction of the hawkish response to hacking. The second
group advocates a policy more consistent with the dovish element of
the CSI and those hackers that argue their expertise could be more
effectively utilised. They criticise the first group for failing to
prevent 'an accident waiting to happen' and expecting that the
teaching of computing ethics will solve what they perceive as an
essentially technical problem. The likelihood of eliminating the
problem with the propagation of a suitable code of professional
ethics seems to them remote:
I would like to remind everyone that the real bad guys do not
share our ethics and are thus not bound by them. We should
make it as difficult as possible -- (while preserving an
environment conducive to research) for this to happen again.
The worm opened some eyes. Let's not close them again by
saying 'Gentlemen don't release worms' (Dougan and Gieryn
1988: 12).
The hacker Craig Neidorf known as 'Knight Lightning', in his
report on a CSI conference, underlines the theory that the debate
over hacking centres upon a project of professionalisation, with the
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argument that what mostly distinguishes the two groups is the form,
rather than content of the knowledge they seek to utilise:
Zenner and Denning11 alike discussed the nature of Phrack's12
articles. They found that the articles appearing in Phrack
contained the same types of material found publicly in other
computer and security magazines, but with one significant
difference. The tone of the articles. An article named 'How to
Hack Unix' in Phrack usually contained very similar
information to an article you might see in Communications of
the ACM only to be named 'Securing Unix Systems'. (Craig
Neidorf: CuD 2.07).
The implication is that hackers' security knowledge is not
sought due to reasons other than its lack of technical value; instead
the CSI fails to utilise such knowledge more fully because it
interferes with their boundary-forming project that centres upon
attempting to define the difference between a hacker and a
'computer professional':
Ironically, these hackers are perhaps driven by the same need
to explore, to test technical limits that motivates computer
professionals; they decompose problems, develop an
understanding of them and then overcome them. But
apparently not all hackers recognise the difference between
penetrating the technical secrets of their own computer and
penetrating a network of computers that belong to others. And
therein lies a key distinction between a computer professional
and someone who knows a lot about computers. (Edward
Parrish 1989).
Another interesting example of the similar traits that the CSI
and CU share in common, is the case of Clifford Stoll's investigation of
an intrusion into the Berkeley University computer laboratories,
11 The former was the defence lawyer for Craig Neidorf in the E911 trial of 1990, Dorothy
Denning being a computer scientist from Georgetown University, Washington, with an
academic interest in CU issues.
12 CU electronic magazine
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which he subsequently wrote up in the form of a best-selling book,
The Cuckoo's Egg. Thomas points out that:
Any computer undergrounder can identify with and appreciate
Stoll's obsession and patience in attempting to trace the hacker
through a maze of international gateways and computer
systems. But, Stoll apparently misses the obvious affinity he
has with those he condemns. He simply dismisses hackers as
'monsters' and displays virtually no recognition of the
similarities between his own activity and those of the computer
underground. This is what makes Stoll's work so dangerous:
His work is an unreflective exercise in self-promotion, a tome
that divides the sacred world of technocrats from the profane
activities of those who would challenge it; Stoll stigmatises
without understanding (Thomas 1990).
What makes Stoll's behaviour even less understandable is that
throughout the book he recounts how he himself engages in the same
kind of activities that he criticises others for indulging in. This fact
that Stoll labels hackers as 'monsters' despite the fact he shares some
of their qualities13 is indicative of the boundary forming process the
CSI have entered upon. The process also involves other groups that
are involved in the de facto marginalisation of hackers whilst not
actually being directly involved in computing, examples of such
groups are the various government agencies and politicians involved
in the drafting of legislation about hacking. Combined together, these
groups have contributed towards a response to hacking that has been
labelled a 'witch-hunt' mentality by some observers.
6.7.2 Witch-hunts and hackers
Part of the cause of the witch-hunt mentality, that has
allegedly been applied to hackers, is the increasing tendency within
society towards the privatisation of consumption examined in the
13 Thomas' review of The Cuckoo's Egg includes numerous examples of Stoll indulging in such
activities as borrowng other peoples' computers without permission and monitoring other
peoples' electronic communications without authorisation.
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early chapters. The pressures to commodify information can be seen
as an extension of the decline of the public ethos in modern society
which is accompanied by the search for scapegoats that will justify
the retreat from communitarian spirit. The hacker is the latest such
scapegoat of modern times in a series including Communism,
terrorism, child abductors and AIDS:
More and more of our neighbours live in armed compounds.
Alarms blare continuously. Potentially happy people give their
lives over to the corporate state as though the world were so
dangerous outside its veil of collective immunity that they
have no choice ... The perfect bogeyman for modern times is
the Cyberpunk! He is so smart he makes you feel even more
stupid than you usually do. He knows this complex country in
which you're perpetually lost. He understands the value of
things you can't conceptualize long enough to cash in on. He is
the one-eyed man in the Country of the Blind (Barlow 1990:
56).
This is the root of peoples' fear of hackers and the reason why
they are labelled as deviant within society despite the fact that, as
we have seen above, hackers share some of the same characteristics
as their CSI counterparts. The simultaneous existence of shared
characteristics and deviant status for hackers is a necessary result of
the fact that:
The kinds of practices labelled deviant correspond to those
values on which the community places its highest premium.
Materialist cultures are beset by theft (although that crime is
meaningless in a Utopian commune where all property is
shared) ... The correspondence between kind of deviance and a
community's salient values is no accident ... deviants and
conformists both are shaped by the same cultural pressures —
and thus share some, if not all, common values — though they
may vary in their opportunities to pursue valued ends via
legitimate means. Deviance ... emerges exactly where it is most
feared, in part because every community encourages some of
its members to become Darth Vader, taking 'the force' over to
the 'dark side' (Dougan and Gieryn 1990: 4).
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The vocalised antagonism between the CSI and CU and the
exaggerated portrayals of the media examined in this chapter are
part of the process whereby hackers are marginalised and defined as
deviant. In the quotation below Stoll is singled out to personify this
process but the method he uses is held in common with all the other
figures quoted in this chapter who contribute to the 'them and us'
scenario by the strength of the views they express and the analogies
they choose to express them with:
Witch hunts begin when the targets are labelled as 'other', as
something quite different from normal people. In Stoll's view,
hackers, like witches, are creatures not quite like the rest of us,
and his repetitious use of such pejorative terms as 'rats,'
'monsters,' 'vandals,' and 'bastard' transforms the hacker into
something less than human ... In a classic example of a
degradation ritual, Stoll -- through assertion and hyperbole
rather than reasoned argument -- has redefined the moral
status of hackers into something menacing (Thomas 1990).
6.7.3 Closure - the evolution of attitudes
The witch hunt process is a device to facilitate what Bijker and
Law (1992) have analysed as closure. The notion is usefully
illustrated by examining the evolution of society's attitudes from the
benign tolerance of the early MIT hackers to the present climate of
anti-hacking legislation. In addition to Levy's identification of three
generations of hackers14, Landreth suggests the arrival of a fourth
generation of hackers when he talks of a major change occurring in
the CU around about the time the elitist hacking group he joined
known as the "Inner Circle" was set up. In addition to the effect of
the increased dispersal of micro-computers, there was also the effect
of the hacker movie Wargames.: "In a matter of months the number
of self-proclaimed hackers tripled, then quadrupled. You couldn't get
through to any of the old bulletin boards any more - the telephone
14 c.f. Appendix 2 for a full account.
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numbers were busy all night long. Even worse, you could delicately
work to gain entrance to a system, only to find dozens of novices
blithely tromping around the files" (Landreth 1985 :18). These
'wannabe' hackers reflect the relative immaturity and absence of the
original hacker ethic that characterises the latest manifestation of
hacking. Chris Coggans from the Legion of Doom concurs with this
identification of a change in the basic nature of the CU environment.
In the early days:
People were friendly, computer users were very social.
Information was handed down freely, there was a true feeling
of brotherhood in the underground. As the years went on
people became more and more anti-social. As it became more
and more difficult to blue-box the social feeling of the
underground began to vanish. People began to hoard
information and turn people in for revenge. The underground
today is not fun. It is very power hungry, almost feral in its
actions. People are grouped off: you like me or you like him,
you cannot like both ... The subculture I grew up with , learned
in, and contributed to, has decayed into something gross and
twisted that I shamefully admit connection with. Everything
changes and everything dies, and I am certain that within ten
years there will be no such thing as a computer underground.
I'm glad I saw it in its prime (Coggans: e-mail interview).
Thus one reason for the changing nature of the computer
underground is simply the fact that more would-be hackers arrived.
'Elite' hackers such as Coggans felt that this cheapened in some way
the ethos and atmosphere of camaradarie that had previously existed
within the CU. Feelings of superiority which help to fuel the
motivation of a hacker had become undermined by the advent of too
many 'wanna-be' young hackers. Sheer numbers alone would mean
the demise of the previous emphasis hackers placed upon sharing
knowledge and the importance of educating young hackers. The
idiosyncratic actions of the first generation hackers, within the
isolated academic context of MIT, were often praised for their
inventiveness. Similar actions in the wider modern computing
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community tend to be automatically more disruptive and liable to
censure.
The reasons for this change in attitude are inextricably linked
with the evolution of computing as a technology. Herschberg argues
that computer security can be compared to the experiments of the
Wright brothers, yet apart from such peripheral 'dovish' sentiments,
the climate within the CSI and society as a whole is increasingly
unsympathetic to the claims by hackers that they represent innocent
intellectual explorers: closure in computer security has occurred.
Leichter's perception of the evolution of hacking is at odds with that
of Herschberg. He too uses an airplane analogy but prefers to
emphasise that:
When the first 'airplane hackers' began working on their
devices, they were free to do essentially as they pleased. If
they crashed and killed themselves well, that was too bad. If
their planes worked - so much the better. After it became
possible to build working airplanes , there followed a period in
which anyone could build one and fly where he liked. But in
the long run that became untenable ... If you want to fly today,
you must get a license. You must work within a whole set of
regulations (Jerry Leichter: CuD 4.18).
Over time, technologies develop, and as a result, people's
interactions with that technology, even if they remain unchanged,
will be viewed differently as society adapts to the changing
technology. An example of this is the changing role of system
crashes. In the earliest days of computing, the computers functioned
by means of large glass valves, which after relatively short periods
of use were liable to over-heat, thus causing a system crash. Even if
hackers were responsible for some of the system crashes that
occurred, the fact that they were equally liable to be caused by other
non-hacker means, led to a climate whereby hacker-induced crashes
were accepted as a minor inconvenience even when they were
extremely disruptive by today's standards. This is an example,
therefore, of the importance of taking into account the societal
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context of an act involving technology before an evaluation of its
ethical content is made.
6.8 CONCLUSION
This chapter has traced the origin of the ethical debate
between the CSI and the CU, showing how the novel nature of some
of the situations thrown up by computing has resulted in a process of
negotiation. This process takes the form of markedly different
ethical responses to the novel situations being made and competing
with each other. The contrasting interests and perspectives of the
two groups is highlighted by the fact that whilst hackers see their
activity as manifesting ethical concern over potential governmental
and commercial abuses of privacy, the CSI prefers to see the activity
as unethical or as evidence of a general decline in social values.
There are two important elements of doubt regarding the view
of the CSI. Firstly, the argument that hacking is intrinsically
unethical is weakened by the fact that, as Levy documents, the same
acts of hacking that are now criticised as immoral, were benignly
tolerated in the days of the early MIT hackers. Bloombecker even
goes so far as to claim that what would nowadays be labelled a
computer criminal, helped to make computing what it is. Cohen also
asserts, that unofficially, hackers are often used commercially to
check the security of systems. Secondly, the chapter has shown, that
an increasing aspect of computing is the way in which it produces
novel situations where there seem to be no clear-cut boundaries
between right and wrong. This is most noticeable in the situations
produced by technology that are most divorced from everyday
experience, typified by the notion of cyberspace. Ethical uncertainty
concerning hacking is also exacerbated by the fact that the activity is
often motivated by a series of complex factors. The fact that there is
a keen debate, both within the CSI, and between the CSI and the CU,
implies that any purported immorality of hacking is due to the social
shaping of a perception that has evolved from the MIT days of
benign tolerance to the present atmosphere of criminalisation.
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An important part of this process of social shaping is the way
in which physical analogies are used in the formation of computer
ethics. They are being increasingly used in professional discussions
of the issues as part of the process of group delineation. Where
previously there were only blurred or indefinite computer ethics,
physical analogies are now used to establish clearer computing
mores. The need to use physical analogies in the first place arises
because hacking takes place in the qualitatively new realm of
human experience: cyberspace. The fact that the real world and
cyberspace are such different realms has led to a need to explain and
make ethical judgements about hacking from a conventional frame of
reference, that is, using analogies based upon the physical world.
The constant use of physical analogies and metaphors in
discussing the legal and ethical issues of hacking is thus an attempt
to redefine, in a practical manner, the concept of informational
property rights, as they are to be applied in the computer age. The
use of analogies is much more common within the CSI than it is from
hackers themselves. This is because the CSI have a general need to
make comparisons between cyberspace and the real world in order
to legitimate their role and to demonise the CU. Hackers do not have
this need; their behaviour is based upon accepting computing as a
realm of intellectual and social experimentation, and they find it
attractive because of the very fact that it is different from the real
world.
In summary, there are perennial claims from each successive
generation that the youth of the age are largely unethical, and that
they are harbingers of a break-down in the general moral order.
Such claims are perhaps an inevitable part of the human condition,
and its inter-generational relations. This study, however, is more
concerned with the specific aspects of computing that give rise to
qualitatively new circumstances facing computer users, the ethics of
which are indeterminate. These situations encourage behaviour,
which, to be recognised as unethical, assumes that an adequate and
convincing comparison can be made with non-computing situations.
It is the difficulty of attempting to conceptualise the ethics of
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computer-induced scenarios that leads to attempts to translate them
into a more easily understood and common-place experience.
The chapter shows, however, that there is doubts as to whether
'real-world' ethics can be transposed in such a literal manner. This is
illustrated by the various examples given of the CSI's alleged double
standards. These examples imply that the vagueness of computing
ethics is such that any professional code of ethics that is produced is
likely to be more the result of one group enforcing its value system
on another group, rather than one group having any inherently
superior moral advantage in the ethical debate.
The process whereby one group's value system can be imposed
upon another has been analysed in a frame of reference that
compares the increasing marginalisation of hackers from mainstream
computer usage to the practice of witch-hunts. One analysis of the
gradual stigmatisation of hackers is that they have been part of a
degradation ritual whereby a more dominant social group has
progressively alienated them from 'normal' society in order to
promote its professional interest. The role of the media in this
process has been shown by the way it projects hackers as
stigmatised 'others', thus aiding the boundary forming
professionalisation process of the CSI.
Particular examples of the process of group differentiation and
professionalisation have been given, relating to the advent of viruses
and the specific case of the Internet Worm. The likelihood of
eliminating threats to computer security with the propagation of a
suitable code of professional ethics seems remote considering the
extent of the CU's ethical disagreement with the CSI and the thrill
obtained from the very fact that the CU is 'underground'. Despite
this, once the process of professionalisation has been initiated, the
temptation is to proceed to codify the nascent but dominant group's
response to computing's ethical dilemmas, by means of legislation.
The subsequent closure of computing technology has occurred
to such an extent that the hippy-like ethos of the CU looks
increasingly anachronistic in the 1980's and 90's. In so far as
hackers have represented a force of anti-capitalistic information-
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sharing, their stance seems to have absorbed within the state's
sponsorship of the development of computing technology. The
second generation hard-ware hackers such as Steve Wozniak, have
seen their 'wholesome and green' product (hence the name 'Apple')
brought to the masses as indeed they wished, but significantly as a
commodified product. This is perhaps a reflection of the market's
ability to co-opt and absorb radical change. It threatens, in the case
of hackers, to undermine their status as a group embodying
alternative values. The new generation of 'wanna-be' hackers, is
significant because it represents more than simply adolescent boys
intrigued by the intellectual challenge and feelings of power of illicit
computing. In addition, they also represent the increasing tendency
of information to be viewed as a tradeable commodity in the form of
'Amiga kid'-type groups. Their illicit blackmarket activities and their
seemingly amoral views regarding the ethical implications of
accessing and manipulating other peoples' information represents the
extreme end of a spectrum which also includes the activity of
'benign' hackers. It is a spectrum whose various points reflect some
of the ethical issues that society still has to satisfactorily address
regarding information and the implications of its changing properties.
An example of the unsettled nature of society's response to
information is the doubt that still remains regarding the effects of its
policy of closure towards hackers. The question still arises from the
above analysis of whether the evolution of attitudes towards the CU
is in response to a change in its nature towards a more crime-
orientated environment, or whether the increased tendency to
perceive and portray hacking as a criminal and unethical activity has
taken on the quality of a self-fulfilling prophecy, driving would-be
'pleasure hackers' into the arms of the criminal underground. The
implications of this latter scenario are examined in the next chapter.
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Society's attempts to reconcile competing views about
informational property rights are reflected in the debate as to
whether non-malicious system cracking/browsing should be treated
as a criminal act. Anti-hacking legislation is the logical extension of
the stigmatisation process identified in the previous chapter. Moral
language is used in both legislative debates and in the law
enforcement techniques adopted, exacerbating the 'them and us'
feelings of polarisation. This chapter explores the specific case of the
1990 United Kingdom Computer Misuse Act. Material is thus taken
from the parliamentary debates and committee readings of the Act,
which was brought to the House of Commons as a Private Member's
Bill, by Michael Colvin MP. This was after a previous attempt by
Emma Nicholson to pass a similar bill had been thwarted through a
lack of parliamentary time. The resort to legislation raises a number
of issues to be addressed in this chapter, as highlighted in the
following quotation:
Through legislation we can turn what the hackers do into a
crime and there just might be a slim chance that we can stop
them. But that won't fix poorly designed systems whose very
existence is a violation of our privacy (Goldstein 1993).
Firstly, legislation is far from certain to eliminate hacking, and
may indeed best be described as largely symbolic. Secondly, it
reiterates a common theme running throughout this study, namely
the security weaknesses of many systems and the recurrent failure
to deal with them; a failure that is unlikely to be remedied with the
application of legislation. In addition, there is a third issue, namely,
the potential problem associated with even successfully implemented
legislation: the danger of driving hacking knowledge into the hands
of the criminal fraternity.
The chapter illustrates some of the difficulties faced by
legislators in responding to the pressures to criminalise hacking, and
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in attempting to draft laws that will adequately cover some of the
new situations thrown up by computing technology. Daniel Cunliffe,
an Edinburgh University researcher, points out that:
I think the concepts of theft and trespass do need to be applied
in order to define computer crime. However, it is obvious that
they will require legal redefinition if they are ever to be acted
upon. Theft and trespass work well at an intuitive level but
the real (virtual?) world of computer systems is too
complicated to allow a simple application of existing laws. It
requires very careful drafting by people that know the law and
people who understand the nature of computers. Even then,
there are likely to be problems with proof, e.g. how do I prove
that someone broke into my system and sent off obscene mail
to my ex-wife in my name? The whole area presents a very
interesting challenge to the legal profession and to the way
people think about computers (Cunliffe: e-mail interview).
The challenge to the legal profession and the rest of society,
resides in the fact that, as we have seen in chapter 3, information has
an ambivalent status as a commodity and is something to which
property rights cannot easily be assigned:
I think it stems from the cultural (in a sociological sense) basis
which we use to attach financial values to things. Cars and
houses have a financial and personal value which most people
can negotiate and agree on. If we suffer loss or damage to this
kind of object we can usually gauge that loss and society can
work out some recompense for that loss (insurance, punishing
offenders etc.) I think information, especially electronic
information is different. We don't have the necessary agreed
mechanisms on which to establish its financial and personal
value. By its very nature it is very easy to move ('steal'). Thus
given the lack of effort in 'stealing' it and the lack of any
perceived damage (on behalf of the thief) it is not seen (by
them) as a real crime (Dr David England Glasgow University: e-
mail interview).
In this context, hackers fail to perceive much of their activity
as a crime. They see the new emphasis being deliberately placed
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upon ethics in the professional worlds of business and science as part
of an attempt to develop a coherent response to the contradictions
associated with information's evolving nature: "For all the trumpeting
about excesses of power and disrespect for the law of the land, the
revival of ethics, in the business and science disciplines in the Ivy
League and on Capitol Hill ... is little more than a weak liberal
response to working flaws or adaptational lapses in the social logic of
technocracy" (Ross, 22: 1990). The 'weak liberal response' has taken
the form of legislation to outlaw hacking activity:
Lobbying by computer users for the criminalisation of cruelty
to (their) computers has been extensive and vociferous. The
imposition of criminal sanctions is seen as some sort of magic
talisman ... the law takes the computer too seriously. All sorts
of magical qualities are ascribed to the machine. The debates
on the Computer Misuse Act are replete with demonic images
of hacking and its consequences. The computer is the ultimate
bogeyman and has produced a knee jerk reaction from
Parliament (Ian Lloyd- Strathcylde University Law
Department, 9. 6.1993: Edinburgh Univ AI Dept. Seminar).
Chapter 5's statistics and their illustration of the relatively low
threat posed by hackers give credence to the view that the
legislative targeting of hackers is a misapplication of resources. This
chapter explores Lloyd and Cunliffe's assertions that there has been
an over-reaction to the problem of hacking, and that attempts have
been made to apply unsuitable notions of property rights to the
realm of computing.
Various examples are given in this chapter of pressures, from
numerous sources, to criminalise hacking. The soubriquet of
symbolic legislation'1 is then introduced to examine the view that
laws are being passed against hacking for their symbolic qualities
rather than any hope of efficacy: the Computer Misuse Act is
evaluated with particular reference to its professed objectives of
deterrence. Three of the main factors that are likely to limit the
1A phrase first used in relation to computer misuse legislation by Hollinger and Lanza-Kaduce
(1988).
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efficacy of legislation designed to prevent hacking are also examined.
The first of these is the problem law-makers encounter when trying
to take into account the intent of the hacker; the intrinsically
anonymous nature of computer communication makes gauging intent
extremely difficult. Secondly, it is found that many conventional
legal concepts fail to transpose literally into the world of cyberspace,
for example, when computer intrusion is compared to 'breaking and
entering', the comparison begs the question of what is actually
'broken'. Thirdly, legislators have difficulties basing policy upon a
dearth of reliable statistics. In the context of this 'information gap'
there seems to be a tendency for spurious computer crime estimates
to gain legitimacy if for no other reason than they are repeated often
enough.
Given the above problems, and assuming that effective
legislation results in the imprisonment of hackers, the chapter
concludes by raising questions as to the likely implications of the
risks of pushing hacking techniques into the reach of the
conventional criminal underground.
7.2 CLASSIFICATIONS OF COMPUTER CRIME
Hollinger and Lanza-Kaduce (1988) identify four categories of
computer crime.
1. The computer is the specific 'object' of a direct act. This refers to
destructive acts aimed specifically at the hardware of the computer
itself. One dramatic example is the Californian Highway Patrolman
who shot the computer terminal he was using with his magnum2.
2. The 'symbolic' use of the computer and its output to defraud. The
example the authors give is that of the 'false invoice scam'.
3. The computer as the 'instrument' of the offence. In these
incidents computing equipment is used to carry out theft or
2 c.f. Bequai 1987
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trespassing acts which could only have previously been carried out
by physically stealing from a person or their property.
4. The computer as the 'subject' of the offence. In this category, the
computer and the information it contains is the focus of the activity.
The implication is that a breach of security or confidentiality is being
carried out for its own sake and not for any pecuniary gain.
This chapter will deal mainly with the distinction to be made
between categories 3 and 4. The former, it will be argued, is the
continuation of traditional forms of fraud and industrial espionage,
whereas the latter forms a qualitatively new activity only made
possible by the technological advances of computing. It is the
fundamental change in the nature of information due to computing
technology, examined in chapter one, that forms the basis of category
4 and gives rise to the issues analysed in this chapter as to whether
traditional notions of criminality can be effectively applied in certain
computing situations.
7.3 CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES OF HACKERS
As would be expected, most of the emphasis placed upon
criminal types of motivation for hacking comes from the CSI. The
criminal element of hacking was, however, recognised by several of
the hackers I spoke to, one of whom, Mike, whilst claiming it was
only to see whether it could be done, demonstrated on the table of
the cafe in which the interview took place, his prototype magnetic
credit-card copier:
By the way, this is the card-copier, I'm proud of it. [So what
does it copy?] Everything. [Everything with a magnetic strip?]
Yeah, I'll let you hear how a credit-card sounds, the trick is you
take two cards, you slide them through here at the same time,
yeah well it gives the same sound but then it copies from this
one to this one, you can also use this for credit cards, there's a
different sound, I can hear what kind of card it is through the
ear-phones (Mike: Utrecht interview).
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Whilst interviewing at the headquarters of Hack-Tic in
Amsterdam, I was also shown their latest prototype touch-tone
dialler which they were in the process of miniaturising further, and
which is used as a means of phreaking free phone calls by emulating
electronically the switching tones of the international digital phone
systems:
Well, I can show you something, this device, this chip, is also
available in a very small package, it will fit into this whole
thing [a small touch-tone dialler case he bought from the Dutch
equivalent of Argos, on my arrival]. This whole prototype will
be in here [large sandwich board of electronics], he [a colleague]
is working on the board now. What this basically does is, it's a
touch-tone dialler that has extra features which mean you can
make tones which are called C5 to control the phone system
and to tell phone switches in other countries that they should
complete calls without charging you for it, so with this system
you can make free phone calls, and its all going to be in a little
dialler this big, it's pretty nifty ... you can have it make these
tones and try things at different times, there's all these
protocols for in-band telephone signalling in there, it's fully
programmable ... We make our phone-calls with this type of
technology so it doesn't cost anything (Gongrijp: Amsterdam
interview).
Whereas Gongrijp and his colleagues were not, or would not
admit to being, interested in the potential commercial aspects of
their activity, Mike, another Dutch hacker, was much more
forthcoming. When I asked him about monetary reward being a
possible motivating factor behind hacking, he related how:
A friend of my brother ... is only concerned with the money he
gets for it, [and] all kinds of schemes he has to make things.
Free phone calls, there's a lot of business in it. They sell cards,
copy cards and things like that. Car phones: they change the
chip with the ID of the car phone, things like that (Mike:
Utrecht interview).
He then proceeded to give more details of his own personal
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involvement in a scheme aimed at funding an excessively large
phone-bill that had been accumulated as a product of his hacking
exploits:
The first system we attacked was the Spanish Telephone
system, it was about seven years ago, we didn't have a meter
to check the costs, later we found that when we called Spain,
there was one special tone which activated the computer and
we had a phone-bill of 10,000 guilders, so we made little boxes,
blue boxes, and me and my brother went to Spain with the
boxes. Well, we first sent the taxi-driver to pick up the boxes
and then waited to see if the taxi-driver came back without the
police and then we took the boxes and sold them to all kinds of
people, dealers of cars and such like, it was very hard to deal
with the Spanish people because they can't get money from the
banks very easily, they have to show where the money is
going, per box we asked 1,500 guilders, so after 10 boxes we
paid the bill and got back to Holland (Mike: Utrecht interview).
Mike believes that there is the possibility that hacking
expertise will become more widely used by criminal elements in
society:
If you keep it illegal then I think in the future there will be
more people who will be interested in it, really malicious
people, right now there aren't so many people who want to sell
it to espionage or companies or whatever, but I think in the
future there will be more people, you always see people who
are interested but they don't have the means to hack
themselves. There was a hackers' party, the 'Galactic hackers'
Party' in Amsterdam and we were trying to make free phone
calls and always someone behind you, some foreigner from
Egypt "free phone calls, free phone calls". The only thing he
could say in Dutch was "free phone calls", and they offer a lot of
money to make free phone calls and stuff: often companies if
they want to know something else about other companies - like
a friend of mine had an account that would check out all
companies, they were offered money to check out other
companies but when they wouldn't do it, they would get in
trouble (Mike: Utrecht interview).
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For obvious reasons, it was difficult to look in any depth at
hacking conducted solely for criminal or monetary purposes, or even
to check the absolute validity of claims such as Mike's above. What I
did see of the above instances seemed to be real methods of fraud,
and the hackers I spoke with, with the exception of the Zoetermeer
group, all had knowledge of each other and seemed to verify each
other's claims and accounts. Hacking with criminal intent or for
monetary gain of some sort, appeared, from my interviews in
Holland at least, to be conducted on the fringes/margins of main¬
stream hacking. The pressure to commercialise their activity may,
however, be increasing as techniques become more widely desired
by such groups as drug dealers.
Ralph, another Dutch hacker, also gave his perspective on
monetary-induced hacking. In an attempt to quantify a perhaps
inevitably vague area, I asked him to give me a percentage figure for
the number of hackers that hack for monetary gain, he replied:
No, you can't say it in percentage, I'd guess it's about five
persons in the whole of Holland that do it for the money. For
instance I had a hack and somebody wanted to publish it, he
gave me money for it. Now, did I do it for the money. No, not
initially, initially I did it for the kick, not because it was illegal
but for the kick. Okay, so I earned a little money with it, big
deal, I didn't do it for the money, and another reason is
convenience, pure convenience. It is very convenient if you
can make free phone calls, it is absolutely convenient if you can
pull copies off magnetic cards, it is very easy if you can get
your TV at home without a de-scrambler, things like that. And
it's not a kick, it's not a thrill, it's not that it's illegal, it's just
pure convenience (Ralph: Utrecht interview).
One group which is much more criminal-minded, and
recognised as such by Rop, Mike and Ralph, are known as the "Amiga
kids", after the computers they most use. When discussing viruses
Mike described how:
There are a lot of viruses in the Amiga world. That's one of the
groups they have to get rid of, the Amiga kids, that's a real
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pain in the arse. Also for hackers, if we hack a system and
they find out about it, like making free phone calls, they spread
it. It's incredible, those guys are really destructive, because
when they use something they use it for software, we use it
occasionally for hacking or making calls but they use it 24 hrs a
day for software, they'll do anything for software, they use and
abuse credit cards and things like that. Anything for software,
and a few of them, I know, are the ones that write viruses to
combat other groups, to put viruses in the programs of other
groups, I hate those guys. [Just like gangster warfare?] Yeah,
here in Utrecht there are a lot of these groups and they card a
lot of stuff, you know carding? Using credit cards to get stuff,
but illegally. They wear Rolexes, little kids on the street with
Rolexes around their wrists it's incredible (Mike: Utrecht
interview).
The hackers that form the basis of this study were at pains to
disassociate themselves from such groups, although there seems
evidence to suggest potential for hacking-related activities to branch
into criminal activity. Maelstrom3, a hacker from the USA related
how:
In 1989 a local friend put up a world headquarters BBS for the
West German group Red Sector Inc.. They were into writing
Amiga demos, and were one of the top ten groups in the world,
which got us a lot of interesting and well-known callers. We
obtained a voice mailbox and put up a codeline on it, which was
very popular for a long time. RSI made me an offer: if I would
give them stolen AT&T calling card numbers to enable them to
call the USA, they give me all the hardware I needed to have
the ultimate computer system. I was offered computers, high
speed modems, hard drives, and software ... the only catch was
their method. Using CBI or TRW's computer, some people use
credit card numbers to steal merchandise, and by having stolen
stuff sent to West Germany, they were able to escape detection
when the theft was discovered since the post office there didn't
keep records. This was against my morals, and I dropped out
of the scene for a while (Maelstrom: e-mail interview).
0
A fuller account of his activities is contained in the case-study section of Appendix 2.
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7.4 PRESSURES TO CRIMINALISE
The previous chapter has illustrated this tendency to portray
hackers as either criminals by nature or as in constant danger of
becoming criminals. Hylton Boothroyd of the University of Warwick
Business School, points to the fine dividing line between hacking and
more criminal activity:
I see the traditonal curious hacker who makes no alteration to
what he looks at and uses no information to the detriment of
others as practising a particular form of intellectual curiosity.
However, like the adverts encouraging you to treat fire with
respect, he can in an instant be tempted to transform himself
into a criminal (Boothroyd: e-mail interview).
This section shows how such perceptions facilitate the
criminalisation of hacking. One of the best illustrations of the
differences in approaches to the question of whether hacking should
be viewed as a criminal act is the marked contrast in the perceived
applicability of the breaking and entering analogy. Hackers prefer to
compare computer intrusion to being tempted to walk into
somebody's house when the door has been left open. In the case of
such negligence, and assuming that no damage is done (such an
intrusion will be inevitably non-violent because of its non-physical
nature), hackers argue that even if the morality of such an intrusion
is questionable, there are insufficient grounds for making it a
criminal offence.
In common sense as in criminal law there exists the notion that
the victim of a crime is partly or fully responsible if the crime
was made possible by negligence on the victim's part ... if I
don't lock my car and it is stolen, my insurance company won't
reimburse me and the pepertrator of the crime will get away
with a lenient sentence, as he was led into temptation by me
and it is partly my fault that the car was so easy to steal ...
Common sense tells most people that 'breaking' into a wide-
open computer system is not a crime - if there was sensitive
information in the computer, it wouldn't be wide open, would
it? Sadly enough that kind of reasoning doesn't hold. Security
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on many government and research facilities is appalling (Freiss:
e-mail interview).
Despite the hackers' argument that breaking into a system that
is wide open should not be labelled a crime, the legislation that has
been passed regarding hacking treats computer intrusion more
harshly than it would its physical counterpart. The 1990 Computer
Misuse Act, for example, holds it as an offence to intentionally obtain
unauthorised access to a program or data held on any computer,
whereas the act of physical trespass, unaccompanied by any
aggravating conduct, is not criminal, but rather a civil offence.
Hackers argue that this discrepancy between the real and virtual
worlds is being systematically used against them. There have been,
for example, various instances in the US where hackers have claimed
that their first and Second Amendment rights have been infringed in
a manner that would not have been allowed if the situation had
arisen in relation to a paper-based medium4. In a similar way, the
application of a punitive legislative response to hacking in excess of
that applicable to a physical intrusion is seen as inherently unjust.
The charge from the CU is that a failure of the CSI to deal with
security weaknesses has led to increased pressure to criminalise
hacking, as a means of reducing the activity whilst simultaneously
avoiding having to fix the faults it draws attention to. The structure
of Ken Thompson's 1984 Turing Award Lecture unwittingly adds
weight to this charge by the way in which it closely links the ethical,
legal, and technical issues of hacking. The basis of the speech was a
description of the ease with which undetectable bugs can be
introduced into programs, and the subsequent implication that error-
free software is easier to obtain from a trusted source. This lack of
assurance about technical security leads to the search for a non¬
technical solution. Thompson, thus argues for a sharper legislative
response to hacking:
* c.f. Sterling's (1993) coverage of the Steve Jackson's Game incident (pp 138-146).
5 A programmer, and winner of the 1984 Turing Award.
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I would like to criticise the press in its handling of the
'hackers', the 414 gang, the Dalton, gang etc. The acts
performed by these kids are vandalism at best and probably
trespass and theft at worst. It is only the inadequacy of the
criminal code that saves the hackers from very serious
prosecution. The companies that are vulnerable to this activity,
(and most large companies are very vulnerable) are pressing
hard to update the criminal code (Thompson 1984: 763).
The CSI shows a marked reluctance to differentiate between
'responsible hackers' and vandals. Instead, it tends to emphasise the
more malicious and destructive elements of hacking, and distinctions
between malevolent and harmless browsing are played down. There
are strong pressures to criminalise hacking; to seek a draconian
legislative response; and to treat all hacking activities as criminal.
7.5 SYMBOLIC LEGISLATION1
Hollinger and Lanza-Kaduce (1988), along with Michalowski
and Pfulh (1990) concentrate upon the process whereby computer
crime legislation is produced and then passed. The former describe
how, in their view, computer crime provided a useful opportunity for
legislators '"to maximise their individual media exposure without
offending any major constituency' (Hollinger and Lanza-Kaduce 1988:
113), and this opportunity for positive political exposure resulted in
the passage of what is sometimes termed symbolic legislation, i.e.
legislation whose purpose is more ideological than instrumental."
(Michalowski and Pufhl 1990: 261). Michalowski and Pfuhl conclude
that computer crime legislation resulted from:
the unexpressed understanding [of legislators] that unless
computer-resident information was extended the the
ideological and practical protection of the law, established
relations of property and hegemonic authority relations could
be deroutinised by 'information thieves' ... It was within this
ideological framework that the dangers of computer crime
proclaimed by computer security experts and the press made
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sense. And in the final analysis, it was this ideological
framework that made the passage of computer crime laws a
low-risk, high visibility opportunity for law-makers
(Michalowski and Pfuhl, 1990: 271).
Vinten's analysis of hacking legislation concludes that:
Legislation will at least raise the profile of computer security.
Enforcement will be another question ... Nobody can deny the
potential and actual threat of hacking. The Law can serve as
one plank in its prevention and deterrrence. Increasingly the
law is giving out clear signals. It is too early to judge the
impact of this ... [but] one cannot but wonder if hacking will
prove as intractable as the drugs and Aids issues, and whether
the legal response will be as effective as King Canute trying to
beat back the waves (Yinten 1990:15).
Thus there is a perception that computer crime legislation has
been used as a 'bandwagon' upon which legislators and technical
experts could jump in order to further their own career-orientated
goals. In support of this hypothesis is the noticeable lack of public
pressure for computer crime legislation. Not only was there no
apparent public pressure for legislation, there are also various
qualities of computer crime that may evoke particularly tolerant,
even admiring, attitudes from the public. Pfuhl (Uitenbraiuer
1991:1), for example, gives the following reasons why the public may
be reluctant to censure computer criminals: computer crime is
comparatively rare, people are more interested, than bothered by it;
people tend to admire the daring often associated with hacking
exploits; most of the victims of computer crime are faceless
institutions that do not appeal strongly to peoples' sympathies;
elementary precautions are often omitted in the systems that are
attacked which can lead to a displacement of blame from the
attacker to the victim; and finally, the game element of much
computer crime such as system cracking means that it is often
viewed as being outside of normal moral bounds.
7.6 THE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE
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We turn now to examine the parliamentary legislative debates.
In many ways these underlined the discussion taking place in the
computing industry (as detailed in the previous two chapters). For
example, a justification for hacking is that it provides a useful service
within computing by drawing attention to system weaknesses which
would otherwise remain unfixed. We have previously seen how
hackers have claimed that they are victims of blame displacement
from those responsible for the security of systems that have suffered
a security breach. The notion of the a priori responsibility of a
computer crime victim to secure his system to the best of his ability
was raised by Mr Cohen MP: "In my view, a computer system that is
not properly secure can potentially cause more damage than a
Rambo maniac who gets hold of guns, horrific though that is. Logic
surely dictates that computer owners should be legally responsible
for the security of their computers just as gun owners are
responsible for their guns" (Hansard Standing Committee C 28 March
1990: 88). The subsquent parliamentary responses to this point
encapsulate one of the main rationales behind the criminalisation of
hacking. They express the view that, since purely technical solutions
to systems weaknesses are too expensive, hacking should be
prevented by the use of legislation rather than technical fixes: the
view expressed is that legislation is needed to make up for the
unwillingness of companies to invest sufficiently in security
measures: "It could be argued that perhaps one fifth of investment in
a computer software system should be allocated to security. Very
few companies adopt that principle" (Nicholson Hansard 88: May
1990). Legislation is thus seen as a cost-effective measure with
which to confront hacking that would otherwise prove too expensive
to deal with:
In much the same way as we lock our doors to deter burglars,
it is possible to protect computers, and many people do ...
However, there is no complete form of protection for
computers. High levels of security can be achieved but they
are horifically expensive, in terms of money, inconvenience or
both. Security systems tend to slow up the computer. When
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speed is the essence, that can be extremely costly. We do not
expect householders to turn their homes into Fort Knox. We
expect them to take sensible precautions and we add to that
the support of sound laws against burglary. That is precisely
my approach in the Bill (Mr Colvin MP Hansard 1139: 9 Feb
1990).
The admission that there is 'no complete form of protection for
computers' reiterates some of the concerns over the general state of
computer security we have previously encountered in Chapter 5.
Thus Mr Hogg MP asserts that "the computer industry will welcome
the Bill because it cannot build into its technology the necessary
safeguards to prevent hacking or other offences. At the moment
such safeguards are technically impossible and, therefore, the law
must fill the gap" (Hansard 1143: 9 Feb 1990). The consensus of
opinion during the parliamentary debate emphasised the fact that
although hackers might possess potentially useful technical
knowledge, legislation should aim at their removal so that they
cannot exacerbate the security weaknesses that are acknowledged to
exist:
A study of 20 European companies carried out by Coopers and
Lybrand showed that 19 had inadequate standards of security
which were a real threat to the economic development of those
companies. The report said: 'The catastrophic effects of poor
security are likely to discourage organisations from becoming
any more dependent on their network systems.' That suggests
that there may be a level of complexity in our society beyond
which, because of safety interests, we may be frightened to go.
If hacking increases our fears, there will be damage to the
cohesion and organisation of our society. That is a perfectly
good and sufficient justification for the Bill (Mr Arbuthnot MP
Hansard: 1179 1990).
The use of the word 'fears' is significant because it draws
attention to an aspect of the parliamentary pressure to criminalise
hacking: the fact that legislation is used as a conduit to formally
express and codify elements of the 'them and us' scenario.
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Dr Taylor provided me with his model of computer security
which measures cost against the security provided by that
expenditure. At the lower level of the model there are basic
precautions such as paper shredders, and the rotation of staff
between jobs if they might be likely to collude. More complicated
(and therefore expensive) technical precautions are measures to
introduce more secure operating systems. Encrpyted passwords
(and may even be programmed to move about the operating system
ahead of any potentially curious intruder), are just one example of
more sophisticated access control which protects against browsing
from someone who has gained access to the password file. The basic
underlying factor of all these measures is the direct linear
relationship between the level of security obtained and the expense
incurred. Secure, technically sophisticated, operating systems may
involve man-years of effort.
Dr Taylor described his view of what role, given this cost-
security scenario, legislation has to play:
If there is no law in place to protect information, then
according to the value of your information's sensitivity, you
have to install appropriate technical measures which cost more
and more money as they become more and more sophisticated
to protect your information ... then you don't need these higher
levels of sophistication, because you know that in fact as a
private sector user, if anyone starts trying to get into your
system and get at things like passwords and your log of events
... you prosecute. So my view of the Computer Misuse Act is
that it's trying to provide a legal procedure, which will provide
quite a lot of protection to quite sophisticated systems which
then require less technical protection, so there's a trade-off ...
legal measures cost quite a lot of money whatever level of
security you want, because you have to put things like the
Computer Misuse Act in place, provide the methods to
prosecute the people that have breached it ... police time and so
on ...What this means is that provided the legal protection is in
place and working, it makes unnecessary the more complex
levels of protection (Taylor: Knutsford interview).
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Dr Taylor seems to recognise, however, that legislation may not
be an unequivocally good thing:
I suppose that is really going the wrong way because to get
quite a good level of security by providing legal protection,
you've still got to spend a lot of money ... whatever the breach
of security. If it's a very simple one like pinching certain
copies of paper, or it's a breach of an operating system, the cost
of processing that particular breach is pretty constant, because
you've got to invest in police time, in court time, and so on
(Taylor: Knutsford interview).
It should also be recognised that for certain publicity-sensitive
organisations such as banks, legislation may be an unfeasible
solution. The adverse publicity that may result from taking a
security breach case to the courts is likely to result in a marked
reluctance to take recourse to legal solutions.
(i) Stigmatisation and analogies
This section analyses the specific parliamentary example of the
stigmatisation process discussed in the previous chapter, and the
contribution the choice of particular analogies and statistics pay to
this process.
Analogies
The debate over the Computer Misuse Bill provides numerous
examples of the tendency in discussions of hacking to make use of
physical analogies with which to transpose real world criteria to the
virtual reality of computing. The analogies used in the debate over
the Bill compare hacking to burglary and acts of violence and the
promulgation of this concept prepares the ground for further
stigmatising statements. Nicholson illustrates the use of analogies
with the following rhetorical rebuttal:
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Mr Cohen spoke of a new power to make a computer owner
liable if a criminal commits an offence against his computer ...
If a madman with a knife attacks another person in a street
and then stabs himself, would the victim be liable for
compensation for not taking reasonable care to prevent the
man from stabbing himself? (Nicholson: Hansard 88:28 March
1990).
Similarly, Mr Powell MP contends that:
Computer hacking has many parallels with burglary. Burglary
takes many shapes or forms. It can be with intent ... or it can
be aggravated burglary, as it appears in aggravated offences.
Computer hacking remains astonishingly akin to the offence of
burglary ... The hacker who says that he is performing a public
service is doing exactly the same as the burglar who advances
by way of mitigation the argument that he is performing a
public service (Powell, Hansard 28 March 1990: 89 and Feb 9th
1990: 1147).
In contrast, Cohen responds: "Stabbing and burglary, are not
relevant examples. If a person has been negligent, left his doors
open and been burgled, I bet a lot of insurance companies have a
get-out clause to avoid payment" (Hansard 28 Mar 1990: 89).
Cohen's response questions Powell's belief that conventional criminal
concepts can be successfully transposed into virtual reality. We see
here how the use of analogies tends to encourage a continual
redefining of the particular question at issue. Small changes in the
analogy are used in order to question the suitability of the original
premise the analogy sought to illustrate. Despite doubts such as
those expressed by Cohen, the parliamentary debates leading up to
the Bill explicitly sought to criminalise hacking and stigmatise
hackers:
We must think of hacking as a form of burglary. We must
stigmatise such criminal activities for what they are. Because
computer buffs use a different vocabulary and have a method
of thought different from the conventional method that we all
use does not alter the fact that the principles of criminal law
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are just as clearly at stake (Powell, Hansard 9th Feb 1990:
1148).
Previously, the process whereby such stigmatisation is enacted
has been referred to as a "degradation ritual". The following is
evidence that at least to some extent, such a process has occurred in
the parliamentary debate. Parliamentary stigmatisation can be seen
as taking two closely-related forms. In the first, the motivations of
hackers are impugned, and in the second, the dubious nature of
hackers' motives are highlighted by a group-bonding process which
emphasises the "them and us" scenario.
The following is an example of the first form, it is Dr Lewis
Moonie MP's portrayal of the motivations of hackers:
The motive ... is simple to understand - human greed.
Although we do not condone theft, we can possibly understand
the need or personal circumstances which may drive someone
to commit that act. That is not the case with the kind of
computer misuse that we are discussing. Very often the people
involved are educated professional people and they have the
werewithal to afford to carry out such behaviour ... Although
we may not accept greed, we can understand it. The motive for
malice is more difficult to comprehend ... There are many kinds
of people involved and most, although not exclusively all, are
men. Although I have never professed to have espoused the
cause of Freud in my psychiatric work, I believe that a
profound sexual inadequacy is often related to such behaviour
(Dr Moonie, Hansard 1156: 9th Feb 1990).
The second aspect of the stigmatisation process: the
construction of the 'them and us' scenario takes the form of, first,
reinforcing group identity by underlining those qualities that
produce the "us" and, second, contributing to perceptions of the alien
nature of "them". An example of the former is the way in which
Powell 'proves' the potential menace of hacking by referring to the
social position of a figure calling for legislation to deal with hacking:
Yesterday I received a letter from a constituent who is a
leading official in one of the world's leading banks. He asked
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me to support the Bill, and I am happy to assure him that I do
so with enthusiasm ... When such an important official troubles
to write to a Member of Parliament about a specific piece of
legislation, knowing the background of his career I have not
the slightest doubt that the menace of hacking and its
consequences is widespread (Powell, Hansard 9th Feb 1990:
1147).
The difference between such a constituent and those of the
culture against whom anti-hacking legislation is aimed is starkly
apparent:
To show the sort of twisted culture that the Bill is trying to
stamp out, I have an extract from a bulletin board ... stating:
'who's seen the news in the 'Sunday Times' ... page A5 ... about
hacking ... and phreaking Mercury ... they also want restrictions
on BBS's ... it's that stupid cow ... the Devon MP 'computer
expert' [Nicholson] ... don't make me laff ... could be bad news
tho ... maybe someone should assassinate her?' Did somebody
suggest that hacking is a harmless culture? All that I can say is
that it is a privilege and I am honoured to join my hon. Friend
on the hackers' hit list (Colvin, Hansard Feb 9th 1990: 1137).
Once the sense of the 'us' has reinforced a sense of group
identity, the process to establish unequivocally 'who we are not'
begins: Colvin continues by relating how he hoped "that the debate
will dispell any lingering belief that the computer hacker is some
sort of Raffles of the microchip" (Hansard Feb 9th 1990:1142).
Nicholson describes in detail various salacious and potentially
destabilising aspects of hacking activity ranging from proliferation of
pornography on bulletin boards to interest being shown by political
groups such as the Greens, Anarchists and those behind the
Electronics and Computing for Peace Newsletter'. She seeks to
distance herself from "people who believe that they have a right of
access to all knowledge and that everything should be out in the
open - and should specifically be open to them". Nicholson proceeds
to relate reported incidents of hackers who have allegedly 'tried to
kill patients in hospital by accessing their drug records and altering
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their prescriptions on computer' (Hansard Feb 9th 1990:1151 +
1153). Finally, Nicholson advocates legislation against hackers
because:
It is no good saying that people must increase their protection,
because hackers are very clever. They will find a way around
every form of protection that one buys or creates. That is what
they are there for. They make a great deal of money out of it
and the German hackers, at any rate, support a drug-based
lifestyle on their activities. I was about to say, 'enjoy', but I
should certainly not enjoy a lifestyle based on drugs. Because
drugs are expensive, hackers need to make a great deal of
money to support their lifestyle (Nicholson, Hansard Feb 9th
March 1990: 1154).
Nicholson fails to give any corroborating evidence for many of
these assertions. Her association of German hackers and drugs is
! possibly a reference to the case of Pengo, the hacker Stoll tracked
down in The Cuckoo's Egg, but that individual case does not seem to
warrant the status of being generally applicable to the whole German
hacking scene. This example of lack of specific evidence raises the
question of the information gap regarding computer crime that policy
makers are faced with. The disproportionate reliance upon the
'casual empiricism' of rumour and 'guestimates' increases pressure to
legislate against hacking because of the increased levels of fear the
lack of statistics may produce: "while we are aware of the tip of the
iceberg, we do not know how much lies beneath the surface" (Waller,
Hansard Feb 9th 1990: 1161).
(ii) The information gap in parliamentary debates
In the parliamentary debate, Nicholson exemplifies this
tendency of reliance upon rumour by refering to the unsubstantiated
casually empirical' case of Scottish poll tax computers having had
details of those eligible substituted with information of dead people.
Waller demonstrates the role of 'guestimates' with observation that
80% of the computers in Hong Kong have been infected with at least
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one kind of virus. The Internet worm is an example of a computer
intrusion incident which recieved large scale attention and suffered
a similar exaggeration, this time more specifically as a result of press
interest:
The incident received world-wide press coverage. Along the
way the extent of the damage was magnified. One of the first
estimates- from John McAffe, the ever-quotable chairman of
CVIA - was that cleaning up the networks and fixing the
system's flaws would cost $96 million. Other estimates ran as
high as $186 million ... McAfee's estimate of $96 million was
dismissed as being 'grossly exaggerated' by Cornell University's
subsequent report on the incident (Clough and Mungo 1992:
98).
The vagueness of figures relating to computer crime appears to
be a common quality compounded by the boastfulness of some
hackers, and also stemming from a reluctance of the victims of the
crimes to report their vulnerability. This produces subsequent
difficulties when trying to collate reliable and meaningful data about
security breaches. Dr Taylor gave the follwing account of this:
There's lots of media hype but it all comes back to the number
of facts and occurences, what I'd say is that there are very few
virus incidents that are discussed in public which is due to a
very simple reason. If ... a company gets hit hard with a virus
because somebody's been negligent in checking for example in¬
coming discs or in-coming software, then the next time there's
a general meeting of that company, then all the share-holders
of that company will go for the chief-executive or his
henchmen and just roll the lot of them and put in a new board.
It's a job-losing incident, so whenever there's a security
incident not just involving viruses, anything involving hacking,
fraud, forgery in any pic which has got public share-holders,
there's a big white-wash job done ... I would say, I've got to
guess, but I would say there's probably 10-20 serious security
incidents in public companies a year, all of which are white¬
washed, otherwise the management are accused of negligence
(Taylor: Knutsford interview).
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In summary, the wide-spread reliance on 'guestimate' figures,
in the press and trade journals, results from a reluctance to report
incidents. This exacerbates fears by exacerbating perceptions of the
potential harm hackers can commit, which then contribute to the
'them and us' stigmatisation process and the concomittant sense that
a legislative response is required to solve the problem.
7.7 ISSUES IN COMPUTER MISUSE LEGISLATION
Amongst the problems faced by computer misuse legislators, is
the problem of attempting to interpret the motivations of hackers -
the legal question of intent, and there are also various difficulties
encountered in the previous chapter of how to transpose real world
concepts into 'virtual reality'.
(i) Interpretations of motivation
Everything is so ill-defined. How can you guess what lies in
their hearts if you can't see their eyes? How can one be sure
that, unlike Mitnick, they won't cross the line from trespassing
into another adolescent pastime, vandalism. And how can you
be sure that they pose no threat when you don't know what a
threat might be?" (Barlow Fall 1990: 14).
The question of intent is obviously important when it comes to
framing legislation to deal with the perceived problem of hacking.
The Computer Misuse Act attempts to distinguish between the
different possible motivations of hacking. It imposes maximum
sentences of six months for harmless browsing and five years for
"unauthorised access with intent to commit or to facilitate the
commission of a more serious further offence, such as fraud or
blackmail" (Colvin Hansard Feb 9th 1990: 1138).
The crucial difficulty faced by legislators is that they face the
danger of being accused of excessively punishing and labelling
people as criminal, when their 'crime' is liable to perceived as
relatively 'innocent' computer browsing. Chet Laughlin, for example,
253
gives the scenario of a "14 year old hacker-wanna-be" who largely
through luck gains access to a system and uses the opportunity to
browse through it. In such a case "pressing for time behind bars for
this (strawman) seems overkill. Now perhaps if I can demonstrate a
DESIRE TO DESTROY or MALICIOUS INTENT I could see otherwise"
(Laughlin 1991: Risks 11.34). Thus, even if it is accepted that
computer intrusion is wrong, achieving widespread agreement that
hackers are criminals in the traditional sense, is arguably much more
difficult. The dichotomy faced by legislators in the case of computer
crime is that to successfully label hackers as criminal requires proof
of malicious intention, whilst the anonymity afforded by the medium
of computing often makes such a task extremely difficult to achieve.
This has not stopped attempts being made, however, and in the
following description of the Atlanta sentencing of Riggs6 and his
associates, the process of marginalisation at work in a specifically
legal context can be seen:
Although the prosecution concedes that '[the] defendants
claimed that they never personally profited from their hacking
activities, with the exception of getting unauthorized long
distance and data network service,' the prosecutors
nevertheless characterize the hackers' motives as similar to
those of extortionists: 'Their main motivation [was to] obtain
power through information and intimidation.' The prosecutors
add that 'In essence, stolen information equalled power, and by
that definition, all three defendants were becoming
frighteningly powerful (Thomas CuD 2.07).
The fraudulent underworld described previously by Gongrijp is
an example of the more obviously criminal aspects of the computer
underground. It becomes less easy to interperet the correct
legislative approach to adopt, however, when the 'crime' being
committed is limited to non-destructive, but illicit use of someone
else's computer system. Kevin Mitnick, pointed out to me the
likelihood that in many legal cases a judge would have to use his/her
discretion as to whether an act was committed with criminal intent.
6 C.f. Fig. 7.1
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Harry Onderwater of the Dutch Criminal Research Institute in The
Hague concurred with this idea. He also outlined his perspective on
how, even accepting that hackers are criminal, there is still room for
differentiations to be made:
I think there are some good hackers and a lot of trained
monkeys as they call them. What they do, it's very easy by
internet, you connect to a site and say system administrator or
system manager, test, test, they know that you can ... and that's
not hacking, that's the difference between a burglar who puts a
big crow-bar between a door and the guy who's picking the
lock. He's a specialist and he doesn't break your door, if he
meets the night-watch, he wouldn't kill him or hit him, it would
be his risk. There's quite a difference between those guys ...
there's a difference between the guys who are worth the
knowledge and who know what they are doing and trained
monkeys ... If you get a Dutch data-base you can enter a lot of
sites because the other people already, the specialists, already
found it out for you, and that doesn't make you a good hacker
(Onderwater: Hague interview).
Even though people such as Onderwater can recognise the
differences between technically 'good' and 'bad' hackers: the
'specialists' and the 'trained monkeys', those involved in both the
practical prevention and the legal prosecution of hacking are,
perhaps inevitably, much more concerned with the effects of hacking
than the original motivations behind it. This forms an important
element of the "them and us" situation. The CSI thus generally works
on the assumption that the motivation of all hackers has to be
viewed as if it was criminally-induced. The argument is that there
should be no differentiation made between the different motivations
of various forms of hacking. Although hackers such as Mitnick
request recognition of these differences, security people such as
Thompson, Taylor and Tozer emphasise the fact that the effects of
j hacking, potential or actual, can be damaging regardless of the
! original motivation or intent, and that therefore legislation should
seek to eliminate hacking regardless of its intent.
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This call to treat as unimportant differing motivations was
reiterated by MP's. One rationale centred upon the line of argument
that victims of intruders, once aware of an intrusion, are obliged out
of caution to treat it as being maliciously inspired, the law should
therefore back this socially responsible attitude by treating all
hacking as legally punishable:
The issue is whether criminal law should be available for
trespass into computer systems. We must remember that
trespass is criminal in certain circumstances ... For example,
statute law makes trespass criminal where trespass occurs on
certain property and in particular on British Rail property ...
Similarly, it is a crime to trespass on certain property if no
damage is done, but firearms are being carried or is someone
trespasses in pursuit of gain ... I believe that computers should
be the kind of property on which to trespass would be criminal,
because of the damage that such trespass can cause (Cohen,
Hansard Feb 9th 1990: 1178).
Trespass is not seen as being strictly analgous to computer
trespass because it does not normally give rise to actual physical
damage, the damage caused by computer trespass stems from the
obligation to check for damage it forces upon the owner of the
system. The parliamentary debate over the Computer Misuse Bill
reflected the concerns regarding the question of intent:
The Bill criminalises the act of unauthorised access to a
computer, irrespective of the circumstances in which that is
done. A person might access a computer to read something
that he could obtain in a library-for example, a Shakespearian
sonnet. Such an act will become a criminal offence subject to
six-months' imprisonment. By contrast, an unauthorised
person who reads the most sensitive manual files can get away
with it, but such action is far more offensive (The Independent:
p.4, 15 July 1993).
He points out that the fact the Bill does not uncontroversially
deal with the subject of intent is shown by the close 3:2 outcome of a
British Computer Society debate, which occurred in a committee
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room of the House of Commons attended by 130 comptuer specialists
between, amongst others, Miss Nicholson and Prof Brian Niblett a
Home Office computing adviser. The division within the
establishment over the implications of the Bill are further
highlighted by the view of Mr. Eric Howe, the Data Protection
Registrar:
Mere misbehaviour, for example by youngsters, is not a matter
which we normally would seek to criminalise unless it has
some significant effect. To criminalise all unauthorised access
or attempts at access regardless of whether there is damage or
risk of damage would be to take a serious step which I find
hard to justify as a matter of principle. I believe that it would
be wrong to criminalise those who have no criminal intent and
create no hazard. This is analgous to a case of trespass where
no damage is caused. There may be a case, however, for
dealing with persistent unauthorised access. We should not
lose sight of the fact that computer users ought to protect their
own systems ... you've only yourself to blame if your
neighbour's cattle get into your unfenced field (Cohen, Hansard
Feb 9th 1990: 1166).
There is a worry that anti-hacking legislation will exacerbate
lax security rather than aid attempts to improve it. Quoting a
computer conferencing speicalist, Terence Wright, Leigh contends:
'The great Prestel 'hack', which is so often cited, was a case of a wide-
open door, and not of security being broken. There was no security
and there should have been." I hope the Bill will become an Act, but
no one would want it to absolve people in the computer industry
from being responsible for closing doors. That is their responsibility"
(Hansard Feb 9th 1990:1171). The veracity of this statement would
seem to be underscored by the way in which Robert Schifreen, one of
the perpetrators of the hack, has previously been quoted describing
the poor level of security that allowed his largely serendipitous
intrusion to occur at all.
The problems of assessing the intent behind a computer
intrusion are exacerbated by factors that have been emphasised
throughout this study. One of these factors is the cultural difference
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between those implementing legislation and those most likely to be
affected by it, previously identified by Herschberg as stemming from
the fact that hackers have grown up with computers 'from the
cradle'. Mr Leigh MP argues: "There is a wide cultural gulf between
those who learned computing in 1961 and those who learned in
childhood more recently.' Is my hon. Friend ... (Miss Nicholson) able
to distinguish hitting keys 1980 style from hacking? Can the courts?
Will they convict the innocent because they did not do what the
manuals said they should do?" (Hansard Feb 9th 1990: 1171).
(ii) Non-applicabilitv of conventional concepts in cyberspace
The non-transferability of virtual world concepts to the real
world identified particularly in Chapter 6, contributes to legislative
problems. 'Disembodied' is a phrase the Michalowski and Pfuhl
(1990) use to refer to computer-based crime in their discussion of
the formation of computer crime laws. It is a phrase that aptly
describes the consequences of the growing immateriality of
information. One implication of this is that the act of attempting to
illicity access and use such information does not fit neatly into
existing laws designed to deal with traditional notions of theft:
In one such lament, Business Week claimed that even if
information thieves are caught 'it is not always easy to
prosecute them. Larceny means depriving someone of their
possessions permanently. Can a person be tried for stealing a
copy of information when the supposedly stolen information
remains in the computer?' Similarly, Mano complained, that
one 'might as well play billiards with a sash weight' as try to
control computer abuse by applying existing laws to this new
threat (Michalowski and Pfuhl 1990: 268).
The basic problem which the authors identify is that society is
finding it increasingly difficult to protect traditional property rights,
in the realm of computing, due to the qualitatively different features
of electronic data storage. In the face of these problems, Gongrijp
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contends that the establishment response to computer crime has
involved a disproportionate and unjustified strength of reaction
when compared with similar real world crimes. This over-reaction
occurs, he claims, because whereas normally within the justice
system the intentions of the defendant are an important part of the
alleged crime, the same allowance for motives is not made with
incidents involving computers:
you can steal a document in a company, photocopy it and take
it home, and they could do nothing, maybe within the company,
but there would be no criminal offence, within the company
they could fire you. And then if you do the same thing with a
computer it should be a criminal offence, why? In all the rest
of the justice system it depends on what you do with them
[documents or whatever], it depends on your intentions, and as
soon as you use a computer, your intentions are no longer
important, it's just that you use a computer, it's a magic area
that we don't understand and that we can't control so that we
must take you one step before you do harm and we must not
care about your intentions: it's bullshit! (Gongrijp: Amsterdam
interview).
This forcefully expressed opinion highlights some of the
difficulties encountered in the transposition of legal concepts to
computing. For some hackers, the problems encountered in
legislative approaches are indicative of the fundamentally misguided
nature of the attempting to make this transposition: "If we succeed in
convincing people that copying a file is the same as physically
stealing something, we can hardly be surprised when the broad-
based definition results in more overall crime. Blurring the
distinction between a virtual infraction and a real-life crime is a
mistake" (Goldstein CuD 5.43: 1993).
In keeping with Goldstein's assertion, attempts to create
legislation aimed at facilitating the blurring have encountered
various anomalies. Cohen points out that Alistair Kelman a barrister
specialising in computer law has queried why non-malicious
browsing should become a criminal offence, in terms similar to those
of Goldstein he warns that: "The Bill's net is being cast far too wide,
259
and it will lead to many people, some vulnerable, committing a crime
where none now exists ... In years to come, the Bill could apply to a
washing machine, controlled by a chip ... That is nonsense" (Hansard
Feb 1990:1166+7). It has been argued that the Bill inherently
lacks focus: "Are we really saying that members of staff who make
unauthorised use of a firm's personal computer to produce their own
CV or every perpetrator of a childish prank that their misdemeanour
is worthy of a criminal record they will keep for the rest of their
life?" (Leigh Hansard Feb 1990: 1173). Such anomalies result from
The anomalies encountered in the literal transposition of real world
criteria into 'virtual reality', are both caused by, and subsequently
exacerbated by, the rapidly changing nature of computing. The
speed of this change is such that there is no point within The
Computer Misuse Act where the phrase 'computer' is actually
defined. Colvin, the MP who brought the Bill before the House,
claimed: "The problem is that it was six weeks ago when I first
defined the word 'computer' to my satisfaction. That definition is
already out of date. The passage of time and the pace of
development within the computer industry mean that any definition
of a computer or a computer system would soon be out of date"
(Hansard Feb 1990:1159).
(iii) Deterrence
There are various problems stemming from the fact that it is
effectively impossible to know, a priori, the intent of an intruder
cloaked in electronic obscurity'. Legislation, therefore, instead of
aiming to be efficient in terms of retributive justice, may have to
focus on the limited aim of acting as a deterrent. Even this more
limited aim, however, may be difficult to achieve. Zmudzinki, a
system manager on a military site, put forward the following
argument about the effectiveness of computer misuse legislation
with reference to the actions of Robert Morris:
The law is ... an ass. At the time I thought he should have
gotten two years with a roommate called "Bubba". Now I'm not
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so sure. The problem is that most legal systems are based on
the concept of punishment as a deterrent. This assumes that
one is dealing with persons of adult viewpoint. Unfortunately,
adolescents are not adults by definition. [I've always like the
definition of 'adult' Bob Heinlein gave in The Moon is a Harsh
Mistress: An adult is a person who has accepted the
inevitability of his or her own death. (There are a lot of "tall
children" running around.)] The point is that when one is
dealing with people who truly believe it-can't-happen-to-me,
deterrence fails (Zmudzinski: e-mail interview).
This is a view backed by fieldwork evidence of hackers
experiences:
Laws really don't mean anything to hackers until they get
caught. They might consider them to the extent that they will
not give out their number, or use an alias, or try to hide their
call routing through a number of paths, but they don't really
care. It's akin to jaywalking, it's illegal, but the law is
considered as an inconvenience to the offender (Eric Coggans:
e-mail interview).
Kevin Mitnick argued:
I don't think they're doing it because it's against the law and
they want to break a law, they do it because it seems an
interesting thing to do, a very interesting thing to do and it just
happens to be against the law, but, tough. Speaking for myself,
I was into computers, I wanted the knowledge and I was very
interested, it wasn't totally against the law in my day, it was a
very grey area, but I wasn't doing it because it was a kick
because it was against the law, I was doing it because I wanted
that knowledge and it just so happened to be against the law,
but I would have done it if it was legal or not (Mitnick:
telephone interview)
Mike Jones, is a member of the DTI's security awareness
division, and as such, was instrumental in the drafting of the 1990
Computer Misuse Bill. In contrast to Zmudzinski, he thinks that
legislation, at least in the British experience, has in fact dampened
261
down, at least temporarily, hacking activity, and does act as a useful
deterrent:
I would like to see no prosecutions at all and hacking stop, but
I recognise that we live in the real world were hacking will
continue just as theft and murders continue, but that ideally,
the Act will provide a greater deterrent to hacking than
previously obtained. To provide a deterrent I think the Act
has to be used not only in threat but inevitably it has to be
used in anger ... so inevitably, there will have to be
prosecutions, how many I don't know, maybe two or three a
year would be sufficient to provide the level of deterrrence, I
don't know maybe one would do it ... I've spoken to senior
spokesmen in the Metropolitan police, who argue that hackers
are now lying low, they might still be waiting, they haven't
given up hacking altogether, but they're just looking to see
which way the cat will jump basically (Jones: London
interview).
That the threat of jail sentences for what was previously
considered to be an act of intellectual fun-seeking has contributed to
a tense atmosphere within the CU is shown by Maelstrom, who, after
recounting the diversity of his previous hacking exploits, admitted
that:
Now I spend most of my time here at the college learning VMS
on my legal accounts. I still have fun getting into computers on
other campuses, but I don't really have the time I did before I
started college. Many of my close friends have gone to jail or
have quit the scene, so the inspiration to come up with neat
hacks has also died down a little (Maelstrom: e-mail interview).
The emphasis the CSI placed upon the more psychologically-
disturbed members of the CU7 in the formation of legislation is
viewed by the CU as irrelevant to the extent that it fails to address
the underlying thirst for knowledge and access to systems
motivating 'responsible' hackers. The CSI is perceived as
simultaneously over-emphasising the extent to which hacking
7 E.g. Dr Taylor and Mr Tozer of the BCSSC and their accounts of Chapter 5.
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activity is dominated by vandals, whilst unrealistically wishing or
believing that such vandals can be eliminated from their systems:
Should all responsible hackers be scared off by the militant
action of security people, it would seem obvious that the
security people would have much, much more to worry about ...
Fantasizing about the absence of vandals is no different than
wishing for the disappearance of all drug dealers. Basing
argument upon such fantasy is beyond comment. I venture a
guess that most security people are not the brightest of fellows
because even one who is as twisted as I, can see that malicious
and vandalous acts perpetrated in any environment, whether it
be in the slum or in a VAX, are the result of many factors not
having anything to do with computers. Addressing these
causes and making education available is where resources
should be dedicated. If individuals didn't need to break into
computers to quench their thirst, either for knowledge or for
malice, then certainly it would not take place as often (if at all)
(Mofo: e-mail interview).
Mofo thus raises the issue of the potential policy implications
resulting from loosely associating vandals and hackers together. A
failure to distinguish between them is part of the stigmatising
process that signifies the CSI's attempt at closure; all hackers are
grouped together under the label of 'vandals'. Such stigmatisation
serves the purpose of reinforcing the CSI's group identity, yet risks
constituting a misdirection of resources if the ultimate aim is to
eliminate hacking. The implication from Mofo's view is that punitive
responses to hacking are likely to leave unaffected those motivated
by destructive and malicious intentions, thereby severely limiting
the effectiveness of the deterrent qualities of computer misuse
legislation.
(iv) Symbolic value
Such legislation as the 1990 Computer Misuse Act may have
deterred some would-be hackers. However, as we have seen,
considerable doubt remains regarding its role as a deterrent and
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further doubt has been expressed as to whether such a desire to
deter was the main motivating force behind the legislation in the
first place. This adds weight to the symbolic view of computer
misuse statutes. A specific charge relates to the scant resources
available if the Act is likely to be enforced:
I hope that the Minister will deal with the problem of
enforcement. We are reminded that out of 150,000 police
officers in England and Wales only five are mainly concerned
with computer crime ... Fewer than 100 have received even the
minimum four weeks basic training and the Serious Fraud
Office has one computer-knowledgeable official (Leigh, Hansard
Feb 9th 1990: 1172).
Claims that the Computer Misuse Act is largely a symbolic
measure are also inadvertantly supported by some of its own
proponents who question the likely efficacy of the Bill whilst
affirming the sentiment behind it. This is a characteristic of symbolic
legislation (and to a lesser extent most legislation): that it should
espouse a particular social message irrespective of the law's likely
ability to enforce that message. An example of this characteristic is
Moonie's questioning of whether the Bill will provide adequate
deterrence:
It may deter the occasional recreational hacker, but the
seriously disturbed person who perpetrates serious offences
may not be adequately deterred by it. People will not be
deterred if there seems little chance of being caught ... Will
inventive minds find some way of circumventing the Bill? I
hope that it's drafting is secure enough to prevent that. I
support the Bill in principle. Its internal structure is sound, but
it is a matter of conjecture whether it will do what it is
purported to do (Moonie Hansard: 1160).
The quantitative questionnaire also illustrated the doubts
people have as to the likely efficacy of legislation, at least in its
existing form, in reducing the incidence of security breaches. This is
shown in the table below which summarises responses to a question
from the fieldwork's quantifiable survey, about future changes in the
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level of security. The vast majority of respondents (73%) felt that
security breaches would increase.





system breaking decrease 1 0.5
increase 146 73.0
decrease 14 7.0
stay the same 39 19.5
Total 200 100.0
The above factors suggest that the justification of the Computer
Misuse Act on the grounds that it will reduce security breaches by its
deterrent effect on hacking is open to criticism. In addtition, the
statistics from Chapter 5 imply that the Act may be of limited
effectiveness because it over-estimates the significance of hacking as
a security threat. Whilst the Act applies to those misusing computer
resources inside an organisation, as well as hackers, it's efficacy in
this situation is likely to be reduced by the fact companies fearing
adverse publicity are more likely to take internal disciplinary
measures than resort to prosecution under the Act. The charge that
the Act is more symbolic than a real deterrent is also strengthened
by the belief that the timing of the Bill's introduction had more to do
with a desire to be seen to be doing something about the problem,
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rather than a sudden realisation that there was a problem in the first
place:
Arguably, any need to deter abuse existed long before the
enactment of computer crime statutes. In fact, the available
data suggest that serious economic losses linked to computer
abuse have been and continue to be attributed to current and
former employees of the victimised organisation rather than to
interloping hackers with modems. The temporal lag in the
criminalisation of computer abuse (not observed with the
introduction of other technological changes), seriously
challenges the extent to which the computer crime laws can be
understood purely as instruments of classical deterrence
(Hollinger and Lanza-Kaduce 1988:116).
The classical deterrence view, however, still seems to hold
sway in the mind of the legal establishment. In the same case that
Paul Bedworth was acquitted, two of his codefendants were
sentenced to prison terms. The judge explicitly stated that his
sentencing rationale was based on the desire to deter other hackers.
In his summing up he said:
If your passion had been cars rather than computers we would
have called your conduct delinquent, and I don't shrink from
the analogy of describing what you were doing as intellectual
joyriding ... There may be people out there who consider
hacking to be harmless, but hacking is not harmless.
Computers now form a central role in our lives ... Some,
providing emergency services, depend on their computers to
deliver those services. It is essential that the integrity of those
systems should be protected and hacking puts that integrity
into jeopardy'. He said that hackers need to be given a 'clear
signal' by the court that their activities 'will not and cannot be
tolerated' (The Independent pg4, Saturday 22 May 1993).
It is impossible at this early stage of the Act's existence to
evaluate its success as a deterrent. Judging from the difficulty I
encountered in trying to interview British hackers or presently
active American ones, it would seem that at the very least, the
legislation has discouraged the hacking community from carrying on
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their activity, or discussion of it, "above ground". The accompanying
assumption is that unless the deterrent effect of the Act has been
large, then it has served to drive most hacking activity
'underground', which as we shall shortly see, creates its own
associated problems.
7.8 PROBLEMS OFENFORCEMENT
(i) Problems of Enforcement
Because of the electronic basis of their activity, hackers are an
elusive and largely anonymous target for law enforcement agencies.
Even assuming that they can be caught, achieving a punishment
likely to provide a deterrent for other hackers has proved difficult.
The problems associated with enforcing computer misuse legislation
are illustrated in the table below:
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FEW VICTORIES IN THE WAR ON HACKERS
SUSPECT AI thctED CR IMF- outcome
Robert Morris Jr. Convicted of breaking into and






Steve Jackson President of computer-game maker
company accused of publishing





Craig Neidorf Accused of publishing classified









Convicted of conspiring to defraud
BellSouth** of information and
disrupting telephone services
Each sentenced




Leonard Rose Jr. Pleaded guilty to transmitting stolen
AT&T Software




8 U.S. telephone company.
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(ii) Legal complexities - the Bedworth case
The case of Paul Bedworth illustrates several of the problems
encountered by the Computer Misuse Act in the sense of both
drafting and enforcing computer misuse legislation. The fact that the
case of Paul Bedworth ended in an acquittal despite unequivocal
evidence that Bedworth had gained illegal access to numerous
computer systems raises doubt as to whether the Computer Misuse
Act will function efficiently as a means for both deterring and
punishing hackers. It would seem that society's response to hacking
is still of an ambiguous nature: even where uncontested evidence of
computer hacking can be produced (and this itself is often extremely
difficult to do), a conviction under the relevant legislation is not
guaranteed. This points to both the legal difficulties encountered in
trying to combat hacking, and also the general ambivalence of the
public's response to it: for example, the jury only took 90 mins to
come to its decision, despite the complexity of the case and the fact
that the prosecution's case had involved two years of work involving
police from eight separate forces. One of the possible reasons why
"the perverse verdict" was passed is due to the fact that the
Bedworth case exemplifies the problems of attempting to enforce a
generic law over computing situations that vary significantly
according to each individual case's particular circumstances and
which are subject to the above-noted problems of being able to apply
adequately, real world concepts onto the realm of computing.
There is, for example, a tendency to couch computer misuse-
orientated legislation in broad terms so as to avoid legal loop-holes
that can be exploited by defence councils. Because of the difficulties
of pinning down a stereotypical hacking method of entering a
computer illegally, the Act prohibits generic "unauthorised entry"
with the subsequent problem that too much computer activity will
then tend to be inadvertantly included within the provisions of the
Act. Despite the determination of the Act's drafters to ignore the
"benign intent" defence of harmless browsing, the issue of intent
remains important to juries. The underlying malice or harmlessness
behind a computer intrusion becomes the yardstick by which juries
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assess hacker trials. They may find it difficult to attribute malicious
intent to hackers faced with the immaterial nature of their activity.
Because hacking exists in a "virtual reality", what the law seeks to
label as criminal intrusions, tend not to have the same criminal
associations real-world physical intrusions would have:
somehow over the period of the 16-day Southwark Crown
Court "show trial", as the defence described it, the scrawny,
wan 19-year-old has always seemed an unlikely villain...All
three charges faced by Mr Bedworth were couched as
'conspiracies' But, the defence asked, can conversations with
other teenagers over computer chat lines really be said to
constitute a conspiracy, or was Mr Bedworth operating largely
alone, and just swapping the odd tit-bit of information with
modern-day pen pals? (editorial Independent 18.3.93: 4).
It is doubtful whether the technical ignorance of the jury can
be used as an excuse for the reluctance of people to categorise
hacking as a tradtional crime. The psychologist Mary Shotton
typifies the reluctance of even professional groups with interests in
the question of hacking, to label hacking as a criminal activity (using
language remarkably similar to that quoted above by Zmudzinski).
She contends that, "Most people who hack are aware that it is a bit
unethical but they see no reason not to do it. They are far from
stupid. They think the law is an ass. I would rather have a hacker
as a son than someone that ram-raids or joyrides ... you could argue
that hacking is safer, saner and more intellectual" (Nutall 1993:5).
7.9 LEGISLATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF HACKING: MIT TO
ALCATRAZ
The charge that legislation is largely symbolic may also result
from the apparently inevitable bind that legislators face when
seeking to produce a legal framework within which hacking can be
contained. They can be accused of attempting to 'shoe-horn'
computer security cases into existing but allegedly unsuitable laws,
or alternatively, they can be accused of producing new laws that
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misapply traditional concepts such as theft and privacy to the
qualitatively different world of computing. Because of the relatively
recent appreciation of the problem of computer security and its
implications for computing and society, many of the complex legal
issues remain to be resolved through the usual processes of legal
debate and precedence. Chapter 5's treatment of the technical
aspects of hacking has shown security weaknesses to be a part of the
inherent fallibility of human-designed systems, and that given
sufficient perserverance and technical knowledge on the part of
hackers, bugs and software faults can be used for purposes other
than those intended by the original designer. The basic problem
facing legislators, therefore, is how to design a legal structure that
will deter such illicit uses from occurring whilst avoiding the
potential risk of marginalising "benign" hackers, with legislation, so
that their knowledge and perseverance is herded towards more
orthodox and traditional criminal groups:
Today we are faced with a new breed of vandal. In the past 3
years I have seen the emergence of real computer thugs.
These people are from low-class areas who have immersed
themselves into the computer networks and look at hacking as
a means to control their environment. Hacking to them is more
than intellectual fulfillment, it's an ego trip. Where people like
myself learned and moved on, these people learn and abuse for
their own gain ... I think that the computer underground as I
know it will be gone very quickly. It will be replaced with a
TRUE criminal underground. The technology is slowly reaching
the baser elements of society who are using it for their own
benefit. Hackers as we know them will be gone, washed out
with the implementation of laws, and technological advances to
prevent casual break-ins. The only people who will be
intruding into computer systems will be doing so with ulterior
motives (Coggans: e-mail interview).
The above quotation exemplifies some of the perceived dangers
confronting computing from the allegedly increasingly criminal
nature of hacking activity. Understanding the motivation behind
hacking activity and the differences between "responsible" and
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"vandal" hackers is seen by the CU in particular as necessary in order
to target resources to the real causes of hacking without alienating
"responsible" hackers who may prove to be a useful resource in
limiting the destruction of the vandals. The predisposition of the CSI
to group non-intentional and intentional damage together, would
seem to increase the tendency towards the criminalisation of hacking
whatever its underlying motivation. A view warning of the dangers
of criminalising hacking, was voiced by Dr Cohen, who argues that
the main motivating cause of hacking is the desire to explore that is
common in teenagers irrespective of computing technology:
We can either treat it as healthy and provide a venue for it, or
turn our children into criminals by criminalizing their normal
behaviour ... When I was younger, I knew many "hackers" who
went after systems, and none of them were malicious. Now I
know some malicious ones, but they are generally malicious
because of family or financial problems, not because they are
"criminals". In every case I have seen, these people need
friends and legitimate ways to explore. They need guidance
and moral interpretation from someone they respect, not jail
time with rapists and thieves in some stinking cell ... As the
group ages ... people begin to cross the line between explorer
and pirate. Unfortunately, many of these latter day Fagans
corrupt young people who, in their quest to explore, are not
given legitimate venues, and are thus drawn into illegitimate
activities ... the reason most of these people are drawn into the
"dark side" is because they are abandoned by the "good guys".
I for one, will not abandon our youth to criminal acitivities
(Cohen: e-mail interview).
This view reinforces Mofo's claim that the CSI should be more
concerned with the "access" and "thirst for knowledge" causes of
hacking. Targeting resources in these directions is arguably more
productive in the long run than the risk of provoking 'militant' CU
acts of vandalism with hawkish, unsympathetic responses. This
argument gains some credence when one looks at the existence of
"virus factories" in the former Eastern Bloc countries, largely as a
result of a lack of useful alternatives for programmers' computing
skills.
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The reponse of the CSI to hacking activity is crucial in
determining the uses to which much hacking knowledge will
eventually be put. The fear that by placing hackers in prison such
knowledge will be directed into the criminal community is also
expressed by 'Mofo' who also uses the example of the Internet
Worm. He contends:
There were individuals who would have Mr. Morris be
quartered in an actual prison. Such puerile reaction! I myself
was in a position to demand that Mr. Morris receive capital
punishment AND a fine, but reason seems to have eventually
prevailed in my muddled mind. I present this observation: an
intelligent person sent to prison for such an act would certainly
come to the conclusion that society demands his/her
subsequent interaction with the denizens of such an institution.
Thus, I believe that society as a whole would be far better off if
the intellect of a person like Mr. Morris was not shared and
information not disseminated among hardened criminals with
truly malevolent intent (Mofo: e-mail interview).
In keeping with this scenario, there is the example of Nicholas
Whitley known as the 'mad hacker':
The only times Nick Whitley was ever approached to do
something he thought was illegal was when he was already in
jail. The first attempt was made in the exercise yard in
London's Brixton prison: Whitely was a hacker, wasn't he? He
could break into computers, right? Well couldn't he break into
the Police National Computer and change a few files? It would
be worth £10,000 to some people to have their police records
deleted. Nick declined (Clough and Mungo 1992: 42).
The experience of hackers such as John Draper, who have
served prison sentences for hacking further illustrates some of the
problematic implications of imprisoning hackers:
In most cases, criminals hackers might meet in jail or prison
are too stupid to understand the ramifications of hackers'
information. Lately, however, a lot of newer prisoners have
been added to the usual murderers, drug dealers, thiefs, etc..
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These are embezzlers, fraud artists, scam artists, and other
"sharks" that wouldn't hesitate for a moment to capitolize on
hacker technology to enhance their scams ... Your academia
experts may know a LOT of things, but until they actually
EXPERIENCE inmate life in jail, they will NEVER EVER know
what really goes on in prisons ... In MY experience, when I was
released, almost everyone I had contact with in prison has
since contacted me after they also got released. Some have
even offered me large sums of money to hire me as a
consultant ... In most cases, those hackers approached by ex-
cons will be offered huge sums of money as an incentive to
"spill the beans" and teach hacker technology, so a hacker will
be most patient, even though they are talking with a moron.
Eventually, even the dumbest moron will catch on to the
automated techniques of breaking into systems (Draper: e-mail
interview).
There is, therefore, an indefinite boundary lying between the
boredom and frustration felt by some adolescents who feel they have
inadequate access to computing facilitites, and the criminal activities
that may result from such boredom. There is on the one hand a need
to deter troublesome hacking activity, yet to criminalise such activity
has potentially dangerous and counter-productive consequences.
7.10 CONCLUSION
Draper's account of his prison experiences points toward how
the gap between the CSI and CU's knowledge of security weaknesses
may become exacerbated if hacking knowledge is driven further
underground and into the prison system. Draper's observations
would seem to reinforce Dr Taylor's warnings of hacking technology
becoming more widespread, and hacking knowledge being passed
down criminal information networks, yet they also seem to imply
that such a process would be speeded up by legislation against
hacking. To avoid this problem, there is a need to devise a legislative
approach which would successfully reflect different and appropriate
legal approaches for the various motivations that may lie behind
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hacking activity: whether this is possible, is yet to be seen. There
remains, however, a practical need for legislators to develop a
thorough understanding of the motivations which lie behind hacking,
both malicious and non-malicious, if future legislation is to prove
effective in dealing with the problem both as a deterrent and as an
effective means of enforcing retributive justice.
Investigations into the formation of legislation aimed at
computer crime emphasise its symbolic characteristics. Its primary
aim is seen as not so much to be efficacious, but rather, to serve the
political aspirations of its promoters. If such claims are true, then
there is ground for substantial concerns about the future
development of computing. This chapter delineated the various
anomalies associated with attempting to use existing legislation, or
new laws, to deal with what are arguably qualitatively new
situations engendered by computing technology. These anomalies
may not be assimilated adequately into new legislation. There is
pressure to enforce ultimately unsuitable, but established ethical
codes and property rights in order to create and maintain boundaries
between groups in a nascent industry. In addition, there is a
perceived need to enforce these ethical codes in order to defend the
status quo of a societal order threatened by the disruptive
technological innovation of computing.
The implications for the development of computing of the
above scenario, become potentially more harmful if it can be shown
that new legislation has not adequately addressed the conditions
within the computing industry that allow the possibility of hacking in
the first place. Thus if legislation against hacking becomes more
draconian, yet computer security remains inherently weak, there is
the danger that hacking knowledge will be driven further
underground into professional criminal elements, and that the
overall effect of legislation will have been counter-productive to the
original aim of reducing the threat posed by hacking. It may in fact
become more destructive, whilst at the same time, fear of
prosecution may reduce the numbers of cooperative hackers willing
to help draw attention to security weaknesses.
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The tendency to punish all hackers, irrespective of motivation,
as a result of the problems of establishing a priori intent, raises
various legal problems. Firstly, the precept of "innocent until proven
guilty" is threatened, and secondly, in the desire to punish all
hackers, the particular anomalies and complexities of cyberspace are
largely ignored, and conventional legal concepts are consequently
misapplied to the realm of cyberspace. Examples of this are the
problems encountered when attempting to transpose the legal
concept of "breaking and entering" onto concepts of computer misuse:
any act of computer intrusion and subsequent "theft" is most likely
to leave the "stolen" object remaining in the breached computer.
Attempts to impose proprietal relations onto computing activities are
confronted by opposition, caused, not by a wilful desire for illegality,
but rather, the sheer convenience of using technology illicitly. A
conflict occurs between informational exclusivity and the benefits of
flouting it.
The statistical evidence relating to computer crime further
complicates the issue of legislation. The existing data is used both by
those claiming that legislative responses are largely symbolic, rather
than effective, as well as by those who argue that the figures justify
legal responses aimed at reducing computer crime. This study shows
that from the most extensive research performed to date, the
financial costs of hacking are relatively small compared with more
prosaic threats such as user-error and insider-based fraud.
Advocates for legislative responses, however, emphasise the fact that
available crime figures may be understated due to companies' fears
of adverse publicity.
Despite the rationale for legislation, commentators tend to be
sceptical of its likely success in significantly reducing the incidence of
hacking. They compare legislative attempts to King Canute trying to
order back the waves, or to playing billiards with a sash-weight.
Both those advocating and opposing the legislative solution to
hacking emphasise the fine dividing-line that exists between a
hacker enjoying a particular form of intellectual curiosity and him
acting upon the criminal potential the activity holds. The more
hawkish attitude is that hackers are already liable to change into a
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criminal 'in an instant' and are thus suitable subjects for criminal
legislation. The more dovish response portrays society as being on a
cross-roads whereby hacking in the form of intellectual exploration
can be encouraged, and remain predominantly benign, or
criminalised and liable to become more malicious and destructive.
The latter course is criticised on the grounds that it is penalising the
innate intellectual curiosity of adolescents and pushing them towards
the conventional criminal underground. The account of the prison
experiences of hackers such as Draper seem to add weight to fears
that hacking knowledge could be utilised by those with ulterior
motives, who although they may not be particularly technologically
able, will still be able to make use of automated intrusion techniques.
The overall significance of the Computer Misuse Act is that
unlike other forms of legislation, such as that relating to the wearing
of seat belts, this particular legislation is not just seeking to convey
an ethical message, the sentiment of which most people can agree
with, but it more specifically seeks to create a particular climate of
opinion by which a group within society (in this case hackers) can be
marginalised. Ultimately, what separates hackers from the CSI is the
manner in which they choose to underline how the technology of
computing creates new communicational possibilities and ethical
situations, and arguably these should not be judged using a rigid
application of "real world" notions that do not fit cyberspace.
Legislation to enforce informational exclusivity is viewed as the
latest course of action in the dominant social constituency's attempts
to socially shape computing away from the hacker ethic.
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8.1 INTRODUCTION
This study is an empirical explanation of social theories of
technological change and their emphasis upon the theme of closure.
It describes attempts by the CSI and the dominant social
constituency to stigmatise and marginalise hackers from any position
of influence within computing. There is also a common call in social
theories of technological change for a counter-cultural response to
this process of perceived closure and the ethos of the dominant
constituency. The form and rationale of such a culture is often left to
speculation. This study investigates hacking as an actual
representation of such a counter-culture.
To summarise briefly the progression of the closure argument
in the study: the affinity hackers have with technology contrasts
with the feelings of alienation the majority of people experience. The
contrast gives rise to the initial respect given to hackers by the
public who often perceive them as "computer whizz-kids",
"technological wizards" and so on. More negative perceptions have
arisen, however, especially within the CSI where there is a frequent
failure to differentiate hackers from conventional computer criminals
such as financial fraudsters. Hackers, in contrast, do differentiate
amongst themselves, some claim to be representatives of "the hacker
ethic" whilst denigrating others as unskilful "wannabes". This
evolution and complexity of interpretation reflects the mix of
motivational causes of the activity, combined with knowledge gaps
within computing that complicate assessments of hacking's
implications and potential worth. This lack of technical and ethical
certainty gives rise to various shades of opinion as to the role and
function of hackers. These shades of opinion are debated in the
social process of closure.
This description of the process of "closure" is used as a means
of addressing the major theoretical issues surrounding the subject of
technological change, of which computer hacking is but one aspect.
Chapter 3 introduced the concentration of the social shaping theorists
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upon the need to develop a theoretical rejection of technological
determinism. This study responds to that need by demonstrating
how computer hacking is an illustration of the primacy of a social
shaping-based explanation of technical change within computing
over more determinist accounts. Latour's characterisation of
technological change as the intrigues and machinations of "The
Prince" identifies the most significant aspect of technological change
as the question of the processes by which power is gained by one
group and closed to others. The concept of the Prince is equated with
the exercise of power. The dominant social order's power is best
cemented through the use of technology. Technology, however, has
ambivalent qualities, it represents both the site where power is
manifested in physical form, but also where the purposes of that
power are contested by groups such as hackers.
The study's analysis of closure within computing thus
forcefully illustrates the double-edged nature of Latour's thesis.
Technology cements social bonds that are already in place, but it can
also be utilised by opposition groups to weaken them. The dominant
constituency's desire to utilise technology to achieve this cementing
of social bonds has been shown to require the increasing
commodification of information. The study's examination of hackers'
opposition to this commodification and their progressive exclusion
from influence within computing is thus used as a specific illustration
of Latour's Prince in action.
8.2 CONTRIBUTION TO HACKING LITERATURE AND
METHODOLOGICAL NOVELTY
(i) Contribution to hacking literature
By highlighting both the complexity of the internalist account
of hacking provided by hackers themselves, and some of the
weaknesses of the externalist account of outsiders to the activity, the
study serves to debunk some of the mythologising and hyperbole in
the press's coverage of hacking, and provides a more well-informed
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account. The importance of this study's contribution to work in the
field resides in the dearth of material that attempts to evaluate
seriously the views of hackers. Most of the existing material treats
hacking tangentially, as in Turkle's Second Self, or concentrates upon
the more sensational empirical aspects of hacking as in books such as
The Cuckoo's Egg. Beating the System. Cyberpunk, and Approaching
Zero.
The literature's tendency to report the sensational,
concentrates upon hacking's negative aspects such as its tendencies
towards obsessive and misogynistic behaviour, thus producing a
rather one-sided account of the activity. To some extent, the study
reinforces these negative impressions of hacking with it's analysis of
the roles played within the activity of gender and addiction. It also,
however, shows that these negative aspects of hacking are only a
part of the activity's importance and significance for computing. The
analysis of the range of other factors that motivate hacking, provides
a more balanced and multifaceted account with which to aid a truer
understanding of the phenomenon. For example, the evidence given
in Chapters 4 and 5 combines to illustrate how hackers' technological
curiosity has a potentially useful role to play in improving security
standards within computing, and that this positive implication of
hacking's technical knowledge is worthy of consideration along with
its more negative aspects.
With the exception of Kane (1989) and Denning (1990), little
attention has been paid by non-hackers to the non-addictive aspects
of hacking. Writers tend to use evidence of obsessive computer use
as proof of technological determinist fears that human values are
jeopardised by the inexorable encroachment of machines, as
illustrated by Weizenbaum's (1976) conclusion from his analysis of
the effect of computers on the value placed upon human reason, that
computers were the invention of the devil. Also, whilst the extant
literature is agreed on the almost total predominance of men in
hacking, very little has been written regarding the possible reasons
for this situation. The study has sought to remedy this lacuna. The
reasons for the male predominance of hacking seems to be
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ambivalent, the situation seems due to a mixture of both the positive
male penchant for technical problem-solving and the negative
contributory factor of misplaced sexual inadequacy.
(ii) Methodological novelty
The study's novel methodological utilisation of e-mail
correspondence, to supplement conventional interviews, is a direct
response to the challenge of adapting the social scientist's
methodology to "the network quality of the Prince's moves". (Latour
1986: 22) The study has utilised the medium of Computer Mediated
Communication (CMC) as part of its exploration of the social processes
behind technological change. It's use has made possible a more
thorough investigation of the "gossamer framework" of the
community and culture of hackers than would be possible by more
conventional means. An example of this is the anonymous qualities
of e-mail, described in Chapter 2. They enabled information to be
extracted from hackers who would otherwise have been unlikely to
risk communicating in a less secretive manner, for fear of
prosecution. The use of e-mail has thus facilitated a first-hand
examination of the opposition provided by hacking culture to the
dominant social order.
A main empirical novelty of the study is its contrasting use of
internalist and externalist accounts of hacking. The internalist
account is the first-hand evidence given by hackers as an
explanation of their culture and what motivates them. The
externalist account consists of the views and perceptions of
computing's establishment: those that are at pains to assert their
non-hacker status. It is only through the contrast and conflict of
these two accounts that the process of closure and transformation
can be adequately analysed. Previous accounts of hacking have
suffered from being rooted solely in either an internalist or
externalist approach. This limits an analysis of the evolution of
computer security as an issue to an essentially one-sided and static
account that fails to appreciate the boundary-forming process
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whereby the identities of both the CSI and CU are dependent upon
the existence of each other. Specific aspects of this study that are
empirically novel or substantial improvements on existing work are
its detailed analysis of: the motivational characteristics of hacking;
the reasons why hacking is overwhelmingly dominated by men; and
the use of physical analogies in the ethical debate over informational
property issues.
8.3 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS - STATUS OF ORIGINAL RESEARCH
QUESTIONS
(i) Hackers and technological determinism
The study's description of the differing perceptions hackers
and non-hackers have regarding hacking is of crucial importance for
the exploration of its two main themes relating to technological
control: first, the complex process whereby groups within society
negotiate over the right to influence technology for their own
purposes; and second, hacking as a particular illustration of the
increasingly close nature of human interaction with technological
artefacts. The study demonstrates the extent to which the gains and
losses from IT are indeterminate and "up for grabs". Proving that an
area of negotiability exists, helps to refute notions of technological
determinism and contribute to its replacement with a more
sophisticated account that describes how computing is socially
shaped.
One of the initial questions of the study was whether the
concept of technological determinism had relevance to the
experiences of both the individual and the group as they seek to
utilise technology. The account provided by hackers addresses the
relationship of individuals to technology by the way it portrays their
inventive curiosity. They are characterised by their ability to
subordinate technology to their wishes rather than suffering the
often prevalent feeling of being controlled by it. The account of non-
hackers places more emphasis upon hackers' more "nerdish" and
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addictive behaviour. In contrast to the hackers' own account, non-
hackers perceive them as worshipping a 'silicon idol', having lost
their humanity in a Faustian bargain whereby they become
psychologically immersed in the machine.
The second technological theme regarding the way in which
groups attempt to shape technologies is also illustrated by the
differences between the two accounts. Extending its concern about
people being able to control technology, the internalist account
describes how the potential to socially shape computing has been lost
due to the establishment's "construction of irreversibility". This is
the process of closure by means of which hackers have mutated from
their earliest days as pioneers of technological development to their
present marginalised status on the fringes of computing. Whilst
always having been idiosyncratic "outsiders" they have travelled
from their early position inside the computer laboratory's of MIT to
the "blustery Dutch field"1 of the 1993 Hack-Tic computer club's
summer conference.
The externalist account, in contrast to emphasising control of
technology, explicitly admits that society's inability to technically
secure its computer systems in the face of increasing levels of
technological complexity has led to a need to stigmatise hackers. The
baroque complexity of computing has produced a need to produce a
social fix for a technological problem. In the words of Mr Arbuthnot
MP quoted in Chapter 7: "There may be level of complexity in our
society beyond which, because of safety interests we may be
frightened to go. If hacking increases our fears ... that is a perfectly
good and sufficient justification for the Bill." The failure of the
externalist account to recognise the merits of aspects of the
internalist account, whether this is deliberate or not, is thus
compounded by technical pressures to exacerbate, not mitigate, the
stigmatisation process. Increased levels of stigmatisation will, it is
hoped, help to reduce the incidence of hacking and thereby lessen
1 as described by Rupert Godwins, The Independent Friday 13th Aug 1993.
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the need for increased technical measures to combat security
weaknesses.
(ii) Hackers counter-culture status - internalist vs externalist
accounts
Academic authors and the media have overwhelmingly
concentrated upon the negative aspects of the motivations lying
behind hacking. They have emphasised its addictive, "power-
hungry" aspects, in addition to linking its prevalence with the
purported sexual inadequacies of its adolescent practitioners.
Chapter 4's analysis has shown that other motivating factors are also
worthy of investigation, and this study's attention to the hackers'
own accounts has illustrated the complex and mutually antagonistic
mixture of several of these factors. Thus, for example, whilst the
activity may involve some addictive attributes, this is only of limited
importance in any overall explanation of hacking. Turkle's depiction
of people sometimes using computers for psychological reasons of
dependence or insecurity may indeed give an accurate description of
compulsive programmers such as Paul Bedworth. However, as a full
explanation and frame of reference for the type of hacking that is
encountered in this study, it is lacking. The exact mix of hacking's
motivating factors is complex and difficult to disentangle completely.
This makes the issue of gender and why it should effect a person's
proclivity to hack, for example, hard to evaluate conclusively. The
difficulty is exacerbated by the fact that the internalist account has
produced ambivalent evidence. The limitations of the 'nerdish'
image portrayed in externalist accounts is challenged by the
fieldwork evidence of the more positive intellectual, and potentially
useful, aspects of hacking. Yet the image is also reinforced by the
hackers use of language that incorporates addictive and sexual
imagery.
The study thus provides a full-blown account of a group
offering, at least an attempt to create, an alternative to the
technological status quo. Criticism of that status quo riddles
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technological writings. Theorists from differing schools of thought
join in their calls for more human-orientated technology in various
forms: "convivial tools" (Ivan Ilyich); and end to "one dimensional
man" (Marcuse 1964); "technological politics" (Winner 1977); an
"alternative social constituency" (Molina 1989) or "technical
democracy" (Latour 1986). The study provides an original account of
a group accepting Latour's warning not to hand technological
superiority to the Prince on "a golden plate" by unquestioningly
accepting its imposition (Latour 1986:24).
The opposition provided by hackers, however, is not without
weaknesses. The potential of hacking to produce "the more humane"
technologies normally associated with alternative cultures is possibly
reduced by its tendency to encourage misogenystic behaviour
containing elements of misplaced masculinity and/or sexual
inadequacies. The gender and addiction-based critiques of hacking
combine in Donna Haraway's notion of women embracing "cyborg
power relations". Hackers represent a role model for counter-
cultural recognition of the need to contest social power in full
knowledge of its technological context. Haraway's feminist
technological agenda acknowledges this, whilst seeking at the same
time, to maintain recognition of the ultimate difference between the
human body and the technology it is interacting with. She seeks to
avoid the particularly male addictive willingness to totally embrace
technology. Such willingness is shown by hackers who seek to "lose
themselves" in their computer systems, thus Chip Tango "attaches his
consciousness" to, or "butterflies around", a system. The gender-
based criticism of hacking culture, however, may be mitigated by the
possibilities CMC offers for non-gender-specific interactions between
its users, as illustrated by "The Strange Case of the Electronic Lover"
(cited in Dunlop and Kling [eds] 1992).
The charge that hacking represents more of an "alienated
shopping culture" than a radical political group, received resonance
in the fieldwork from some hackers' complaints that their main
motivating factor is a lack of legitimate access, rather than the
motivation of a coherent set of oppositional beliefs. The study's
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evidence of hacking's obsessive traits also reinforces somewhat the
belief that hacking's counter-cultural claims are weakened to the
extent it represents domination by technology. The evidence is
limited because the "visceral" association hackers make with
technology can be equivocally interpreted as proof of their depth of
their control over it or alternatively as subjugation to it.
Ross (1990) has been shown to criticise the cyberpunk
celebration of the "aesthetic of detritus" which he argues leads to the
danger of overstating the counter-cultural status of cyberpunks (and
by extension hackers) as part of an "urban fantasy" fashioned more
from white male middle-class fears of the "mean streets" than being
based on any aspect of reality. The irony of this criticism lies in the
fact that the criminalisation of hacking promoted by the authorities
themselves,has hastened hacking's aura of "street credibility" and the
aesthetic of detritus. They have done this by pushing it further
towards the criminal fraternity than would have been likely if
hacking had been left to evolve on its own steam. The fieldwork
recounted, for example, John Draper's experiences in prison.
Despite the above weaknesses of hacking's status as an
embodiment of alternative cultural values, positive oppositional
qualities have been identified throughout the study. Hackers exhibit
in the heterogenous range of their technological curiosity a
celebration of human ingenuity's ability to subvert and manipulate a
diverse stock of artefacts. This subversion is seen in acts, potentially
disruptive to the social order, that range from the study's example of
a Dutch hacker obtaining free time out of a parking meter, to the
bringing to a standstill of the Internet communication system, which
occurred as a result of Robert Morris Jr's worm program.
The nature of the CMC environment within which hackers
operate has made identification of their oppositional potential
difficult to establish, their anonymity producing a "gossamer
culture". The intangibility of the culture has ambivalent implications
for the researcher. On the one hand, the anonymity afforded by CMC
enables relatively easy contact with hackers, but on the other hand,
hacking's ability to effect computing and society from within has
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been diminished by the process of closure, and as and its alternative
status remains firmly rooted "underground", observation of its
counter-cultural qualities is thus, on occasion, problematic.
(iii) Boundary formation
The origin of hackers' gradual lessening of influence within
computing was described in Chapter 5's analysis of the software
crisis, and the pressures it produced for a more scientific, as opposed
to a craft-based, hacker-type, approach to software development.
The main vehicle for the articulation of this process has been the use
of physical analogies in the expression of particular ethical positions.
This is an extension of the ethical debate, the origins of which are
addressed in Chapters 3 and 4. Novel concepts such as cyberspace,
initially presented in popular science-fiction, have been increasingly
recognised as explanatory tools that can be utilised in understanding
the implications computing's development has for the nature of
information. The use of analagous thought upon which the new
concepts are based is extended into the terms used in the ethical
debate over the new issue concepts like cyberspace give rise to. The
need of the dominant social constituency to use analogies in order to
reevaluate ethical norms in their favour, is an important part of the
closure process identified by this study, but otherwise ignored in the
literature of computer security issues.
Latour's theory of the Prince contains the description of
technological change as a scrabble-like game where competing
groups use different strategies and ethical approaches in order to
mould technology to their preferred shape. Some justification for
such a view is contained in the evidence this study has provided
from Chapters 5 and 6 that the CSI and CU have similar knowledge,
but what differentiates them into separate groups (culture versus
counter-culture) are the particular ways in which that knowledge is
used. This implies that the subsequent dominance of one group over
another is likely to be due to the success of one cultural outlook
imposing itself on another. In this scenario, the marginalisation of
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the CU away from mainstream influence in computing is due to a
deliberate project of exclusion rather than any intrinsic inadequacy
in the technical ability of, or potential benefits to be derived from,
hackers and their knowledge. An example of such a project is the
CSI and establishment's impugning or "smearing" of hackers'
motivations. This is illustrated in both Chapter 6's section describing
the CSI's strength of hawkish feeling and in Chapter 7's account of
MPs discussing hackers in terms similar to those previously
identified as part of a degradation ritual.
The use of analogies in the process of closure has been shown
in Chapter 7's analysis of the passage of the Computer Misuse Act,
and underlines hackers' arguments that criminalisation of their
activity is a misdirected social response to the technical problem of
insecure systems. The significance of the study's analysis of
analogies is the way it shows the process of boundary formation
taking place at the expense of technical solutions. The legislation is
both a reflection of, and an exacerbating factor in, this process.
(iv) Stigmatisation
In order to show that hacking has been subjected to a
deliberate process of stigmatisation, the research has thus described
how in the nascent environment of computing, potentially useful
information has been ignored or avoided for non-technical reasons.
The rationales used are couched in terms of ethical and moralistic
language that form part of a boundary-forming professionalisation
process within computing. The stigmatisation process grows out of
the fact that the changing nature of information threatens the
dominant group's ability to control information specifically for its
own ends. Hackers are a direct threat to the establishment's ability
to enforce informational property rights, a threat exacerbated by
technical tendencies which threaten the commodity status of
information. Stigmatisation of hackers is used as a way of reducing
their influence, and subsequently their threat, by marginalising them
away from a position of influence within computing.
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The stigmatisation project as the part of the boundary forming
exercise is facilitated by the use of physical analogies. Chapter 5
illustrates, with admissions from CSI figures themselves, that it is
difficult to find examples of intrusions achieved by particularly
difficult means. This apparent ease with which computer intrusions
occur means that victims of a computer intrusion may often feel
more responsible and guilty than would the victim of a physical
crime. Computer intruders are then compared to real world burglars
so that they can be more readily associated with people who pose a
criminal threat and physical danger rather than being associated
with the relative benignity of mere intellectual hobbyists. They are
thus used by victims of security breaches in order to more
effectively condemn the perpetrators, in a process described by
Herschberg in Chapter 5 as "blame displacement". It is a means of
avoiding the culpability associated with lax security.
However, this blame-displacement exercise may not be
smooth-running. It is, ironically, used in the first place to make up
for the fact that computer intrusions are not particularly comparable
to those of the real world. The ease of access to computer systems
combined with a lack of physical threat or violence posed by hackers
undermines the applicability of breaking and entering analogies to
their activity. The fact that computer intrusions are more often
associated with lax security than their real world counterparts,
where some physical violence is normally required to overcome the
physical security precautions in place, means that an immediate
response to the victim is likely to be blame for inadequate security
procedures rather than sympathy that the incident occurred.
The stigmatisation process, is part of the wider closure process
by which the establishment uses technology to more effectively gain
power. The study shows how the oppositional activities of hackers
mean that the CSI and establishment groups do not have a free hand
in exerting their influence over computing. Their need to stigmatise
and implement closure in the first place is indicative of the complex
process of defining different groups' status within computing, by
means of negotiation and conflict. The example given of the
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Bedworth case is a vivid illustration of the unresolved nature of the
conflict. The polarised rhetorical ploys used in this legal attempt to
deter hacking proved to be an inadequate method of dealing with the
complex issues raised by it. They assumed a level of shared values
between juries and prosecutors that may not in fact exist.
(v) Policy implications
Contrasting the internalist and externalist accounts shows the
latter to be at least partially lacking, and this has direct policy
implications for those attempting to establish a coherent institutional
response to hacking. For example, there are mixed and inconclusive
views as to whether increased access to, and education about,
computing facilities may lessen or exacerbate the incidence of
hacking. The motivations lying behind hacking are important to the
success of legislation aimed at reducing the problem: legislation is
likely to remain at the symbolic level if it is drafted in general
ignorance of the phenomenon it is seeking to control. The strength
and importance of curiosity as a motivation for hacking has shown
the likelihood that hacking is a perennial human quality, only one
aspect of which is its application to computers. The particular
significance of hacking, however, rests with the increased social
implications it has compared with other forms of technological
curiosity, its higher profile is due to the centrality of computers in
modern society.
Those aspects of the study that emphasise hacking's basis in
technical curiosity imply that legislation aimed at detering it is
unlikely to be very successful. Apart from the limited impact
legislation is likely to have on peoples' innate curiosity, the unusually
anonymous and fluid nature of hacking culture described in Chapter
4 also makes conventional punitive approaches difficult to enforce
for the obvious reason that the perpetrators of hacks are difficult to
identify. The inherent difficulties of successfully applying legislation
to hacking gives rise to the charge that it is symbolic legislation. The
establishment's desire to be seen to be taking action in response to
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hacking appears to be more important than the likelihood of the
response achieving its declared aims. Hackers are therefore more
stigmatised than actively prosecuted.
8.4 CONTRIBUTION TO THEORETICAL KNOWLEDGE
This study compensates for the fact that the non-academic
literature's approach to hacking has left little room for analysis of its
larger theoretical issues. It covers those theoretical issues with an
analysis of the significant characteristics of hacking that make it an
identifiable culture actively involved in the development of
computing, and thereby contributes to the social shaping debate of
technological change. Hitherto these theories have tended to
concentrate upon groups shaping technology from within the
dominant constituency. Whilst the first hackers may have initially
fitted this scenario, the study has described how successive
generations of hackers have increasingly sought to influence
computing's development from the outside, thus providing a novel
perspective: oppositional influence within technological change. The
emergence of the CSI, and the passing of the Computer Misuse Act, is
evidence that this influence has not been insignificant.
Hackers represent an aspect of technological change that is not
adequately covered in social shaping theories. Molina, along with
Pinch and Bijker, for example, talk in terms of "sociotechnical
constituencies" or "relevant social groups" which are instrumental in
the development of a technology. They presuppose, however, an
overall constituency with a generally agreed direction towards which
the smaller groups within the constituency are aiming. Pinch and
Bijker's, for example, utilise the notion of micro-social groups in their
social construction of technology approach, which requires that
assumptions about what constitutes a relevant group are easy to
make. This study throws doubt upon their pluralist model by using
the example of hackers to provide evidence of how counter-
constituencies can arise within a technology. Pluralist accounts do
not adequately take into account the issue of dominance, and how
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relevant and non-relevant groups achieve and maintain their status.
They tend to gloss over the fact that technological development may
occur as a process whereby one group prevails over another resistant
group with a fundamentally different value structure. In contrast,
the particular case of hackers, demonstrates how counter-
constituencies arise from such resistance. The study thus provides a
fuller account of the concept of power by using hackers as an
example of the struggle and contesting of power that occurs before it
can be exercised in the process of technological change.
In response to technologically deterministic theories, social
shaping analyses of the IT revolution strive to stem a tide of
technological determinist pessimism. Such pessimism is also evident,
however, even in otherwise optimistic social shaping approaches that
look for areas within technology of potential political change that will
reinforce the influence of the democratic 'social' over the technical.
An example of this is Molina (1989) who shares with Mumford
(1970) the conclusion that a more politically liberated form of
technological development will only be achieved at the cost of, and
by means of, a "catastrophe" whereby a "wholesale conversion of
people to a new way of life" is necessary: "If mankind is to escape its
programmed self-extinction the God who saves us will not descend
from the machine: he will rise up again in the human soul" (cited in
Molina 1989: 180). Social shaping theorists such as Russell and
Williams (1988) also acknowledge areas of technological
irreversibility which point toward the possibility that human choice
and social shaping may be a real force, but a real force that exists in
a circumscribed arena of intervention due to macro-induced
limitations. This study has examined the role of hacking both as an
embodiment of the 'human soul' and in its attempts to expand the
circumscribed arena.
Latour recommends that the researcher should sit, "just at the
point where the contract is made, just where the forces are
translated, and the difference between the technical and social is
fought out, just where the irreversible becomes reversible ... There,
only a tiny amount of energy is necessary to drag a maximum
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amount of information about its growth from the newborn monster"
(cited in Knorr-Cetina 1981: 301). This is what this study has
attempted to do by using hackers and their interaction with the
establishment as a specific example of the point at which the
"difference between the technical and the social is fought out": that
is, the struggle between the CSI and the CU over the establishment of
closure within computing. Whilst Latour's analysis highlights the
laboratory as a site for the struggle between the social and the
technical, this study has shown how hackers contest technical change
far from the laboratory where closure is most keenly felt. Thus, the
main theoretical contribution of this research stems from its analysis
of hacking's important implications for theories of technological
change.
Despite its critique of social shaping theories, the study agrees
with their conceptual rejection of technological determinism.
Although the study's internalist account of hackers emphasises this
rejection by illustrating hackers' ability to control and shape
technology, hacking can also be viewed in a more technologically
deterministic manner. Chapter 3's analysis of cyberpunk fiction
provides vivid examples of some of the technological determinist
fears that hacking gives rise to. The image of hackers as "surfers on
a technological wave", epitomised in the literature by Chip Tango,
implies that although hackers utilise technology for their own
enjoyment they do not influence its ultimate direction and therefore
do not fully escape a determinist experience of technology. Hackers
are in the words previously quoted from Meyer "a conscious
resistance to the domination of, but not the fact of, technological
encroachment into all realms of our social existence" (Meyer and
Thomas 1990: 7). This implies that hackers object to the form
computing has taken in society, but that their desire to see it used
differently is still subordinate to their passive acceptance of its
inevitable encroachment. This assessment of hackers is reinforced
by Chapter 5's description of hacking's origin in the programming's
software crisis. The fact that the best programmers and hackers are
described as wizards, relates to the perception felt by predominantly
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non-technical people that the technology they are manipulating
constitutes a "black box" surrounded by an aura of "mystery" that
even the hackers and programmers do not fully understand.
The dominant social constituency too, is not immune to
perceptions of technological determinism in the sense that it has
needed to react to the threat computing's technical development has
posed to informational property rights. The adoption of physical
analogies to develop new concepts is part of this attempt to deal with
these changing technical conditions. Thus the technical induces a
response from the social which would seem to be more in keeping
with technologically determinist rather than social-shaping
perceptions; it is an example of the "cultural-lag" thesis of
technological determinism whereby societal institutions react to,
rather than control, technical change. In this scenario the
establishment, although overseeing the diffusion of computing, is
itself struggling to come to terms with its social implications. It too,
is faced with responding to the qualitatively new social situations
which computing repeatedly produces.
The study, however, provides a rebuttal of temptations to
interpret this scenario as society deterministically responding to the
impact of technology. The struggle over the nature of computing,
and by extension, information, fought between hackers and the
dominant social constituency can be viewed as the price the
establishment pays for using computing to increase its level of
control in society. Theorists such as Latour (1986) describe this
process in terms of a deliberate policy whereby the dominant social
constituency encourages perceptions within society which hold that
humans are largely unable to effect "autonomous" technological
change (Chapter 3's concepts of inertia and automatism).
Diffusion of technology throughout society offers greater
potential for increasing the establishment's power because it
broadens the scope for implementing higher levels of inertia and
automatism. The possibility of greater power has to be enforced to
become reality, however, and it is in the conflict of competing
strategies that hackers' status as a repository for alternative cultural
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values lies. Hackers threaten the power-enhancing project of
dominant social groups, and as a result, the strategies adopted by the
establishment assume the qualities of Latour's Prince-like intrigues.
An example of this is the establishment's stigmatisation of hackers.
The externalist account depicts them as "nerdish" obsessives and our
empathy with them is further eroded when they are portrayed as
threatening our increasingly networked and safety-critical computer
systems.
Hackers are an intrinsically interesting group at the forefront
of issues connected with technological change because their activity
described throughout this study opposes the strategies of the
dominant social constituency. They oppose responses of inertia to
technology with their manipulative and imaginative reinterpretation
of uses for artefacts; they oppose automatism by calling attention to
the political implications of governmental use of computing, and
through their anti-bureaucratic ethos. The various limitations of
hacking as an alternative cultural force, however, make it difficult to
argue that hackers are likely to achieve any of their political aims,
even presupposing that they have a coherently articulated and
widely-shared program of action. This does not mean that hackers
are redundant as a force of opposition, however. The inherent
contradiction faced by the dominant social constituency's attempts to
utilise technology to increase its own power is that the potential uses
of that technology are double-edged: the technology's power is
potentially available to both the dominant constituency and the
counter-cultures seeking to oppose it.
Thus the research has provided evidence that hacking
represents a significant site for those seeking to redefine society's
development and implementation of technology. It opposes attempts
to use technology to impose control without resorting to any form of
Luddism. Instead, it utilises the very knowledge and artefacts used
by the dominant social order to exclude groups with alternative
agendas for technology. Instead of capitulating to the realities of
existing social power by calling hopefully for an alternative
technological ethos, hackers pursue democracy within the very
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science and techniques that are being used against them. The
disadvantage of this approach is that it risks becoming one with what
it seeks to oppose. This is a charge made against hackers described
by Ross (1990) in Chapter 3. Hackers are seen as the ultimate
embodiment of establishment values for the way they exhibit
"qualities that are valorised by the entrepreneurial codes of silicon
futurism". The advantage of the hackers' approach, in contrast, is
that it avoids the political fatalism and quietism of those like
Marcuse and the Frankfurt School whose ultimate raison d'etre
became the avoidance of instrumental rationality in any form.
8.5 UNANSWERED QUESTIONS - FUTURE RESEARCH
This investigation ends with the fourth generation of hackers
which contains both the "wannabe's" who reject the original hacker
ethic and are involved in hacking for personal gain, and also the
remaining "ethical hackers" who hack solely to satisfy intellectual
curiosity. The impact of the establishment's response to this latest
generation of hackers is still being felt, and it is likely that the
conflict between the CU and the CSI will produce a fifth generation of
hackers. This latest generation will occur as a result of the
interaction between different constituencies. Future research might
fruitfully examine, in retrospect, the impact of those aspects of the
establishment's response to hacking such as The Computer Misuse
Act. Because of the secrecy within the computing community
engendered by the Act, the research has not been able to fully
evaluate such questions as whether it has been effective in deterring
hacking. Fuller access to such sensitive but potentially interesting
areas as the banking sector and its contribution to the debate over
hacking also proved largely unobtainable.
Finally, because of the wealth of social aspects that have
stemmed from this analysis, less attention than desired was paid to
the more specifically technical areas of hacking and some of the
internal debates occurring within computing. The study has
described those internal debates, such as the arguments over the
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pros and cons of craft versus science-based approaches to
programming, and the issue of the software crisis. The fact that
these disputes exist at all, reflects how practices have not kept pace
with the complexity of computing and this provides the space within
which the hacker can operate. The ways in which attempts are made
to resolve these debates in the future and the future implications of
such developments as data encryption will have a decisive effect on
whether hackers' technical knowledge and curiosity will still have a
role to play in the social shaping of computing.
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Appendix 1 - Statistical Analysis
1 QUANTITATIVE QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES
2 THE AGE FACTOR
3 POTENTIAL USEFULNESS OF BREACHES
4 STATE OF THE INDUSTRY







































































Virus and hack 7
Virus and browse 12.5
Total 100
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The above responses to the quantitative questionnaire
reinforce several points encountered in the qualitative fieldwork.
Most notably, the extremely small percentage of female respondents
is indicative of the low level of female participation in the areas of
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computer security. In addition there are the following pertinent
points to be made from the above responses:
Question 5: The evidence from the qualitative fieldwork seemed to
emphasise the perceived widespread weaknesses of computer
systems. In this particular response only 25% of people felt their
systems to be inadequately secured. This may be explained,
however, by the tendency of people to underestimate the
weaknesses of the systems that they are associated with.
Question 6: The fact that much computing work is carried out by
people without formal qualifications (41.5% of respondents) was
mentioned in the main body of this study. This can be seen as due to
both a lack of adequate levels of education in the computing
industry, but also illustrative of the value of computing knowledge
derived from practical hands-on experience rather than formal
training.
Question 7: Only 17% of respondents had no experience of some
kind of security breach. The experience of the different types of
security breaches can be simplified as:
Malicious Hack or Browse 64.5%
Virus Only 18.5%
Nothing 17%
Question 14: 64% of respondents thought that insiders within an
organisation posed more of a risk to its security than outsiders,
whilst only 7.5% thought the converse.
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Questions 15 and 16: The number of respondents who thought
viruses and system breaking could be potentially useful was high.
40.5% and 67% respectively.
Question 17: 73% of respondents thought that the number of
security breaches would increase in the future, compared with only
7% who thought they would decrease.
Figures 4a-c show how both academic and commerical organisations
experience hacking to a similar extent (62 and 63% respectively),
although the academic sector is almost twice as likely to experience
viruses. In general there is quite a high level of security breaches
with 25% of the academic sector experiencing all types of breaches
and the commercial sectorl8%. The data for those experiencing no
breaches is correspondingly low: academic sector 10%; commercial
sector 25%.
The data also shows that both the academic and commercial
sectors did not view hacking or viruses as particularly serious
threats (6% and 7% respectively in figures 4d and 4e). Hacks and
viruses are perceived as constituting a similar level of threat, 9% of
hacks/browses being thought to be serious and 7% of viruses (figures
4f and 4g). There are relatively high and comparable figures for the
number of repeated breaches of both hacks/browses and viruses.
17.5% of hacks and 16.5% of viruses had been experienced more than
10 times (figures 4h and 4i). Finally, as a reflection of the perception
that breaches are not a serious threat figures 4f-k show how 66% of
both academic and commercial sectors think that their security is
adequate.
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SECTION 2 THE AGE FACTOR
Fig.2a














The prediction of Chapter 6 that age would tend to encourage
firmer ethical judgements is backed by the evidence from fig 2.,
although the over 40 age-group, whilst still adopting a more negative
attitude to hacking than the youngest age-group are less liable to do
so than the 31-40 group.
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SECTION 3 POTENTIAL USEFULNESS OF BREACHES - Age and
Organisational sector factors
Fig. 3a
Response bv % of age group
Age Group Yes No Don't Know Row
Total
15-20 62.5% 25% 12.5% 100%
21-30 75% 18% 7% 100%
31-40 67% 20.5% 12.5% 100%





% of Organisational Sector
Commercial 70% 21% 9%
Academic 63% 23% 14%
Other 69% 28% 3%
Section 3 Summary:
The fieldwork statistics show that significant percentages of the
respondents believe that both hacking and viruses are of potential
benefit. A view held across age groups with the 40+ group being less
disposed to view either as useful. The belief that they are
potentially useful is widely spread across organisational sectors.
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SECTION 4.0 STATE OF THE INDUSTRY
The experience of security breaches by organisation type is
summarised as follows:
Fig. 4b
% of firms experiencing categories
Hack/Browse Virus Nothing M
Organisational Sector
Academic 62% 70% 10% 25%
Commercial 63% 37% 25% 18%
Other 72% 51% 15% 26%
and:
Fig 4c.
% of total industry incidents
experienced bv organisational sector
Type of Breach
Hack/Browse Virus Nothing M
Organisational Sector
Academic 24.5% 27.5% 4% 10%
Commercial 26% 12.5% 10% 7.5%

















Severity of incident as a % of
very not very not at all varies N/A
6% 46% 27% 11%
7% 24% 37% 9%





Very Not very Not at all Varies
9% 44% 35% 12%
7% 43% 34% 16%
11% 33% 29% 27%
Number of incidents of categories as a %
of total incidents
0 1-5 640 10±
35.5% 36% 11% 17.5%
42% 31.5% 10% 16.5%
77.5% 4% 5% 13.5%
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Fig. 4k
View of security as a % of organisation type
Too strict Adequate Lax Varies Don't
Know
Organisation Type
Academic 1% 66% 24% 8% 1%
Commercial 1% 66% 27% 5% 1%
Other 0% 69% 26% 5% 0%
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Appendix 2 - Glossary of Terms and hacking case-studies
1. DEFINITIONS
2. THE GENERATIONS OF HACKERS
3. CASE-STUDIES
1. DEFINITIONS
The following defintions have been taken in large part from the
electronic "underground" publication FBI, Volume 1 Issue 2.
Trasher Someone who searches, usually at night, the trash bins of
companies for information that can help him/her make free/illegal
use of phone or computer systems. It may even involve credit card
numbers.
Crasher "This is a person who logs on to a system and causes it to
crash, making it unavailable until the sysop [system operator] gets on
and reboots the computer. These people can also access the
databases and files of the systeme, making all of it available to
himself."
Cracker A type of pirate who uses various, often ingenious,
programming methods to break the copyright protection schemes on
software that he and others may wish to use.
Computer Militant "This is a person who logs on to a bulletin bbs, or
mainframe with the sole intention of destroying it and all it's data.
These people have tremendous knowledge in the workings of a
computer, but are generally less knowledgeable than a hacker. Many
times these people are nothing more than disgruntled workers, or
ex-workers who are enacting their revenge on the company."
Phreaker "This is a person who is very much like a hacker. Instead
of attacking and learning about computers, he uses the phone lines as
a toy. These people are generally equal to, or superior to most of the
phone company itself in knowledge of the workings of a telephone
service."
Rodent A "wanna-be" hacker who brags more than he actually
accesses systems.
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Code Kidz " This is one of the most hated people in the phreaker
world. This is a person who acquires code to make long-distance
calls, and does not give anything in return. He then proceeds to give
the code to all his friends, and the code dies shortly thereafter."
Abuser An extreme form of a Code Kidz who incur extremely large
calling bills with stolen phone-card numbers. "These people are
hated by phreakers and the phone company alike. Neither abusers
or code kidz have any knowledge of the phone system.
Donn Parker's description of "Crimoids"1
Donn Parker, an American computer security consultant
defines a "crimoid" as an, "elegant, intellectually interesting method
of computer abuse that receives extensive coverage in the news
media...each crimoid illustrates the growing fragility of information
in our society."
In addition to conventional hacking, his list of crimoids includes the
following ...
i) Phone Phreaking
Illicit use of the phone system using imitation switching signals
emitted by a "blue box" to achieve free use. First became known of
in the 1970's and my research has shown it to be still occurring, one
of my interviews being conducted by means of it of a prototype
small touch-tone dialler which has come to replace the old, more
cumbersome blue-boxes.
ii) Salami Fraud
A particular type of fraud relying on the automating of the debiting
of small amounts of money from many accounts in large financial
systems, made feasible only with the advent of the computer.
iii) Electronic Letter Bomb
A trojan horse attack that utilises a programming weakness in
electronic mail messages. Discovered in 1979 by a group of
anonymous students at the University of Berkeley California and
publicised by a journalist in 1981.
1 Denning P. (ed.) (1990) Computers under Attack pp 544-554 ed.
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iv) Software Piracy
Illict copying of licensed software.
v) Radio Frequency Eavesdropping
The use of electronic equipment to pick up radio-frequency
emanations and hence "listen-in" to the display screen of the
computer under target.
vi) Interference
Taking over of a communication system and superimposing upon it
your own message.
Two extra, potential crimoids of the future Parker mentions are:
* Voice mail terrorism- Attacks upon voice-mail systems within
companies by phone-phreaks.
* Fax Graffitti- Saturation of company fax machines with obscene,
pornographic or simply bothersome fax messages.
2. THE GENERATIONS OF HACKERS
The advent of hackers occurred with the computer pioneers of
MIT described by Levy (1984).
The first generation - the "true hackers".
This first generation of hackers was responsible for the
development of the earliest software. Hackers perceived themselves
to be in opposition to a bureaucratic hierarchy that stifled their
ingenuity. The earliest computers were large mainframe computers.
Access to them was strictly controlled by laboratory technicians
nicknamed 'the priesthood' by what came to be known in their turn
as the 'mainframe' hackers. These hackers dedicated themselves,
within the confines of MIT, to reducing the power of the
'priesthood^' and superseding it with the hacker ethic.
The second generation - the "hardware hackers".
This generation were known as the hardware hackers because
of their major concern of liberalising access to computers from
2 The phrase was used to describe the white-coated computer lab technicians
that fed the early computers with the punch-cards containing the program
instructions.
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dependency upon mainframes through the mass dispersal of
personal computers. Their expertise resided more significantly in
the production of computer hardware than its software components.
This project involved aspects of the 60's and 70's hippie movements.
"Apple" Computers so derived its name, for example, because an
apple was seen as a symbol of natural purity and wholesomeness.
Freeing computing power so that it could be more widely available to
society at large was viewed as a political act.
The third generation - the "Game Hackers".
Levy categorises this generation as a representation of the
point at which "The Hacker Ethic had met the market place". (Levy
1984: 284). Within the third generation of hackers, such capitalist
tendencies sat uneasily with their previous non-profit making ideal
which emphasised the free flow of information devoid of proprietary
claims. "The Third Generation lived with compromises in the Hacker
ethic ... [they] never had the sense of community of their
predecessors, and early on they came to see healthy sales figures as
essential to becoming winners" (Levy 1984: 372).
As a result of this new found entrepreneurial spirit within
hacking, those programs which did promise to produce large sales
needed to be copy-protected. This led to the further compromising
of the Hacker Ethic by some hackers themselves: "Oddly, most
companies hired as copy-protection specialists the same kind of
young hacker who commonly spent hours figuring out
countermeasures to bust somebody else's protection routine." (Levy
1984: 374) This helped to produce the ambivalent situation
whereby hackers were being employed to implement methods which
endangered the Hacker Ethic.
3. CASE-STUDIES OF HACKING ACTIVITY
Maelstrom -case study of an American hacker
I started out hacking on a local Michigan network
which was then known as Merit Net. The first time I
entered a system, the thrilling rush was better than the
rush I get when finishing a program, so you can say I was
hooked on the first try. Although I have never been
caught phreaking, many of my friends have, so I made
the natural transition to safer ways fo dialing out, such as
using the PC-Persuit dialout modems directly accessible
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through lymnet's network user addresses. I also scanned
my local exchange and found a PBX I was able to use to
hide my tracks when calling out, thus avoiding traces.
I learnt to use the Michigan C/NA (Customer Name
and Address) bureau, which allowed me to dial up a
computer and, after entering a passcode, use touch tones
to get information on the owner of any Michigan
telephone number. Some of my friends from around the
world would start AT&T Alliance teleconferences every
so often, and we would talk throughout the night,
sometimes for as long as 12 hours at a shot (which was
probably not good for grades at school). On one
memorable conference Cellular Phantom demonstrated a
REMOB number (REMote OBservation) which allowed us
to listen in on any phone line in the country at will...I
learned quite a bit about how much privacy people
REALLY have as opposed to what they THINK they have.
In 1989 a local friend put up a world headquarters
BBS for the West German group Red Sector Inc.. They
were into writing Amiga demos, and were one of the top
ten groups in the world, which got us a lot of interesting
and well-known callers. We obtained a voice mailbox
and put up a codeline on it, which was very popular for a
long time. RSI made me an offer: if I would give them
stolen AT&T calling card numbers to enable them to call
the USA, they give me all the hardware I needed to have
the ultimate computer system. I was offered computers,
high speed modems, hard drives, and software...the only
catch was their method. Using CBI or TRW's computer,
some people use credit card numbers to steal
merchandise, and by having stolen stuff sent to West
Germany, they were able to escape detection when the
theft was discovered since the post office there didn't
keep records. This was against my morals, and I dropped
out of the scene for a while.
Now I spend most of my time here at the college
learning VMS on my legal accounts. I still have fun
getting into computers on other campuses, but I don't
really have the time I did before I started college. Many
of my close friends have gone to jail or have quit the
scene, so the inspiration to come up with neat hacks has
also died down a little... (E-mail interview).
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Trashing
Personally, in those days, I would go through the
wastebaskets in the Michigan State University computer
centre. By comparing punched cards, I could scope out
the username, account number and password. SMITH,
AC5609, ROBBUE SMITG SMITH, AC5609, ROBBIW and so
on, would allow me to go to a VDT and log on as Robbie
Smith. From there, I would use help and try out the
commands that sounded interesting. I even used my own
real money later to pay for my access time. But I learned
to use the Hustler Operating System created by MSU for
their DCD6500 as a hacker. In the summer of 1990, my
account at Lansing Community College was closed for
hacking. I had tried the user/password routine on many
accounts and found five or six inactive accounts this way.
I used them to store textfiles such as library literature
searches and so on. While my account was closed down, I
used the "sense of the system" I had developed to
continue working (E-mail interview).
Eric Coggans - aka - "Eric Bloodaxe"
All the hacking activity he refers to is in the past and he has
had, and concluded, dealings with the U.S. Secret Service. This
meant that he showed a willingness to discuss these issues not
readily found elsewhere to the same level of direct experience:
I have been active in the Computer Underground since
approximately 1982. I have used the handle Erik
Bloodaxe since that time. In 1984 I was asked to join a
hacker group being formed called the Legion of Doom.
This group would go on to become the most
feared/respected/misunderstood entity in the history of
the American computer underground. My own
involvement with the Legion of Doom recently (March
1990) led to a raid of my home by the Secret Service. My
desire as a hacker has always been to learn everything
about every system so that in the future I could stand as
one of the unquestionable experts in the field of
computer security. I feel I am pretty damn close to that
at this point. I plan on going into business in the near
future as part of a computer security consultancy firm...
[This in fact happened in and the firm is
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named ComSec, reference...] I have been in more
systems than one can imagine, ranging from military
installations, financial installations, to soda companies. I
have seen insider-trading information, had access to
transferable funds, had the ability to manipulate credit
information, and have had complete control over phone
networks. Throughout my entire "career" as a hacker I
have never used any system for personal gain of any
kind, nor have I ever been the cause of any loss or
destruction of data. I have never seen a virus, nor have I
ever had one on any system I have owned...Hacking
started out as mischievous curiosity. I wanted to see
things that were hidden from my view. As I opened
more doorways and became exposed to more and more
information and the power that computers wield over
everyday life I began to fall prey to the power that
comes with the knowledge that once you control the
computers you control the world. I outgrew that and
now I basically hack because it is a habit that is
incredibly hard to break. Much like a junkie in need of a
fix, I find my self turning on the computer and digging
around without even thinking. I've been hacking for half
of my life. I challenge anyone to try to stop doing
something that they have enjoyed for half of their life.
"Adlacv" - Irish hacker
I cracked an ICL 39 series level 80 running GMAC. It was
a new computer in college with less security than a Unix.
It was easy partly due to an admin thing of having a
standard type of no. for passwords and also very much
due to the way the OS (operating system) was set up. I
ended up with many Megabytes of extra space, many
class projects for the next four years of college and a
warning never to do it again. I got caught for printing
out all I had access to. It was rather large...it was stopped
after a boxful of paper.
I didn't think college would take it so seriously.
There was a threat of kicking me out of college (to scare
me into never doing it again I'd imagine). I also had to
pay for the box of paper. Funnily enough, I would'nt
hack now. In fact I've been given many opportunities
since, and haven't taken up on them.
318
Everyone else heard about it. They also heard that
I might be kicked out of college, and that I got a summer
job as a result of it.
319
References
Barlow, John Perry "Crime and Puzzlement", Whole Earth Review.
Fall 1990, p. 44-57.
Bequai, August. (1987) Technocrimes. Lexington (Mass): Lexington,
USA.
Bijker, Wiebe E., Hughes, Tom and Pinch, Trevor (eds.). (1987) The
Social Construction of Technological Systems. MIT Press.
Bijker, Wiebe E., (1993) "Do not Despair: There is life after
Constructivism" Science. Technololgv. & Human Values. Vol 18 No.l,
Winter 1993, p. 113-138.
Bijker Wiebe E., and Law, John (eds). (1992) Shaping
Technology/Building Society: Studies in Sociotechnical Change. MIT
Press.
Bloombecker, Buck. (1990) Spectacular Computer Crimes. Ilinois USA,
Dow Jones-Irwin.
Borden, Elizabeth. "Sexism and the CU" Computer Underground Digest.
Vol. 3.00 file 4.
Bowcott, Owen and Hamilton, Sally. (1990) Beating the System.
London, Bloomsbury.
Bowcott, Owen. "Hacking and the Bedworth Syndrome", The Guardian.
(Review Section:19), Thursday, April 1, 1993.
Brady, Tim. (1988) "Crisis What Crisis?", Paper prepared for the PICT
Software Workshop, UMIST 18-19 July 1988.
Brunner, John. (1969) The Shockwave Rider. New York: Ballantine.
Callon M. and Latour B. (1981) "Unscrewing the Big Leviathan: How
Actors Macro-Structure Reality and How Sociologists Help Them Do
It." In Knorr-Cetina K. and A. Cicourel (eds.) Advances in Social
Theory and Methodology: Towards an Integration of Micro and Macro
Sociologies. Routledge, London, p. 277-303.
320
Carr, Edward. "Elemental Issues", Micro Decision , June 1990, p. 30-
31.
Clough, Bryan and Mungo, Paul. (1992) Approaching Zero: Data Crime
and the Computer Underworld. London, Faber and Faber.
The Dark Adept. "The Hermetic Underground", Computer
Underground Digest. Vol. 2.15, File 7 of 7.
De Lacy, Justine. "The Sexy Computer", in Computers in the Human
Context. Forester, Tom (ed.). (1989) Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
Denning, Dorothy E. (1990) "Concerning Hackers Who Break into
Computer Systems." Paper presented at the National Computer
Security Conference, Washington, D.C., October 1-4 1990, p. 653-664.
Denning, Peter J. (ed). (1990) Computers Under Attack: Intruders.
Worms and Viruses. ACM Press and Addison-Wesley.
Doctor Crash. (1986) "The Techno-Revolution", Phrack, 1 (6): Phile 3.
Dougan, William and Gieryn, Thomas. (1990), "Robert Morris: Worm?
Virus? Hero?", Unpublished paper, Sociology Departments of UCLA
and Indiana Universities.
Dunlop, Charles and Kling, Rob (eds.). (1992) Computerization and
Controversy: Value Conflicts and Social Choices. Boston, Academic
Press.
Elliot, Christopher and Mackay, Angela. (1993) "Everyone pays a high
price to beat hackers", The Times, p. 5.
Forester, Tom and Morrison, Perry. (1990) Computer Ethics:
Cautionary Tales and Ethical Dilemmas in Computing. MIT Press.
Gibson, William. (1984) Neuromancer. London, Grafton.
Gibson, William. (1986) Burning Chrome. London, Grafton.
Gibson, William. (1987) Count Zero. London, Grafton.
321
Gibson, William. (1988) Mona Lisa Overdrive. London, Grafton.
Gold, Steve. "Computer Security", Micro Decision. June 1990, p. 47-
61.
Goldstein, Emmanuel. "Response to Telecom Digest's views Computer
Underground Digest. Vol.1:13, July 1990.
Goldstein, Emmanuel. "Hacker testimony to House Subcommittee
largely unheard", Computer Underground Digest. Vol 5:43.
Goodwins, Rupert. (1993) "Motley bunch hack at the end of
universe", The Independent. Friday 13 August, p.ll.
Haffner Kate, and Markoff John. (1991) Cvberpunk: Outlaws and
Hackers on the Computer Frontier. London, Fourth Estate.
Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, Standing Committee C, Wednesday
28 March, 1990.
Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 9th Feb, 1990.
Haraway, Donna. (1985) "A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science,
Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the 1980's", Socialist Review.
no 80, p. 40-55.
Harris, Gillian. (1993) "Computer hacking 'addict' is cleared of
conspiracy", The Scotsman. Thursday March 18, p. 1.
Harris, Gillian. (1993) "Daring data raider dependent on hacking fix",
The Scotsman. Thursday 18 March, pg 3.
Holloway, John and Pelaez, Eloina. "Learning to Bow: Post Fordism
and Technological Determinism" Unpublished and undated paper,
Edinburgh Unversity.
Hollinger, Richard C. and Lanza-Kaduce, Lonn. (1988) "The Process of
Criminalization: The Case of Computer Crime Laws." Criminology. Vol
26, No.l, p. 101-126.
Independent editorial (1993) "Odd addiction, perverse verdict",
Thursday March 18, p. 25.
322
Johnson, Bob. "What the Laws enforce" RISKS 11.32, March 1991.
Johnston, M. and Wood D. (1985) Right and Wrong in Public and
Private Life. Gower, U.K.
Kane, Alan and Mason, John. (1993) "When hacking turns into an
obsession", Financial Times. Thursday 18 March, p. 7.
Kane, Pamela. (1989) V.I.R.U.S. Protection: Vital Information
Resources Under Siege. Bantam, New York.
Keller, Laurie S. (1988) "Machismo and the Hacker Mentality: Some
personal observations and speculations". Paper presented to WiC
(Women in Computing) Conference, p. 57-60.
Koestler, Arthur. (1967) The Ghost in the Machine. London,
Hutchinson.
Landreth, Bill. (1985) Out of The Inner Circle. Washington, USA,
Microsoft Press.
Latour, Bruno. (1986) "How to Write The Prince' For Machines As
Well As For Machinations". Working Paper, Edinburgh University
Seminar, June 1986.
Latour Bruno. (1981) "Give me a Laboratory and I Will Raise The
World" in Knorr-Cetina K.D. and Mulkay M. (eds.), Science Observed.
London, Sage, p. 293-321.
Laughlin, Chet. "What the Laws enforce Debate", RISKS 11.34, March
1991.
Levy, Stephen. (1984) Hackers: Heroes of the Computer Revolution.
New York, Bantam Doubleday Dell.
Lundell, Allan. (1989) Virus! The Secret World of Computer
Invaders that Breed and Destroy. Chicago, Contemporary Books.
Lynas, Mark. (1993) "Mother Tells of Hacker's Addiction", Edinbugh
University Student Newspaper, p. 1.
323
MacKenzie, Donald and Wajcman J. (eds.). (1985) The Social Shaping
of Technology. Milton Keynes, Open University Press.
Marcuse, Herbert. (1964) One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the
Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society. Boston, Beacon Press.
Matthews, Dave "A Bug in the Machine" The Sunday Correspondent.
17th December 1989, p. 37-41.
The Mentor. "The Conscience of a Hacker" Phrack. Vol 1 Issue 7,
phile 3 of 10.
Metcalfe, Stanley. (1986) New Electronic Information Services: An
Overview of the U.K. Database Industry in an International Context.
London, Aldershot Gower.
Meyer, Gordon R. (1989) "The Social Organisation of the Computer
Underground", Unpublished Masters Thesis, Northern Illinois
University.
Meyer Gordon R., and Thomas, Jim. (1989) "Baudy World of the Byte
Bandit: a post-modernist interpretation of the CU", paper presented
at the American Society of Criminology annual meetings. Reno,
November 1989.
Meyer Gordon R. and Thomas, Jim. (1990) "(Witch)Hunting for the
Computer Underground: Joe McCarthy in a Leisure Suit", The Critical
Criminologist. 2nd September 1990, p. 225-253.
Michalowski, Raymond and Pfuhl, Edmund. "Technology, Property,
and Law: The Case of Computer Crime", Contemporary Crisis. 1990, p.
250-283.
Molina, Alfonso. (1989) The Social Basis of the MicroElectronics
Revolution. Edinburgh University Press.
Molina, Alfonso. (1989 a) The Transputer Constituency: Building up
U.K./European Capabilities in Information Technology. Edinburgh
University PICT Research Report Series No.l 1989.
Mungo, Paul. (1991) "Satanic Viruses", Gentlemen's Quarterly. Feb.
1991, Issue 20 (British Edition), p. 126-130.
324
Mumford, L. (1970) The Mvth of the Machine: The Pentagon of
Power. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York.
Nuttall, Nick. (1993) "Healthy hobby that becomes obsession", The
Times. Thursday March 18 1993, p. 5.
Parrish Jr., Edward. "Hacking is a crime, Pure and Simple", Phrack
Vol 2, Iss 24, Feb 1989.
Pelaez, Eloina. (1988) "A Gift from Pandora's Box: The Software Crisis"
PhD Thesis, Edinburgh University.
Pelaez, Eloina. (1990) "Soft Ware", Paper for the workshop on Social
Perspectives of Software. Oxford, January 1990.
Phillips, Martin. (1993) "Computers Turned My Boy Into A Robot",
Daily Mirror. Thursday March 18 1993, p. 1+4.
Pinch, Trevor and Bijker, Wiebe E. (1984) "The Social Construction of
Facts and Artefacts: or How the Sociology of Science and the Sociology
of Technology might Benefit Each Other." Social Studies of Science.
Vol.14, p. 399-441.
Pithers, Malcom and Watts, Susan. (1993) "Hacker penetrated MoD",
The Independent. Tuesday 18 March 1993, p. 1.
Rasmussen, Bente and Hapnes, Tove. (1991) "Excluding Women From
the Technologies of the Future? A case study of the culture of
computer science", Futures. December 1991.
Ross, Andrew. (1991) Strange Weather. Verso.
Roszak, Theodore. (1986) The Cult of Information: The Folklore of
Computers and the True Art of Thinking. Cambridge U.K.,
Lutterworth Press.
Russel, Stewart and Williams, Robin. (1988) Opening the Black Box
and Closing it Behind You: On Micro-Sociology in the Social Analysis
of Technology. Edinburgh University PICT Working Paper Series.
325
Saffo, Paul. (1989) "What is Cyberspace?" Communications of the
ACM. Vol. 32, no.6 p. 664-665.
Schell, Roger R. (1979) "Computer Security: the Achilles' heel of the
electronic Air Force?" Air University Review. January-February, Vol.
XXX No.2 p. 16-33.
Shallis, Michael. (1984) The Silicon Idol: The Micro-revoloution and
its Social Implications. U.K., Oxford University Press.
Shotton, Margaret A. (1989) Computer Addiction? A Study of
Computer Dependency. London, Taylor and Francis.
Silicon Surfer. "Playgrounds of the Mind: Cyberspace", Computer
Underground Digest. Vol. 2:17.
Spafford Eugene H. (1990) "Are Computer Hacker Break-Ins Ethical?"
Purdue University Technical Report. CSD-TR-994.
Spafford Eugene H. (1991) "Three Letters On Computer Security and
Society", Purdue University Technical Report. CSD-TR-91-088.
Spertus, Ellen. (1991) "Why are There so Few Female Computer
Scientists?" Unpublished paper, MIT.
Stallman, Richard. (1985) "The GNU Manifesto", Cambridge, USA, Free
Software Foundation.
Steele, Kate. (1988) "The Social Construction of the Software Crisis",
unpublished work placement report, The Centre for Research into
Innovation Culture and Technology, Brunei University.
Sterling, Bruce (ed.). (1988) Mirrorshades: The Cvberpunk anthology.
London, Paladin.
Sterling, Bruce. (1993) The Hacker Crackdown. London, Viking.
Stockfield, Bob. (1991) "Why the Legion of Doom has little to fear
from the Feds", Business Week , April 22, 1991, p. 62..
Stoll, Clifford. (1989) The Cuckoo's Egg: Tracking a Spy through the
Maze of Computer Espionage. New York, Double Day.
326
Thomas, Jim. (1990) "Review of the Cuckoo's Egg" CuD Vol 1.06, File 4
of 5.
Thomas, Jim. "EFF Response to the Atlanta sentencing", Vol. 2.07,
Computer Underground Digest.
Thompson, Ken. (1984) "Reflections on Trusting Trust",
Communications of the ACM. Vol 27, No.8., p. 761-763.
Toxic Shock Group. "The Evil That Hackers Do" Computer
Underground Digest. Vol. 2.06: File 4 of 5.
Turkle, Sherry. (1984) The Second Self: Computers and the Human
Spirit. London, Granada.
Uitenbrauer, F. "Computer Abuse Proposal Gives Police Lot of Room
for Discretion" (translation of title), NRC Handelsbad (Amsterdam) 23
April, 1991.
Vallee, Jacques. (1984) The Network Revolution: Confessions of a
Computer Scientist. London, Penguin Books.
Vinten, Gerald. (1990) "The Criminalisation of Hacking: A Boon To
Computer Security?" Unpublished Paper, The City University
Business School, London.
Watts, Susan. (1993) "Trial haunted by life in the twilight zone", The
Times. Thursday March 18 1993, p. 4.
Weizenbaum, Joseph. (1976) Computer Power and Human Reason.
San Francisco, Freeman.
Winner, Langdon. (1971) Autonomous Technology. MIT Press.
Woolgar, Steve and Russell, Geoff. (1990) "The Social Basis of
Computer Viruses", Brunei University, CRICT Discussion Paper.




Computer Underground Digest. Vols. 1-5: 1990-1993.
RISKS Digest. 1990-1993.
List of Interviews
Hikers - Face-to-face interviews





"The Zoetermeer Gang" (4 people)
Phone interview
Dutch Hacking-Magazine




The 'Prestel hacker', Managing
Director of TKK Computer Security
Ltd.
Dutch University Hacking Group
























Ex- "Legion of Doom member"
President of the French Computer
Chaos Club


















































Penn state university, USA
Purdue University, Indiana, USA







TSB National Computer Security
Division, Wilmslow
330
Dr Taylor Computer Security Consultant and
Ex-chairman of the British
Computer Security Commitee
Bernard Tozer Computer Security Consultant and
member of the British Computer
Security Commitee
J. C. Van Winkle Dutch Software Engineer
E-mail
Fred Cohen Researcher and Creator of
1st documented virus







































Tardis - "Time Lord"






Co-founder of the Electronic
Frontier Foundation, lyricist for
the Grateful Dead
USA journalist (researcher for
Geraldo programme)
President of the "Free Software
Foundation
Author of The Cuckoo's Egg
332
List of Abbreviations
ACM Association for Computing Machinery
BCSSC British Computer Society Security Committee
CMC Computer Mediated Communciation
CS I Computer Security Industry
CU Computer Underground
CuD Computer Underground Digest
I T Information technology
NCC National Computing Centre
N S A National Security Agency
333
